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Memorandum 12-8-58E
NASA REACTOR FACILITY HAZARDS SUMMARY
by Lewis Research Center Staff
SUMMARY
The Lewis Research Center of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration proposes to build a nuclear research reactor which will
be located in the Plum Brook Ordnance Works near Sandusky, Ohio. The
purpose of this report is to inform the Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission in regard to the design
of the reactor facility, the characteristics of the site, and the haz-
ards of operation at this location.
The purpose of this research reactor is to make pumped loop studies
of aircraft reactor fuel elements and other reactor components_ radiation
effects studies on aircraft reactor materials and equipment, shielding
studies_ and nuclear and solid state physics experiments.
The reactor is light water cooled and moderated of the 51I_-type
with a primary berylliumreflector and a secondary water reflector.
The core initially will be a _ by 9 array of M_R-type fuel elements and
is designed for operation up to a power of 60 megawatts.
The reactor facility is described in general terms. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion of the nuclear characteristics and performance of
the reactor. Then details of the reactor control system are discussed.
A summary of the site characteristics is then presented followed by a
discussion of the larger type of experiments which may eventually be
operated in this facility. The considerations for normal operation are
concluded with a proposed method of handling fuel elements and radio-
active wastes.
The potential hazards involved with failures or malfunctions of
this facility are considered in some detail. These are examined first
from the standpoint of preventing them or minimizing their effects and
second from the standpoint of what effect they might have on the reactor
facility staff and the surrounding population. The most essential fea-
ture of the design for location at the proposed site is containment of
the maximum credible accident.
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SECTION I. - INTRODUCTION
The NACA has found it essential in the development of a propulsion
system that the programs on the various components of a given system be
closely coordinated. It has been severely limited in the nuclear pro-
pulsion systems field by the lack of a facility for investigating the
reactor. Since 1951_ studies have been made of the kind of a facility
needed. In 1955 the NACA obtained funds from Congress to build this
facility.
The development of an aircraft reactor that will give the perform-
ance required for high speed aircraft is hampered by two important
factors.
i. Currently known reactor materials are inadequate at the
high operating temperatures needed to give the high thrust per
unit of powerplant weight required for supersonic aircraft.
2. The high shield weights associated with current reactor
designs make for excessively heavy aircraft.
The continuous competition among nations for higher aircraft speeds pro-
vides a continuing demand for better materials and better configurations
for the reactor and the shield. Refinement in materials and design are
justified for the aircraft application beyond the needs of any other
known application of nuclear energy. Hence_ continuing research for
better reactor and shield materials and configurations is essential.
The need to save shield weight has led to configurations in which air-
craft equipment_ fluids_ and structure are exposed to radiation damage_
and an extensive research program on this subject is required.
The primary objective of the proposed facility is to provide the
means for making the various types of investigations needed to assist
the development of the aircraft reactor. These include:
a. Pumped loop studies of the performance and behavior of fuel
elements and other reactor components at coolant flow; heat flow_
neutron flux; and temperature conditions of interest for aircraft
reactors.
b. Effects of radiation on reactor materials and the inter-
action between reactor materials.
c. Effect of radiation on aircraft structure; fluids; and
equipment.
d. Shield studies.
e. Nuclear physics and solid state physics experiments per-
tinent to the development of the aircraft reactor.
4For realistic evaluation, materials and configurations must be in-
vestigated under conditions closely simulatizg the conditions desired
in the aircraft reactor. Under these conditions failures of experimen-
tal componentscan be expected on a routine basis. The rate of progress
of the aircraft development will depend on the speed with which experi-
ments can be made. Hence, the facility must be designed to expedite the
removal of highly radioactive test objects, and with provisions to min-
imize hazard or delay in operation from failure of a test object. To
insure safety, containment of all radioactive solids 3 liquids, and gases
developed during normal operation and in accidents must be provided.
The pumpedloop experiments are of particular importance to the
aircraft program and special attention was g_ven in the facility design
to reduce the cost_ complication, and handling problems associated with
these experiments.
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Pumped loops can be very costly, and can require much time for de-
velopment and construction, if their elements must fit into a restricted
space, such as a reactor test hole. The shielding plugs for the loops
are likewise expensive and introduce complication. An attempt is made
in the present design to eliminate the need for shielding plugs and to
provide sufficient space near the test area to permit the use of more
conventional types of pumps# motors_ etc. for loop components.
These objectives are attained in the proposed facility by the fol-
lowing design features: The reactor is proviled with only sufficient
solid shield for the reactor shutdown period. The remainder of the
shielding for the test period is provided by a pool of water that sur-
rounds the solid shield. The water covers anl provides shielding also
for the pumped loop equipment which resides ia the water tank. Because
the solid shield is thin, the pumping and other loop equipment can be
close coupled to the test unit and the shielding plug is eliminated.
During removal of the experiment_ a continuous water shielded channel
is provided to the storage and hot cell areas so that irradiated experi-
ments can be handled without coffins.
Pumped loop experiments often require that an appreciable length of
the loop reside in a region of uniform flux. This is achieved by locat-
ing the test holes for pumped loops parallel to the long faces of the
reactor and close to these faces.
In a further effort to simplify the handling of experiments# pro-
vision is made for easy access from the reactor top to test holes in
the fuel element and reflector lattice. This is implemented by location
of the control rod actuating mechanism at the bottom of the reactor.
Experiments in these test holes can be removel to the storage and hot
cell areas through a chute which communicates with the pool system.
OI
For shielding experiments a large test hole is provided which can
be filled with graphite to form a thermal neutron column. This hole
can also be used for irradiation studies of large pieces of aircraft
equipment. A number of small beam holes are provided which permit
neutron beams to emerge into a physics test area.
In an effort to achieve good coordination of the reactor research
with programs on the other propulsion systems components 3 a location
for the facility was sought which combined adequate isolation with
reasonable distance from Cleveland. By being located close to the Lewis
laboratory_ the proposed facility would also have the benefit of con-
sultation service of a large staff of specialists in metallurgy_ heat
transfer_ thermodynamics, stress analysis 3 fluid mechanics, physics, and
chemistry_ and convenient use of the extensive shop and computing facil-
ities 3 and purchase and administrative services.
The Plum Brook Ordnance Works which was chosen for the reactor site
is a 6500 acre plot fenced in and guarded. The reactor facility is lo-
cated 3000 feet from the closest border of the site 3 three miles from
Sandusky 3 a city of 303000 people_ and 50 miles from the Lewis laboratory.
Special effort is made in the facility design to provide for containment
of radioactive gases 3 liquids_ and solids generated either in normal oper-
ation or in accidents. In particular 3 complete containment of Borax-type
explosions was provided.
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SECTION 2. - THE REACTOR FACILITY
The reactor facility is described in section 2.1. The nuclear and
engineering characteristics are then described in section 2.2 and final-
ly the control system and the kinetic behavior of the reactor with its
control system are described in sections 2.3 and 2.4.
A more detailed discussion of the site_ the experiments_ the hazards
involved with the reactor facility and its experiments_ and the adminis-
trative organization is contained in the following sections.
2.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF FACILITY
This section of the report presents a general description of the
proposed NACA Research Reactor Facility. The material presented is in-
tended primarily for orientation purposes. More detailed discussion of
the safety and hazard problems associated with some of the important com-
ponents is contained in subsequent sections of the report.
2.1.1 Location of Facility
Figure 2.1 is a map illustrating the location of the proposed site
for the facility relative to Cleveland and Sandusky_ Ohio. The facility
will be located approximately 50 miles west of Cleveland and 3 miles south-
southeast of Sandusky, a city of approximately 30,000 population. The
NACA site lies in the north section of the Plum Brook Ordnance Works as
illustrated in figure 2.2. It includes an area of approximately 500
acres_ and the facility will be located in the south-central section of
this area. Figure 2.3 is an enlarged map of the NACA site, and illus-
trates the location of the reactor and supporting facilities. Figure 2.4
is a plan view showing the relative locations of the various structures
included in the facility. Figure 2.5 is a perspective drawing of the fa-
cility_ and figure 2.6 is an artist's conception o'f the main building
which houses the reactor.
The function of each of the structures shown in figure 2.4 (referred
to by the letters on the figure) is as follows:
A. Main building which houses the reactor.
B. East wing of the reactor building. It houses pumps 3 heat ex-
changers_ degasser_ and ion-exchanger for the main primary water system.
C. South wing of the reactor building. It contains the hot labor-
atory for handling of radioactive equipment, materials 3 and experiments.
D. West wing of the reactor building. It contains office and labor-
atory space.
E. A building which houses the ventil_,ing fans for the facility.
The exhaust stack is adjacent to the southeast corner of this building.
F. Four hot retention basins for storage of radioactive water from
the facility.
G. This building houses electrical control equipment for the primary
pumphouse, B.
H. Overhead storage tank for processed water.
J. Overhead storage tank for deionized water.
K. Cooling tower.
L. A service building which contains softening, filtering, and de-
ionizing equipment for raw water. It also _ouses air compressors, and
the diesel-generators for emergencyelectrical power. The secondary water
pumpsare located adjacent to the north wall of this building.
M. A substation for incoming electrical power.
N. A concrete retention basin for storage of uncontaminated water.
P. An earthen reservoir for emergencystorage of water.
Q. A utility building for general storsge purposes.
2.1.2 Reactor
The reactor core is essentially a modified version of that of the
Materials Testing Reactor now in operation st the National Reactor Test-
ing Station 3 Arco 3 Idaho. The active lattice is made up of individual
fuel elements of the MTR type. A detailed drawing of a tentative design
of one fuel element is shown in figure 2.7. The elements consists of as-
semblies of flat_ aluminum clad, plates of an aluminum-enriched uranium
alloy and suitable supporting structure. There are 18 plates per element.
Sixteen plates are 0.06 inch thick, and the two end plates are at present
length is 24_ inches. The spacing between plates0.065 inch thick. Their
is 0.115 inch. The assembled fuel element, including top and bottom sup-
structure, measures 2.995 by 3.145 b/ 42_ inches. The fuel ele-porting
ments are cooled by demineralized light water which also serves as a re-
actor moderator. The reactor core has a primary reflector of beryllium,
and a secondary reflector of light water.
oc_
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The reactor core is illustrated in figures 2.8(a) and (b). In the
initial core loading the fuel elements are arranged in a 3- by 9-element
array in a 4 by Ii grid as shown in figure 2.$(a). Positions in the 4
by II lattice are identified as follows: There are four columns LA_ LB_
LCj and LD. In each column are eleven rows. Thus_ lattice positions are
identified by LA-I_ LB-6_ etc. Fuel elements_ indicated by the letter F_
occupy positions LB-2 to LB-10_ LD-2 to LD-10_ and LC-3_ LC-Sj LC-7_ and
LC-9. The grid spaces marked C represent control rod positions_ and i0
such positions are indicated. The remaining grid spaces_ indicated by
the letter R_ are occupied by beryllium primary reflector pieces. The 4
by ii grid is enclosed by a box which extends the full height of the core.
The sides are of one inch thick beryllium_ and the ends are of aluminum.
On the south side of the 4 by ii lattice (fig. 2.8(a)) is a 4 by 8
grid of beryllium blocks which surround one of the horizontal test holes
(described later) to improve the flux distribution in it. The positions
of these blocks are identified by columns RA_ RB_ RC_ and RD_ and rows I
to 8. This grid is enclosed on three sides by aluminum_ and on the side
adjacent to the 4 by ii lattice_ by beryllium.
Cooling of the reactor is accomplished in two passes. Water flows
upward in the secondary region around the ¢ by II lattice and downward
through the fuel elements and primary reflector pieces in the lattice.
Water flow in the _ by 8 reflector grid is upward through cooling holes
in the beryllium blocks.
2.1.3 Control Rods
There are five control rod positions in the active lattice and five
in the beryllium reflector as is indicated by the letter C in figure
2.S(a). Shim-safety rods occupy all five positions in the core_ and the
three central positions in the reflector. Positions LA-2 and LA-IO in
the reflector are occupied by regulating rods_ only one of which will be
used at a time. All control rods enter the reactor from below. The up-
per ends of the shim-safety rods contain cadmium. Below the cadmium are
fueled sections for the rods in the active lattice and beryllium sections
for the rods in the reflector. As poison is removed from the core or
reflector_ fuel or beryllium is inserted.
The control system is discussed in detail in section 2.3.
2.1.4 Reactor Pressure Tank
The reactor is mounted in a vertical_ cylindricalj stainless steel
clad pressure tank as illustrated in figures 2.9(a), (b), and (c). Fig-
ure 2.10 is a cutaway perspective of the reactor and pressure tank. The
tank is 9 feet in diameter_ and has an over-all height of about 32 feet.
I0
The top of the tank is at approximately grad_ level. The center of the
reactor core is 21 feet below grade. The imrer end of the tank is hemi-
spherical in shape3 and the upper end is elliptical. The upper end is
flanged so that it can be removed. A hatch _s also provided to facilitate
changing fuel elements and inserting or withdrawing experiments.
Tentatively 3 three concentric stainless steel clad rings located
within the tank_ and extending above and belcw the reactor core3 will
serve as thermal shields.
The reactor is supported from the lower end of the tank wall by a
stainless steel structure which also serves Co separate the inlet and out-
let cooling water. This structure also supports the entire control rod
assembly3 and absorbs shock loads resulting from deceleration of the con-
trol rods in their respective shock absorbers whenthe reactor is scrammed.
The support is circular at its base and changes to a rectangular shape3
the size of the reactor grid_ at its upper end.
A drilled plate 3 extending radially fro_ the lower reactor grid to
the inner thermal shield ring_ serves to meter and control distribution
of water flow outside the lattice.
The cooling 3 and moderating3 water enters the tank at the side 3 just
below the lower level of the reactor. It flows upward through the re-
flector 3 and the thermal shield rings 3 and downwardin the aluminum-
beryllium box enclosing the 4 by ii reactor lattice. After passing down-
ward through the reactor supporting structure the water is discharged near
the bottom of the tank.
Six horizontally positioned instrumentation tubes enter the pressure
tank just below the reactor core (fig. 2.9(a)) and are positioned around
the periphery of the tank. Four additional t lbes_ inclined downward
toward the core_ are located just above the a_tive lattice. The inner
I
diameters of the lower and upper tubes are ii_ and 9_ inches respectively.
Four additional tubes_ to be used for fission chambersand other instru-
mentation_ enter the tank from near the botton. They have an inner diam-
eter of four inches_ and are inclined slightl/ from the vertical 3 termi-
nating just below the reactor core (fig. 2.9(_)).
Fuel elements are removedfrom the react,_r pressure vessel through
a discharge chute located just above the reactor core (fig. 2.9(b)).
2.1.5 Test Holes
The locations of the various test holes_ with respect to the reactor
core3 are shownin figures 2.8, 2.93 and 2.10_
r
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2.1.5.1 Horizontal through holes. - Two horizontal test holes (des-
ignated HT-I and HT-2) lie parallel to the long horizontal axis of the
core. HT-I is on the south side of the core_ and HT-2 is on the north.
The walls of these holes are aluminum tubes, or thimbles_ both ends of
which penetrate the pressure tank wall. For the initial installation
both thimbles have an inner diameter of 9 inches and a wall thickness of
1/2 inch. The centerlines of HT-I and HT-2 are i inch and 41_ inches 3
respectively below the core center. Test hole HT-I is separated from the
active lattice by the i inch beryllium wall of the box surrounding the
core. HT-2 is further separated by the beryllium reflector pieces.
The 9 inch I.D. aluminum thimbles penetrate the tank wall through
I
13_ inch I.D. pipes_ or liners 3 welded to the pressure tank on their in-
ner ends_ and provided with flanges on the outer ends. The method of
connecting the thimbles and liners outside the pressure tank is sho_ in
figure 2.11(a). A bellows type expansion joint is provided on each thim-
ble to allow for thermal expansion.
As will be described later_ it is proposed that experiments will be
enclosed in containment tubes for insertion into the test holes. A re-
motely operable sealing mechanism is therefore provided to seal the clear-
ance space_ between the test hole wall and the tube containing the experi-
ment_ from water in the shielding pool surrounding the reactor. Connec-
tions are provided so that water_ at high velocity_ can be bypassed from
the primary water systemj through the annular clearance space_ to remove
the heat lost from the experiment in the thimble.
The spaces between the 9 inch aluminum thimbles and the 13.5 inch
liners are filled by removable steel sleeves. For the initial installa-
tion the thimbles are horizontally eccentric with the liners. This ar-
rangement permits test holes up to 12 inches in diameter to be used_ if
desired_ at a later date. With 12 inch test holes the steel sleeves
would be eliminated and the test hole thimble and liner would be con-
centric. The test holes would again lie close to the reactor core. Pro-
vision is made for cooling the steel sleeves by bypassing water grom the
primary system around their inner and outer peripheries.
2.1.5.2 Horizontal beam holes. - There are three horizontal 6 inch
I.D. test holes which terminate at the north face of the reactor. These
holes, designated H-B-I_ HB-2_ and HB-3 are located above HT-2. Their
Ii
centerlines lie in a horizontal plane 6_ inches above the center of the
i
reactor. The thimbles penetrate the pressure tank walls through 9_ inch
I.D. lines in a manner similar to that for the horizontal through holes.
Details of a typical beam hole are shown in figure 2.11(b). It is possi-
ble to increase these holes to 8 inches I.D._ if desired_ by removing the
12
steel sleeves between the aluminumthimbles and the liners. As for the
through holes 3 remotely operable seals will be provided. Provision is
again madefor cooling inside the aluminumthimbles 3 and around the steel
sleeves3 by bypassing water from the primary system.
2.1.5.5 Thermal column. - Provision is made for a thermal column
(designated TC) on the same side of the core as HT-I. A 41-inch diameter
pipe penetrates the tank wall. The thermal column is inside this pipe
and terminates one inch from the beryllium blocks surrounding HT-I. Be-
sides being used as a thermal column this opening can be adapted to shield
studies or to irradiation studies of relatively large bodies 3 such as
pieces of electronic equipment. A drawing of the thermal column is shown
in figure 2.Ii(c).
2.1.5.4 Vertical test holes. - Two 8 inch I.D. vertical test holes3
designated V-I and V-2 are provided 3 one at e_ch end of the core. The
walls of these holes are aluminum tubes which penetrate the top cover of
the reactor tank and terminate near the botton of the core. They are
closed at the lower end.
A series of 28 holes 3 each 5 inches in d[ameter_ are also provided
in the beryllium blocks (RA through RD) above HT-I.
It is also possible to remove the control rod from position LC-6 in
the reactor core 3 so that this space can be m_de available as a test hole.
2.1.5.5 Rabbit rubes. - Two pneumatic r_)bit tubes_ designated RP-I
and RP-2 in figure 2.83 are provided. The c_'rier tubes are 5/4 inch
I.D. and pass the core horizontally and parallel to HT-2. One is located
below HT-2 and the other just above the horiz<,ntal beam holes. These are
through tubes and penetrate the pressure tank wall on both ends.
There are also four hydraulic rabbit tub_Ls designated RH-I_ RH-2_
RH-5 3 and RH-4. These have a carrier tube inside diameter of 5/4 inch
and terminate in the beryllium blocks surroun(ing HT-I. They are located
in positions RA-I 3 RD-I 3 RA-8_ and RD-5.
I
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2.1.6 Biological Shie]d
The reactor pressure tank is surrounded _y barytes concrete to pro-
vide part of the biological shield (fig. 2.9). The concrete below the
pressure tank will be cooled by water flowing in pipes embedded in the
concrete. The remainder of the shield is provided by water contained in
a circular pool surrounding the pressure tank as shown in figure 2.12(a).
This pool is approximately 70 feet in diameter_ and its vertical center-
line is offset 5 feet from that of the pressure tank. The walls of the
pool are made of reinforced concrete and are taree feet thick. The pool
o
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is divided into four quadrants (designated A_ B_ C_ and D in fig. 2.12)
by water tight partitions (quadrant walls). The concrete surrounding the
pressure tank has a minimum thickness of two feet in quadrants A_ C_ and
D. In quadrant B3 which contains the thermal column_ the concrete is
thickened to 9 feet (minimum) to provide adequate shielding without water
in the quadrant. The water in quadrants A_ C_ and D is 25 feet deep. In
quadrant B it is 27 feet deep. This additional depth increases the dis-
tance from the centerline of the thermal column to the pool floor and pro-
vides a better geometry for shield testing (fig. 2.13(b)).
A concrete platform_ cantilevered in quadrants A_ C 3 and D_ surrounds
the pressure tank near the top_ at approximately grade level_ to provide
work space for changing fuel elements_ and for handling the various types
of experiments that can be done from above the reactor.
The shielding pool is enclosed in a I00 foot diameter cylindrical
steel containment tank (discussed later). Surrounding the pool_ and in-
side the containment tank_ is an annular space 13 feet wide and 25 feet
deep. Part of the annulus is occupied by a canal (discussed later)3 and
the remainder is provided with concrete floors at grade level_ and at
pool floor level_ 25 feet below grade.
Three movable bridges are provided to permit access_ from the an-
nular space around the pool_ to the concrete platform above the reactor
tank.
Quadrant D is covered by a removable steel grating.
2.1.7 Shrapnel Shield
Resting on the massive concrete shield above the reactor pressure
tank is a heavy steel cover (figs. 2.9(a) and 2.9(b)). This serves both
as a gamma shield_ and as a shrapnel shield for protection against damage
to the containment tank (discussed later) in the event of an explosion
such as might result from a violent power excursion. This shield weighs
about 60 tons. In the event of a power excursion violent enough to rup-
ture the reactor pressure tank_ the energy associated with the upward di-
rected momentum due to the explosion and resultant flying debris would be
absorbed by lifting of the shrapnel shield. This will be discussed in
more detail in section 6.4.
2.1.8 Containment Tank
The shielding pool and annular space surrounding it_ including work
space and canal 3 are housed by a cylindrical steel tank with an elliptical
roof as shown in figures 2.12 and 2.13. In the event of an accident_ with
14
release of radioactivity from the reactor or experiments_ this tank is
designed to prevent its escape to the atmosphere. This tank has an in-
ner diameter of i00 feet and its wall height above grade is approximately
30 feet. The tank wall extends downwardto the pool floor level_ 25 feet
below grade_ and then continues on as the containment tank bottom_ passing
underneath the entire structure including the subpile room. There is no
excavation under the pool floor level except for the subpile room located
directly under the reactor tank (see fig. 2._.3)_ and a passagewayleading
to this room from an elevator and stairway s_laft located in the annular
space outside quadrant A of the shield pool. The subpile room contains
the control rod drive equipment.
The contained volume includes that within the i00 foot diameter tank
above grade and extending downwardto the pool floor level. It also in-
cludes the subpile room_ passageway_and ele'rator and stairway shaft.
The containment tank can be entered_ at grade level_ by meansof three
openings. Oneis a I0- by lO-foot truck opelling with a pressure tight door
located in the wall adjacent to quadrant D. This opening will be sealed
shut when the reactor is in operation. The other two openings are air
locks for use of personnel. These are located in the wall adjacent to
qt_adrants A and C_ and can be used with the reactor in operation.
There is one additional opening in the _:ontainment tank wall. This
is located under water in the wall nearest q_LadrantB. It permits equip-
ment and experiments to be movedunder water from the circular portion of
the canal within the containment tank to tha_ part which is outside the
tank. This opening is sealed by a watertigh_ door_ so designed that an
increase in pressure within the containment ",ank will augment the seal.
This door also permits the portion of the caTlal inside the tank to be
drained independently of that outside.
Two stairways within the annulus permit:_ access from grade level to
the lower level 25 feet below grade. The el_vator to the subpile room
also permits access to this floor.
A 20 ton crane serves the entire floor _rea of the containment tank
at grade level. A hatch is provided to permit the crane to serve the
lower level of the anm_lar work space around the pool.
!
O
2.1.9 Canal
The canal is provided for underwater tr_msportation of radioactive
materials_ equipment; experiments_ and fuel ,_lements from the reactor to
storagej or to the hot laboratory. As shown in figure 2.12(a), the por-
tion of the canal inside the containment tank extends completely around
the outer wall of quadrant B; and partially around quadrants A and C.
15
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It is 13 feet wide and 25 feet deep. Walkways are provided on both sides.
Direct access from the shielding pool to the canal is provided from quad-
rants A and C. Access is by means of underwater doors_ designed to be
water tight.
During operation of the reactor it is proposed that the portion of
the canal within the containment tank will be drained. Its volume 3 to-
gether with that of the rest of the annular space surrounding the pool_
will act as an expansion volume_ and will aid in absorbing the energy
released in the event of a power excursion severe enough to rupture the
reactor pressure tank. The annular portion of the canal_ within the con-
tainment tank_ connects with the outside portion through the underwater
opening in the containment tank wall that has been previously mentioned.
This opening is on the south side of the containment tank, adjacent to
pool quadrant B. The external portion of the canal extends south_ and
passes through the reactor building surrounding the containment tank 3 in-
to the hot laboratory. Within the main reactor building_ and extending
east, is another extension of the canal. This extension provides storage
space for fuel elements_ and at its closed end space is available for re-
activity measurements. Two watertight movable gates are provided in this
section of the canal to permit local draining.
A traveling bridge_ and a 5-ton monorail hoist_ are provided for this
section of the canal.
2.1.10 Main Reactor Building
Surrounding the containment tank is a flat roofed_ mill type 3 build-
ing measuring approximately 150 by 160 feet (see figs. 2.12 and 2.13). Its
height is 29_ feet. It provides setup and work space around the contain-
ment tank at grade level. It also houses shop and personnel facilities 3
and control panels for experiments. The reactor control room 3 and of-
fices 3 are located on a mezzanine extending along the north and west walls
(fig. 2.12(a)).
The north half of this building has a basement with its floor 15 feet
below grade. The southwest corner has a basement with its floor level 25
feet below grade. These basement areas are connected by a stairway. The
lower basement also connects_ by a passage paralleling the north-south
canal extension, with a vertical shaft which opens into the hot laboratory.
Two hot cells will be located in the southwest corner of the 2S-foot
basement.
2.1.11 Method of Handling Loop Type Experiments
In general, it is proposed to design experiments that are compact
enough to be enclosed in water tight boxes with the test section itself
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mounted in a closed tube extending from the box. The entire assembly will
be taken into the containment tank at grade level, lowered into the shield-
ing pool, and inserted into the proper test hole. The pool water will
provide shielding for the experiment. Integral experiments of this type 3
utilizing either of the horizontal through _les, will occupy either pool
quadrant A or C. Inasmuch as both of these quadrants connect with the
canal, radioactive experiments from the reac-_or can be movedunder water
from the pool, through the canal, to the hot laboratory for dismantling.
For experiments requiring equipment that is too large to be placed
in the pool, or that cannot be placed under water, the annular basement
area around the pool can be used.
Typical loop type experiments are discu_sed in more detail in sec-
tion 4.
!
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2.1.12 Water System
A schematic diagram of the water system for the facility is shown
in figure 2.14. Temperatures, pressures, and flow rates at various points
in the system are given in table 2.1. Figur._ 2.15 is a more detailed dia-
gram of the water system showing all valves _md connections to the various
services. Table 2.2 lists locations, _mde oi_ operation, and control point
location for all valves in the system. Figu:_e 2.16 is a schematic draw-
ing of the water system shown on a plan view of the facility.
TABLE 2.1 - WATER SYSTEM 0PERAT[ING CONDITIONS
Primary water syst_._m
Power output, Mw
Total water flow, GPM
Reactor tank inlet press.; psia
Reactor tank inlet temp.; OF
Reactor tank outlet press._ psia
Reactor tank outlet temp.j OF
Reactor core press, drop; psi
Heat exchanger inlet press., psi_
Heat exchanger press, drop, psi
Pump inlet press., psia
Pump power, each_ HP
Pump outlet press.; psia
Fuel plate temp._ OF (max.)
Saturation temp. at outlet press. 3 OF
Saturation temp. at critical spo-_, OF
6O
17,300
160
159
120
187
5O
99
i0
89
550
159
515
541
55O
17
O
!
!
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TABLE 2.1 - Concluded. WATER SYSTEM OPERATING CONDITIONS
Secondary water system
Cooling water flow_ GPM
Pump power, HP
Cooling water temp. from tower_ OF
Cooling water press._ psia
Cooling water temp. to tower_ OF
Heat exchanger press, drop3 psi
Water evaporation_ GPM
9850
200
85
63
150
20
460
2.1.12.1 Primary cooling system. - The main primary cooling system
is shown in figure 2.14. Deionized water enters the pressure tank from
the side at a point just below the reactor core. It flows upward outside
the 4 by ii latticep reverses its direction above the reactor_ and flows
downward through the lattice. The water leaves the pressure tank at the
bottom and goes to the main heat exchangers. From the heat exchangers it
flows through the primary water pumps and is returned to the reactor tank.
A venturi meter_ and a strainer_ are located in the main water line be-
tween the pump discharge and tbe reactor tank. There are two main heat
exchangers operating in parallel (with provision for a third to be added
later)3 and three primary pumps_ also in parallel. 0nly two pumps are in
operation at one time_ with the third serving as a standby. Each primary
pump has a capacity of 8650 gpm with a pressure rise of 70 psi. The water
pressure in the primary system is normally set by the head of water in a
5000 gallon tank located 150 feet above grade and feeding into the system
at the primary pump inlet. The pressure at this point is approximately
89 psia. At the same level as the 5000 gallon tank_ is a 50_000 gallon
tank_ also filled with deionized water. Normally_ only the smaller tank
is open to the primary system. However_ a line from the bottom of the
larger tank connects with the primary system so that its capacity can be
made available to the primary system by opening a valve. The use of the
small tank for normal operation results in a more sensitive indication of
variations in required makeup water for the primary system.
A mixed resin bed ion-exchanger is connected between the primary pump
inlet and discharge. Approximately I00 gpm are bypassed continually
through the ion-exchanger. The flow is regulated by a valve and metered
by a venturi. A heat exchanger is provided to cool the water entering
the ion-exchanger to a temperature the resin can withstand.
The method that wlll be used for degassing the primary water has not
yet been decided upon. One possible method of degassing is indicated in
figure 2.14. The degasser is located between the reactor tank outlet and
the main heat exchanger inlet. Part of the primary water is bypassed
through the degasser in which the pressure is reduced by a throttle valve.
Degassed water is pumped back into the primary system 3 and off-gases and
water vapor are pumped to the exhaust stack. Two pumps are indicated 3
only one of which would be in operation at a time.
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The main primary pumps_ion-exchanger, degasser, and main heat ex-
changers are located in the east wing of the main reactor building(marked "B" in fig. 2.4). A tentative layout of the wing is shownin
figure 2.17. The heat exchangers and degasser are in one room of the
wing, while each of the pumpsand the ion-exchanger are located in sepa-
rate rooms. The concrete walls of the pumpand ion-exchanger rooms are
thick enoughto provide sufficient shielding so that any one of them can
be serviced while the others are in operation.
A shutdowncooling system is also provided which has sufficient ca-
pacity to cool the reactor a few seconds after shutdown. Cooling immed-
iately after shutdown is taken care of by coast downof the main pumps.
This system is shownschematically in figure _.14_ and its arrangement
in quadrant D of the shielding pool, where it is located, is shownin
figure Z.18.
O
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Referring to figure 2.14, water from the shutdown system enters the
pressure tank at a point just below the reactor core, passes upward out-
side the lattice, down through the lattice and then to a heat exchanger.
From the heat exchanger the water is pumped back to the reactor tank.
The flow rate is metered by a venturi.
Two pumps, of Ii00 gpm capacity each_ ar_ _ provided for the shutdown
primary water system. 0nly one will be in operation at a time. The drive
motors for these pumps are powered by either ¢f two diesel-generator sets.
One diesel-generator with its pump is continually in operation, even when
the main water system is in operation. The pump motors for this system
can also be driven from the regular electrical supply.
The main and shutdown heat exchangers are of the shell and tube type
with primary water flowing through the tubes. The primary heat exchangers,
pumps 3 ion-exchangers 3 degasser and piping are made of 500 series stain-
less.steel, either solid or clad. Some valves may be of cast iron.
2.1.12.2 Secondary water system. - The secondary water system removes
heat generated in the reactor from the primary water in the main and shut-
down heat exchangers and dissipates it in the _ooling tower. Water from
the cooling tower basin is pumped through the _eat exchangers and returned
to the tower.
There are three secondary pumps for the m_in cooling system, each
having a capacity of 4925 gpm and a pressure rise of 48 psi. Only two
pumps are normally in operation, with the third serving as a standby.
There are also two secondary pumps 3 each having a capacity of 800
gpm# for the shutdown cooling system. 0nly one of these is normally in
operation. For the shutdown system_ one primary and one secondary pump
are driven by a diesel-generator set. As stated previously, there are
two such diesels s one continuously in operation.
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Two additional pumps are provided in the secondary water system to
supply water for general service use.
2.1.12.3 Water supply system. - Raw water from Lake Erie is normally
drawn from a 5_500_000 gallon reservoir which is now in existence at the
site. In an emergency_ water can also be obtained from a fire protection
system_ or from city water mains_ both of which are available. Also_ a
i00_000 gallon tank located i00 feet above grade and floating on the proc-
essed water line_ will be provided for further emergency protection.
For normal operation water is pumped from the reservoir through a
clarifier. A portion of the clarified water is used to supply the sec-
ondary cooling system_ and the balance is passed through gravity type
sand filters. Filtered water is supplied to the processed water system 3
and to the deionizers which further purify the water for the primary sys-
tem. Dual deionizers_ pumps_ and filters of I00 gpm capacity each are
provided to condition the primary water. Both of these deionizers can
operate concurrently with staggered regeneration periods to provide a
continuous supply of deionized water to the primary system.
The shielding pool and canal are supplied with processed water. Al-
though not shown in figure 2.14_ approximately 500 gpm of the canal and
shield water will be continuously circulated through a filter with i00
gpm also passing through a mixed bed deionizer to maintain purity and
clarity in the pool and canal. The clarifier_ filters_ and deionizers
which prepare raw water for the primary system_ are located in the service
building labeled "L" in figure 2.4. The secondary pumps are located just
outside the north wall of this building. A tentative layout of this
building is shown in figure 2.19.
2.1.12.4 Water disposal. - Retention basins are provided (fig. 2.14)
for holdup of water from the facility. A I_000_000 gallon "cold" basin
is available for water of little or no activity such as might normally
come from the canal or shielding pool in the event that they need to be
drained. There are also four "hot" basins_ of 125_000 gallons capacity
each_ for water that is more radioactive_ such as that from the reactor
pressure tank_ hot laboratory_ or primary pump house. An earthen reser-
voir is provided for emergency storage of water from the facility. This
reservoir is labeled P in figure 2.4.
Water in the "cold" retention basin can be either drained into Plum
Brook 3 or pumped back into the raw water system. Provision is also made
for filtering and deionizing water from the "cold" retention basin so
that it can be reused in the canal or shielding pool.
Water from the reactor tank_ leakage from pump seals_ and drainage
from the hot laboratory flows into sump tanks located under the reactor
building. From the sump tanks this water can be pumped to any one of the
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four "hot" retention basins. Provision is madefor pumping water from
any "hot" basin through an ion-exchanger and back to another. By recir-
culation of water one or more times through an ion-exchanger_ together
with proper dilution 3 its activity can be reduced to the point where it
can be reused or drained into Plum Brook.
2.1.13 Hot Laboratory
The layout of the laboratory for handli_g radioactive experiments3
equipment3 etc. 3 coming from the reactor is shownin figure 2.20. This
laboratory is housed in the south wing of the reactor building. Nearest
the reactor building are the facilities for handling_ storage_ and dis-
mantling_ of large pieces of equipment_ or experiments, that are highly
radioactive. This part of the hot laboratory is of heavy concrete con-
struction. It contains part of the north-south extension of the canal_
a vault for dry storage of radioactive mater_als_ a hot handling room_
a room for dismantling and cutting up of large experiments and one of the
hot cells. The canal extension serves to corvey experiments from the
shielding pool and as a storage area. A removable water tight gate is
provided at the entrance to the hot laboratory to permit local drainage.
The dry storage vault is available for equipment or materials which
cannot be stored under water. The floor level of the vault is 15 feet
below grade_ and it has a cover of removable concrete slabs located ap-
proximately 14 feet above grade. A shielding window is provided in the
north wall of the vault.
The hot handling roomhas a vertical shaft connecting with the pas-
sagewayfrom the basementarea of the main building. This provides a
meansof conveying equipment from the reactor building basement to the hot
laboratory. A shielding door at the south en_ of the hot handling room
permits access to the rest of the hot laboratgry.
A shielded room for dismantling radioactive experiments and equip-
ment, and a hot cell (no. i) are adjacent to the west side of the hot
handling room. Movable shielding plugs_ moun_ed on rails_ permit access
from the hot handling room to the dismantling room and hot cell. The
ceilings of these rooms are removable concret_ slabs.
A General Mills manipulator serves both _he dismantling room and the
hot cell. A vertically movable wall permits _ovement of the manipulator
between the dismantling room and the hot cell Shielding windows are
located in the west walls of these rooms and manipulator controls are
operated from outside these walls.
A 15-ton remotely-controlled crane and a 5-ton auxiliary hoist ser-
Vice the dry storage vault_ canal_ hot handling room_ dismantling room
and hot cell.
!
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Adjacent to the south wall of the concrete portion of the hot labor-
atory is a mill type building ho_sing a semicontaminated work area 3 de-
contamination room_ and rooms for storage and repair of equipment or ma-
terials that are only mildly radioactive. The canal extension terminates
in this area. Also_ included in this area are seven additional hot cells
of heavy concrete construction. Entrance to these cells is from the semi-
contaminated work area through movable shielding plugs. Shielding windows
are provided in the west walls. A General Mills Manipulator 3 and a crane
mounted on the same rails_ serve all seven cells. Vertically movable
walls between cells permit movement of the manipulator or crane between
cells. The ceilings of all cells are made of removable concrete slabs.
A truck entrance is located in the east wall of the laboratory_ and
an overhead monorail type hoist serves the truck entrance and the end of
the canal extension. A crane serves this area of the laboratory.
At the south end of the hot laboratory wing is a personnel decontam-
ination area including showers_ toilet facilities_ and locker rooms. En-
trance to and from the laboratory areas_ where contaminated materials are
handled_ is through the decontamination area.
A clean shop area_ housed in a mill type structure_ extends along
the west wall of the hot laboratory wing. This shop is for work on un-
contaminated equipment. Access to and from the personnel decontamination
area is through this clean shop area.
2.1.14 Ventilating System
Figure 2.21 is a schematic diagram of the ventilation system for the
facility.
2.1.14.1 Containment tank. - Air is drawn into the containment tank
through a filter at the rate of 200 cfm. Air leaving the containment tank
is pumped by a reciprocating type compressor into one of three tanks. The
capacity of each tank represents 2.5 minutes supply of ventilating air.
When one tank is filled the compressor discharge is automatically switched
to another tank. The air in the tank last filled is monitored for radio-
activity. If found to be uncontaminated 3 the air is discharged to the
exhaust stack. If the air is found to be radioactive 3 it is not released.
The two additional tanks give five minutes time in which to stop the flow
of air without releasing it to the exhaust stack.
Dehumidifying and air conditioning systems and air circulating fans
will be provided in the containment tank.
2.1.14.2 Main building. - Ventilating air for the main building sur-
rounding the containment tank 3 and for the hot laboratory_ is drawn in
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through filters in the roof of the buildimg. One fan of i0_000 cfm ca-
pacity pumpsair from the building above grade level. Another i0_000 cfm
fan draws air from the basement area and_ after monitoring_ discharges it
to the exhaust stack. The balance of the air required to ventilate the
main building is drawn into the hot laboratory as described below.
2.1.14.3 Hot laboratory. - Ventilating air for the hot laboratory is
drawn partly from the main reactor building _nd partly from the clean shop
area along the west side of the hot laboratory. It passes through the
personnel decontamination area into the contaminated work area and hot
handling room. From these areas the air is drawn out of the dismantling
room and the hot cells_ and after being filtered and monitored_ is dis-
charged to the exhaust stack.
Three ventilating fans of i0_000 cfm c_acity each are provided for
the hot laboratory. One fan serves the dismantling room and hot cell
number i. Normally one of the other fans serves hot cells (nos. 2 to 8).
If_ however_ one or more of the shielding pll_gs in the hot cells is re-
moved_ more air is required to maintain the cesired air velocity in the
cells_ and the third fan goes into operation. All three fans are inter-
connected so that any one can perform any other function.
Figure 2.21 also shows a typical hot ce_l ventilation system. In
addition to the exhaust vent_ a vacuum hose _s provided for use in clean-
up of the cells. Individual filters are provided_ within the cell_ for
the exhaust vent and the vacuum hose. Servicing of the filters can be
done remotely by use of the manipulators.
_o
2.1.15 Electrical System
Diagrams showing components of the electrical power system are con-
tained in figures 2.22(a) and (b). Primary clectrical power will be fur-
nished by the Ohio Edison Company by means o_ two 543500 volt lines.
These lines will be connected to two existin_ $4_500 volt lines energized
from separate substations at Sandusky. Each $4_500 volt line will be con-
nected to a $4_500/4160 volt step-down transformer located at a substation
on the site (M, fig. 2.4). Each $4_500 volt line and transformer will
have sufficient capacity to carry the entire electrical load of the
facility.
The portion of the 4160 volt distribution system located at the site
substation will consist of two separated buses and associate circuit
breakers. A tie bus and breaker will be provided to connect the two 4160
volt buses together. Pending approval of the Ohio Edison Company_ it is
proposed to operate normally with the 4160 volt systems tied together.
From the substation 4160 volt feeder ca%les will be extended to motor
starting and circuit-breaker switchgear located throughout the site.
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480-Volt electrical power_ supplied by 4160/480 volt step-down trans-
formers_ will be distributed to motors and 480-volt circuit breaker panel-
boards from motor control centers in various buildings at the site.
Operational voltages for motors and equipment will be as follows:
Motors3 200 hp and over
Motors_ 5/4 hp to 200 hp
Lighting and small power
4160 volt - 5 phase
480 volt - 3 phase
120/208 volt - single phase
Power for operation of pumps for the shut-down cooling system will
be provided by diesel-driven generators at 480 volts. Duplicate diesel
generator sets will be provided_ each unit being capable of starting and
operating the required shut-down pumps.
i
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Duplicate 480-volt feeders will be installed to feed the switchgear
containing the starting equipment for the primary and secondary pumps of
the shut-down cooling system. In addition to the two 4SO-volt services
from the diesel-generators_ a feeder from each of two normal 4SO-volt
supplies will be tied to each set of pump motor switchgear.
Reactor control and instrument power will be supplied by means of
two conversion units and a bank of batteries (not shown in fig. 2.22).
The first conversion unit will convert A.C. power to D.C. power. The D.C.
power will then be used to energize the D.C. motor of a second conversion
unit_ which motor drives an A.C. generator. The output of this generator
will supply A.C. control and instrument needs. The battery system will
be connected to the DoC. bus between the first and second conversion units.
In normal operation the batteries will float on the line. In case of fail-
ure of the normal A.C. power_ required to energize the first conversion
unit_ the batteries will supply power to the second conversion unit to
maintain the A.C. control and instrument requirements. Duplicate conver-
sion and battery equipment will be installed for reactor control3 instru-
mentation 3 and all other systems requiring a guaranteed power supply.
All telephone 3 operational and emergency intercommunication 3 fire
protection (alarms 3 etc.) and evacuation (alarms 3 etc.) systems will be
supplied with power from batteries.
The emergency lighting system will be maintained at a level suffi-
cient for periods of loss of normal lighting_ and evacuation needs. Power
for the emergency lighting system will be supplied by a diesel-generator
emergency power system through step-down transformers. Transfer switches
will be provided so that lighting power will normally come from the regu-
lar power supply.
Electrical power for experiments will normally be drawn from the
regular laboratory supply. For emergency power a diesel generator will
be provided.
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2.2 REACTORPHYSICS
An important class of experiments to be performed in the NACAre-
actor is the operation of representative subcritical sections of proto-
type aircraft reactor cores. Fuel elements_ coolant 3 moderator_ and
supporting structure composingthese representative sections are to be
exposed to the neutron fluxes in and around the critical research re-
actor. The heat generation rate 3 temperature distribution and fuel burn-
up expected in the prototype are to be simulated. Appropriate conditions
in the experiment maybe maintained by operation of the reactor at vari-
ous powers up to the maximum design power of 50 megawatts.
One of the cores experimentally studied in detail at MTR was a 9 by
3 array of fuel elements containing 168 gms of enriched uranium and shim-
rod fuel elements containing 130 gms of enriched uranium. Inasmuch as
the indicated excess reactivity of this loading corresponds to the re-
quirements of the NACA operating cycle 3 this initial loading for the NACA
reactor was selected for analytical study of normal operational behavior
and possible hazards. Reactor design conditions 3 operating cycle_ excess
reactivity requirements 3 neutron flux and specific power distributions
for this reference core are presented in this section.
2.2.1 Reactor Design Cond_tions
A brief listing of nominal reactor design conditions and of reactor
nuclear properties for the loading under consideration_ is presented in
table 2.3. A discussion of reactor heat tran:_fer is presented in appendix
A. A discussion of reactor physics is presented in appendix B.
It is proposed to operate the reactor at approximately constant
average power per unit volume as dictated by _,he desired conditions in
a major experiment up to an average over the core volume of 600 watts
per cubic centimeter of core. The gross power generated is a function
of shim rod position_ so that the maximum design power can only be real-
ized toward the end of the operating period Hen the rods are effectively
withdrawn.
o
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TABLE 2.5 - NACA RESEARCH REACTOR DESIGN CONDITIONS
c_
O
I
0%
!
CD-
Reactor power
Coolant flow
Core inlet coolant, top
Core outlet coolant, bottom
Maximum fuel plate surface temperature
Saturation temperature at location of
maximum fuel surface temperature
Average core heat flux
Maximum heat flux
Uranium loading (9×5 slab)
Kef f (cold, clean)
Average power density
Maximum power density
Average core thermal flux
Average core integrated fast flux
Average core uncollided flux
Percent fissions by thermal neutrons
Mean prompt neutron lifetime
Temperature coefficient of reactivity
Void coefficient of reactivity
60 megawatts
Two pass - iSjO00 gal/minj
50 ft/sec in core
160 ° F_ 150 psia
187 ° F 3 120 psia
315 ° F
550 ° F
490_000 Btu/hr-ft 2
8803000 Btu/hr-ft 2
4.4 kilograms
(22 - 168 gm fuel elements
5 - 150 gm shim rod elements)
1.185
600 watts/cc
Ii00 watts/cc
4x1014 neutrons/cm 2 sec
17×1014 neutrons/cm 2 sec
2xlO 14 neutrons/cm 2 sec
88
90xlO -6 sec
-iSxlO -5 Z_K/K °C_
-lOxlO -5 AK_K OF
-o.18  /K/Av/vK2o
2.2.2 Reactor Operating Cycle
A continuous operating time of i0 days has been selected as being
representative of irradiation times required to simulate aircraft re-
actor core component fuel burnup. It is expected, however_ that the re-
actor will be operated to meet requirements of major experiments. A lO-
day operating cycle may be achieved with a core loading of fresh fuel
elements and shim-rod fuel elements which provide sufficient excess re-
activity for experiments 3 reactor operation_ and transient xenon over-
ride. For reasons of operating economy and minimizing fuel inventory_
reactor core loadings for subsequent operating cycles would consist of
fresh fuel elements of greater uranium content replacing some of the par-
tially spent elements of the previous loadings. Addition of these fresh
fuel elements and relocation of partially spent elements would provide
core loadings of the required excess reactivity for a new set of
experiments.
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As described in reference 2.13 it has been the experience of MTR
that larger average fuel burn-ups maybe achteved by moving partially
spent elements from the corner regions to the center of the slab. New
fuel elements with uranium content of about _00 grams inserted in the
corner regions maintain acceptable heat generation rates as well as re-
duce the peak-to-average specific power ratio over the core volume.
Prior to startup of each new loading, criticality experiments, control
rod calibrations_ and instrument calibrations will be performed until
reactivity effects of refueling are sufficier_tly well understood to fore-
go repeated calibrations.
Of course_ the startup of the first cole, clean loading must also
be carefully executed. A startup procedure manualwill be written.
An alternate method of controlling the required excess reactivity
is through the use of a burnable poison such as boron uniformly dispersed
in the uranium-aluminumalloy of the fuel elements. There are several
possible advantages to the use of such fuel elements. These are discussed
in appendix B where the results of preliminary burnup studies of burnable
poisons applied to the research reactor are _resented. Additional studies 3
using burnable poisons, will be made. The t_chnology of fuel element fab-
rication containing burnable poisons as evolved at OakRidge National Lab-
oratory is being followed. Pending the outcome of these studies, burnable
poisons mayultimately be used. Burnable poisons, however, will not be
employed in fuel elements for initial loadings of the NACAresearch re-
actor. Ti_erefore, for purposes of analyzing the normal operational be-
havior of the proposed NACAresearch reactor, and for evaluation of possi-
ble hazards_ the initial core loading of fresh fuel elements and fresh
shim-rod elements has been studied in detail and is presented herein.
.I._
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2.2.3 Excess Reactivity Requirements
The estimated allocation of excess reactivity for an initial loading
of 168 gm fuel elements and 130 gm shim-rod elements is listed in table
2.4. The value of Kef f for this cold, clean loading was calculated to
be 1.185. A Z_K of 0.125 is required to ope:ate the core for a period of
i0 days leaving an excess reactivity of 0.062 available for experiments
and transient xenon override at the end of cote life. Correspondingly
larger ZXK is available during the operating cycle for overriding tran-
sient xenon. Table 2.4 indicates that for a ZiK in experiments of 0.05,
the transient xenon override potential during the cycle decreases from a
g/< of 0.124 at startup to a fg[ of 0.012 at i0 days. The reactivity re-
quirements of restart after scram during the }perating cycle are covered
in the reactor kinetics discussion in section 2.4. The reactivity require-
ments of representative experiments located iu the horizontal through hole
and in the center test hole are covered in section 4.2. The results were
obtained by solving two-group diffusion equations on a two-dimensional re-
actor simulator.
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TABLE 2.4 - EXCESS REACTIVITY REQUIREMENTS FOR NACA RESEARCH REACTOR
(9 by 5 Array; 4.4 Kgm U235; 600 watt/cc core; Kef f _ 1.185 cold, clean)
oa
o
r4
4
Reactivity
AK
Temperature effects
Xenon buildup
Samarium buildup
LCSFPP*
Fuel burn-out
Total allocated
Operating time
(Days]
0 2 4 6
0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
0 .046 .045 .044 .043
0 .005 .006 .007 .008
0 .003 .006 .008 .010
0 .010 .020 .030 .040
0.011 0.073 0.088 0.i00 0.112
0.112 0.097 0.085 0.073
0.062 0.047 !0.055 0.025
Available for experiments and
transient xenon override 0.174
Transient xenon override if
Z_K of experiments is 0.05 0.124
8 i0
0.011
.042
.008
.012
.050
0 •125
0.062
0 •012
*Low cross section fission product poisons.
The data of table 2.4 indicate how the potential excess reactivity
of the core loading would be employed during an operating cycle 3 assuming
operation of the entire reactor core at a uniform specific power of 600
watts/cc. The fuel burn-up picture deviates from this assumption because
of two things:
i. A nonuniform specific power distribution 3 and hence 3 a nonuniform
fuel burn-up is actually present. Since the larger burn-ups occur in
regions of relatively high statistical weight 3 the calculated reactivity
effects of fuel burn-up may be underestimated for this reason.
2. The critical assembly during the early part of core life is ef-
fectively smaller by the insertion depth of the shim rods. Gradual with-
drawal of shim rods introduces an additional nonuniformity to the fuel
burn-out. In addition 3 the actual average burn-up of fuel is less than
that considered in arriving at the data of table 2.4 because of the chang-
ing effective volume of the core. The calculation for operation at a con-
stant average specific power of 600 watts/cc for the entire core volume
has overestimated the reactivity effects due to burn-out.
I
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calculate reactivity effects of experiments _n this through hole on the
basis of two-dimensional considerationsl the upper half of a vertical
section of the reactor was selected. The two-dimensional simulator geom-
etry is shown in figure 2.24 in which the co_e_ beryllium-water primary
reflector, water secondary reflector_ and alL minum-water top reflector
regions are indicated. The 9-inch diameter experimental space is shown
in position as a square area. (Calculated results for experiments in
this space are presented in section 4.2.) The dotted areas shown indi-
cate the fineness of the grid used in solvin_ the diffusion equations on
the space simulator_ 3-inch square areas were used in the outer regions_
1.5-inch square areas were used in the regioI_s around the experimental
space_ and 0.75-inch square areas were used n the experimental regions.
In all, 252 space points are used.
In order to calculate reactivity effects of shim-rods and experiments
in the center test hole_ one-quarter of a horizontal section of the re-
actor was selected. The two-dimensional simulator geometry is shown in
figure 2.25 in which the core, primary and secondary reflectors, shim-rod
positions 3 and center test hole locations are shown. The fineness of the
grid is indicated_ in all 3 166 space points are used.
The thermal flux and integrated fast fl,_ distributions for the upper
half of the vertical section of the unperturbed reference core_ that is
with primary reflector in the horizontal through hole HT-1 space, are shown
in figures 2.26(a) and (b). The fluxes are _hown relative to a spatial
average thermal neutron flux of unity. The ,_haracteristic peaking of
thermal flux in the reflector and fall-off toward the corners of the slab
may be noted. There is an asymmetry due to _he thicker primary reflector
on one face of the core.
The thermal and fast flux distributions in the one-quarter horizontal
section are shown in figures 2.27(a) and (b) for the unperturbed reference
core. In this case the shim-rods are fully _thdrawn and replaced by fuel-
elements, and a fuel-element occupies the ce_er test hole space. The
fluxes are shown relative to a spatial avera_;e thermal neutron flux of
unity. The relative closeness of the flux contours at the core-reflector
interface indicate the sharp flux gradients _resent here.
With an average specific power of 600 w_ts/cc of corej the average
core thermal flux is 4×1014 neutrons/cm 2 sec)nd. The maximum thermal flux
occurs in a small part of the thick primary _eflector and has an unper-
turbed value of 1015 neutrons/cm 2 second. T_e maximum fast flux occurs
in the central fuel element of the lattice a_ the reactor midplane and
has an unperturbed value of 2.2×1015 neutrons/cm 2 second.
The two-dimensional two-group neutron flux distributions for the
case with all five core shim rods fully inserted are shown in figure
2.28(a) and (b). The shim rods, being water filled cadmium boxes_ ef-
fectively appear as water diffusing media for the fast flux and as a
p
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black boundary for the thermal flux. The thermal flux is taken as zero
at the extrapolated thermal diffusion distance within the walls of the
shim rod.
!
2.2.5 Specific Power Distributions
From the flux distritutions shown_ the specific power variation in
the reference slab core may be calculated. Because epithermal fissions,
lumped into the fast group; are considered in the two-group formulation
e_loyed 3 the thermal flux distribution does not exactly correspond to
the specific power distribution. There is a contribution to the specific
power due to epithermal fissions of about 15 percent at the center of the
core diminishing to about i0 percent at the core-reflector interfaces.
The variations of the specific power along tae axes of the unperturbed
reference core are presented in figure 2.29. The specific power is shown
relative to the average in the core and permits the location of t!_e hot
spot at the interface of the core and the thick primary reflector which
is shown. The peak-to-average specific power has a value of 1.8S_ the
minimum-to-average specific power has a value of 0.46.
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2.5 DESCRIPTIONOFCONTROLSYSTEM
The reactor control and safety-system design and associated imstru-
memtation incorporate manyof the desirable features of the system at the
Materials Testing Reactor. The margins of safety used are_ in general_
comparable to the practice at the Materials resting Reactor in that the
design incorporates the following basic features:
I. Maximumuse of fail-safe circuitry and of amplifier and instrument
circuit-monitoring.
2. Duplication of safety channels of instrumentation.
S. Use of permissive interlocks that exercise certain required super-
visory control on operator action.
4. Use of various modesof reversible power cutbacks as corrective
measurestogether with an alarm system to warn operator of any abnormal
conditions arising in the reactor system which maylead to a hazardous
condition.
S. The fast scram initiated electronically by the safety system upon
instrumental detection of a seriously abnormal situation which poses an
irmnediate threat to personnel safety or reactor integrity.
The shim-safety-rod drive and release mechanism design herein de-
scribed will be subjected to extensive devel]pmental testing. Hence; the
design is not to be construed as the fir_al o_e but rather as the starting
point in the development of a design in every way satisfactory from the
standpoir_ of performance and reliability. _able _.S gives the basic re-
quirements used in arriving at the given design as the starting point for
further development.
O
TABLE 2.S - GROUND RULES FOR CONrROL ROD DESIGN
I. Rod motion approximately thirty inchgs
2. Six inch span between center of rod _ctivators
3. Replaceable poison and fuel element _s short as possible
4. Complete disassembly of actuating mechanism with minimum loss of
reactor water
5. No twist to be imposed on the contro_ rod
6. Double water seal packing - fresh water pumped between glands
o
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7. Electrical latch to be out of water
8. Prefer scram above packing gland
9. Cannot rely on pressure difference across lattice to help scram
rods
I0. Ability to release for scram when driving rods in either di-
rection
ii. Positive insertion after scram
o
_D
| .
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2.3.1 Control-Rod Types and Locations
For the narrow slab fuel-loading (9 fuel-elements long by S wide)
shown in figure 2.8_ the excess reactivity for the cold-clean condition_
assuming none taken up or contributed by experiments_ has been estimated
as 18.5 percent. Eight shim-safety rods are provided to counter this
excess reactivity and keep the reactor subcritical by a wide margin
(Kef f_ 0.85 with all rods fully inserted_ i.e._ in maximum absorptive
position) at all times. The shim-safety rods serve the dual purpose of
providing coarse adjustments of reactivity and nuclear-safety control.
The rods are constructed so that dropping a rod introduces cadmium into
the active lattice. Five of the rods are in the middle of the fuel slab
(positio_is LC-2, LC-4_ LC-6_ LC-8_ and LC-10 in fig. 2.8) and introduce
fuel into the slab as they are raised. The remaining three shim-safety
rods are in the beryllium section of the active lattice (positions LA-4_
LA-6_ and LA-8 in fig. 2.8) and introduce beryllium into the lattice as
they are raised. When the rods rest in the lower shock absorber_ the rod
cadmium sections fill up the lattice.
As explained in section 2.13 the shim-safety rod in position LC-6 of
the fuel slab may be removed and the space used instead for experimental
purposes. In this case_ only 4 shim-safety rods are available in the
fuel slab so that_ if necessary_ the fuel loading will be slightly modi-
fied from that indicated in figure 2.8 to give the required margin of
shutdown reactivity. It will be the policy of operatior_s to use _oadings
giving minimum excess-reactivity required for the specific operation.
Space has been provided in two of the beryllium pieces at the ed_e
of the fuel slab (positions LA-2 and LA-10) for _wo regulati_g rods. The
two regulating rods_ which provide t_e means for continuous fine control
of the reactivity_ are coupled to the automatic servo-cor_trol system de-
scribed later. 0nly one rod can be in servo-control at a time while the
other rod is used as standby to be manually switched J_to operation at
the discretion of the operator.
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2.3.2 Shim-Safety R_ds
A drawing of the shim-safety rod used i_ the fuel slab is presented
in figure 2.30. The rod consists of six prizcipal sections: (I) the
hollow cadmium section, (2) the fuel section, (3) the water-outlet sec-
tion, (4) the transition section, (5) the guide section, and (6) the
drive-release section. The positions of the upper and lower assembly
grids relative to the shim-safety rods for r3ds fully inserted and fully
withdrawn are indicated in figure 2.31. For the fully inserted position,
the rod rests in its shock absorber (dashpot) located in the reactor
tank below the grid assembly as shown in figlre 2.31 (described in detail
later). In actual operation, the shim-safetf rods are never driven to
the fully withdrawn position indicated in figure 2.31. Instead, a mech-
anical stop will be set on the rod drive so ;hat the rod effectiveness is
never less than about 20 percent of maximum, as determined by calibration
of' the rods. The fuel section contains 14 fuel-plates instead of the 18
plates contained in a fuel-element assembly. Water flows downward from
above the upper assembly grid through the hollow cadmium section, past
the fuel-plates_ and out through the water-e:<it slots to the plenum cham-
ber beneath the lower assembly grid. The rod transition section forms
the transition from a rectangular cross-sect!on to the cylindrical cross-
section of the rod guide and drive-release s_ctions. The action of engage-
ment and release of the shim-safety rod by tile drive-rod occurs at the
drive-release section) this action is descri_ed in detail later.
!
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2.3.3 Shim-Safety Rod Support_ and Bearings
Guide bearings are provided for each shm-safety rod at three posi-
tions} at the upper assembly grid, at the lo'_er assembly grid, and at the
lower bearing grid located 46.625 inches bel,)w the lower assembly grid
(see fig. 2.31). The position of these guid_ bearings with respect to
the shim-safety rod is shown in figure 2.31. As indicated in figure 2.32,
the topmost bearing is an individual unit fo:" each rod and is bolted to
the top surface of the upper assembly grid. This bearing consists of 8
spring-loaded rollers each of which bear wit:l a force of about 10 pounds
against the flat sides of the shim-safety roc[. This floating-bearing
guide permits up to 0.040 inch misalinement ,)f the shim-rod from its
center position without the shim-rod coming :n contact with the grid or
adjacent fuel elements. Figure 2.$2 shows t]_e rollers, springs_ and
spring-loading adjustments. Figure 2.33 is _ view of the upper assembly
grid showing cross-sections of fuel-elements and a shim-safety rod in
place and a top view of the shim rod with it:_ bearing guide in place.
The middle bearing guide is identical t_ the topmost bearing and is
bolted to the bottom surface of the lower as_embly grid. Hung underneath
from the same support as the lower assembly grid (see fig. 2.S) is a bear-
ing grid which holds the lower guide bearings: for the shim-safety rods.
37
J
oa
o
r4
As shown in figure 2.34, this bearing consists of 4 concave rollers which
bear against the cylindrical surface of the drive-release section of the
shim-safety rod. This guide bearing is also of the floating type with
each roller loaded to exert a side force of about i00 pounds on the shim-
safety rod to keep it centered; the total movement of each roller is lim-
ited to about I/8 inch. This bearing is hence a relatively stiff guide
con_ared to the upper 2 guides.
This arrangement and design of guide bearings is to permit free oper-
ation of the shim rods in their guides, making due allowance for misaline-
ment and possible distortions of the assembly grids and lower bearing
grid. The possibility of rod sticking due to distortion of the structure
following a nuclear incident is thus reduced.
The bottom shock-absorbers (dashpots) for the shim-safety rods are
located on a plate mounted 50.50 inches below the lower bearing grid (see
fig. 2.51). The plate mounting is by means of hanger supports extending
downward from the main support for the entire grid assembly. A cross-
section of the dashpot is shown at the right side of figure 2.35; the
upper drawing shows the shim-safety rod just out of its dashpot and the
lower drawing shows the shim-safety rod resting in its dashpot. The dash-
pot is formed by the annular space between two concentric cylinders (actu-
ally tapered) into which the bottom end of the shim-safety rod fits.
Since the dashpot is located within the reactor tankj it is always filled
with water which acts as the damping fluid to absorb the energy of a rod-
drop.
For initial installation, the assembly grids with the shim-safety rods
(and regulating rods) and dummy fuel elements, the lower bearing grid, and
the shock-absorber mount are assembled and accurately alined outside the
reactor tank. This entire assembly is then placed in position within the
i
reactor tank and alined to allow free movement of the IT-inch 0.D. drive-
l
rods through the 2_-inch I.D. holes in the reactor-tank bottom wall and
shield and into the drive-release section of each shim-safety rod (see
fig. 2.31).
2.3.4 Drive-Rod and Scram Latch Mechanism
The shim-rod drive mechanism is located in the subpile room directly
beneath the reactor tank and bottom shield as indicated in figure 2.31.
The drive-rod penetrates up into the reactor tank and runs up inside the
shim-safety rod to the drive-release section. As indicated in figure 2.35_
the release-rod runs up within the hollow drive rod from the subpile room.
The scram-release action is shown in detail in figure 2.35. The release
of the shim-safety rod from the drive rod_ and resultant "scram" action_
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is actuated by a i/A-inch downwardmovementof the release-rod relative
to the drive rod. Three release-buttons at the end of stiff cantilever
springs extend upward from the top end of the drive rod. In the locked
position shownin the top drawing of figure 2.35_ the release-rod is up
relative to the drive-rod and the buttons are held out against the tapered
surface of the engage shoulder of the shim-safety rod. Line contact is
obtained between the release buttons and the engage shoulder and between
the release buttons and the plunger of the release rod. The surfaces are
inlaid with a hard_ wear-resistant material. The bearing pressure at the
engage shoulder is due to the weight of the shim-safety rod and the water-
flow pressure forces on the shim-safety rod. In the design shownin fig-
ure 2.35, no forces on the shim-safety rod are transmitted to the release-
rod (other than friction forces due to side pressure on the plunger). As
shownin the bottom drawing of figure 2.35_ a i/4-inch downwardtravel of
the release-rod relative to the drive-rod rel._ases the shim-safety rod
which then drops into its dashpot under the combined forces of gravity
and water-flow pressure. As shownin the middle drawing of figure 2.35_
an additional I/4-inch downwardtravel of the release-rod (total travel =
I/2 in.) results in a positive gripping of the buttons inward. This
feature insures positive disengagement of the drive-rod from the shim-
safety rod, as well as eliminating any possible interference between the
buttons and the rod shoulder during removal ol the shim-safety rod from
the top of the reactor tank. In the event a _him-rod binds and will not
movedown as the drive-rod is lowered_ a shoulder on the drive-rod will
engage a shoulder in the shim-rod and positively pull it down. These
shoulders sre slotted like a spline to permit removal of the shim-rod by
simply rotating the drive-rod until the shoulders of one piece line up
with the slots of the other. A protection tu_e (which also provides sup-
port of dashpot) around each individual shim-safety rod reduces any possi-
ble buffeting of the rods by the turbulent hi_h-speed water flow.
!
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As indicated in f_gure 2.35_ the topmost guide for the drive rod is
fastened to the bottom of the dashpot support mount. This aluminum guide
positions the drive-rod to run up through the inner cylinder of the an-
nular dashpot and into the shim-safety rod to the drive-release section.
Downward, as shown in figure 2.31_ the drive-r_d runs through a hole in
the reactor-tank bottom and shield into the su0pile room. This hole is
lined by a stainless-steel pipe which is cast in the concrete and welded
to the reactor-tank. To the flange at the bottom end of the stainless-
steel tube liner is bolted a gate valve which, during normal operation,
is open to allow the drive-rod to run through _he valve body. The valve
permits removal of the drive- and release-rod _ssemblies into the subpile
room with only a small loss of reactor-tank wa;er. Mounted on the bottom
flange of the gate-valve is a bellows expansio l-joint and, in turn_ the
drive-rod seal assembly. The expansion joint _ompensates for any slight
misalinement of the pipe permanently embedded in the concrete; it gives
some flexibility for alining the drive-rod through the seal-assembly up
to the drive-release section of the shim-rod.
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A drawing of the drive-rod seal assembly is presented in figure 2.36.
The seal-assembly is designed to keep to a minimum any water-leakage where
the drive-rod passes from the pressurized tank-water space above the seal
to the subpile room. Two sets of teflon chevron packings are used. The
top set of packings is held against the walls of the drive-rod and seal-
housing by an adapter. The bottom set is held against the drive-rod and
adapter by means of a packing nut screwed into the adapter. The adapter
is designed to permit introduction of fresh water to the region between
the two sets of seals. The purge water is at a pressure slightly greater
than the reactor-tank water-pressure and thus greatly reduces the possibil-
ity of leakage of activated tank-water into the subpile room. An O-ring
seal between the adapter body and seal-housing is used to reduce the leak-
age of the buffer purge water. The arrangement of two separate sets of
packings permit use of different tightening pressures for the two sets of
packings.
As previously described_ the "scram" action results from downward
movement of the release-rod relative to the drive-rod. Figure 2.37 shows
the bottom latch mechanism actuating the "scram" by reduction of current
to a solenoid. This mechanism is in the subpile room (fig. 2.31) for
convenience of installation, inspection, maintenance_ and adjustment.
Several important functions are achieved by the design_ namely_ (I) only
a small holding force of the solenoid plunger is required in the latching
anti unlatching action; (2) the mechanism is locked for proper drive and
"scram" function during normal operation but can be conveniently dismantled
for pulling the drive and release-rods into the subpile room} (3) after
the "scram," the drive-rod must be driven beyond the bottom stop to re-
latch_ (4) after the relatching action_ a small upward movement of the
drive-rod is required before the shim-safety rods are picked up_ (S) rota-
tion of the drive-rod during its motion is prevented_ and (6) angular posi-
tion of the release-rod with respect to the drive-rod is fixed. As shown
at the left side of the drawing of figure 2.37, a collar is slipped over
the tapered end of the drive-rod shaft and is held tightly in place by a
tightening nut and a key which prevents rotation of the collar relative
to the drive-rod shaft. A cross-head is held in place over the collar by
a snap ring. The collar has a keyed-out section which mates with the
cross-head to prevent rotation of the cross-head relative to the drive-
rod shaft. Two slots in the cross-head run in a fixed frame guide so as
to prevent rotation of the drive-rod assembly as it moves up and down.
A bellows connects the drive-rod assembly to the release-rod assembly as
shown in figure 2.37. Pressurized water from the reactor tank fills the
bellows and tends to force the drive-rod and release-rod apart (tends to
move release-rod down with respect to the drive-rod). Keyed to the
release-rod assembly just below the bellows is a relatching arm whose
function is described later. The drive-rod is made integral with the
drive-rod lower assembly by means of the drive-rod extension bolted to
the drive-rod collar and welded to the drive-rod lower assembly. The
drive-rod lower assembly contains the scram latch and solenoid-actuator
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and_ in addition, incorporates a set of guide-bearings for the release-
rod. The scram latch is a break-leg mechanis_nas indicated in figure
2.37. The bottom pivot of the lower leg is aoout a horizontal axis fixed
on the drive-rod lower assembly. The top end of the upper leg slides up
and downwith the release-rod, its position relative to the release-rod
being fixed (except for someplay allowed for in its motion, such play
being restrained by a spring). This action is accomplished by a pin pass-
ing through the top end of the upper leg through a hole in the release-
rod. At the commonpivot junction of the upp._r and lower legs of the
break-leg mechanismis pivoted a latch bar, t]_e lower end of which can be
engagedby a trigger arm as shownin the figure. The action of the bottom
latch is illustrated in figure 2.37. The solid lines showthe latch en-
gaged, i.e._ the latch bar is held by the trigger arm so that the break-
leg mechanismis holding up the release-rod relative to the drive-rod.
The dashed lines show the latch disengaged.
The sequence of actions of the bottom-la_ch mechanismresulting in
its disengagement upon deenergizing the solenoid and the actions involved
for reengagementof the latch are described h_rein. Downwardforces on
the release-rod due to the release-rod weight water pressure in the bel-
lows, and, in addition, a compression spring _ the bottom end of the
release-rod tend to movethe release-rod downrelative to the drive-rod.
The total downwardforce tending to unlatch the release-rod is resisted
by the friction forces due to the side pressure on the release-rod plunger
and by a counter-balancing force on the break-leg junction exerted, through
the trigger arm and latch bar_ by the solenoi_ plunger whenthe solenoid
is energized. Whenthe current to the solenoid is reduced or stopped and
hence the counter-balancing force reduced, th_ momenton the trigger arm
about its pivot is unbalanced resulting in disengagement of the latch bar
out of the notch in the trigger arm. The break-leg is then "broken" and
the release-rod movesdownwardunder the action of the combined forces
due to release-rod weight_ bellows_ and sprin_. As previously described 3
downwardmovementof 1/4 inch of the release-_od relative to the drive-rod
releases the shim-safety rod from the drive rcd and results in the "scram"
action. Whenunlatched, the movementof the lelease-rod down is stopped(and limited to I/2-inch total distance) by inpact of the end of the
release-rod against the face of the steel nut screwed into the end of the
drive-rod lower assembly. The face of the steel nut and the end of the
release-rod are heat-treated to form hardened surfaces. To relatch after
a scram, the drive-rod must be driven downto its bottom stop where the
relatching arm contacts the relatch stop on the fixed frame guide. Further
downwardmotion of the drive-rod is then required to pull up the release-
rod relative to the drive-rod against the action of the downwardforces}
the release-rod is then in proper position for relatching by solenoid-
actiom.
The relatching arm runs in a slot fastened to the drive-rod exten-
sion so that the release-rod cannot rotate relative to the drive-rod.
!
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The total force downward on the latch is about 400 pounds with the release-
rod weight contributing I0 pounds_ the bellows 230 pounds_ and the spring
160 pounds. Due to the mechanical multiplication_ this downward force
results in a force of about 12 pounds exerted downward on the solenoid
plunger and which must be overcome by solenoid action. The spring alone
or the bellows alone exert enough force to trip the latch so that if ei-
ther the spring or the bellows broke_ the unlatching action would still
occur although the dead time in the unlatching process would be increased.
A slight downward force by means of a torsion spring is also applied
on the trigger arm above the solenoid plunger so that in the unlatched
position with the solenoid plunger down_ the latch is swung away from the
release-rod. Note the O-ring seals in figure 2.37 to prevent leakage of
water from the reactor tank through the bellow assembly.
In the scram-latch mechanism design shown in figure 2.37_ careful
consideration has been taken to ensure ease of assembly_ disassembly_ and
inspection of the individual parts. Means for careful adjustment and
maintaining constancy of adjustment of the forces actuating the latch are
incorporated into the design. The speed of response of the mechanical un-
latching action for the design herein described has been calculated as 18
msec (not including solenoid dead-time)_ part of the developmental work
on the mechanism will be aimed at reducing this dead-time.
2.3.5 Drive-Rod Actuator
The shim-rod withdrawal speed will be limited to 3 inches per minute.
The considerations involved in arriving at this limiting speed are dis-
cussed in section 6.1. However_ the shim-rods will have two possible
limiting speeds for insertion_ namely_ a slow-speed insertion of 3 inches
per minute_ and a high-speed insertion of 9 inches per minute. To incor-
porate the feature of a high-speed insertion without the possibility of
it becoming_ by any means whatsoever_ a high-speed withdrawal_ two sep-
arate motors are used for each shim-rod drive. One motor gives the low-
speed withdrawal and insertion whereas the second motor gives the fast
insertion only. The two motors drive_ through individual self-locking
worm-gears_ a common differential epicyclic gear train_ the output of
which drives the drive-rod by means of a lead screw (see fig. 2.38). The
locked worm-gears preclude the possibility of one motor driving the other.
The low-speed motor is a reversible 2-phase A.C. motor. The motor will
have speed and direction-of-rotation control through the control of the
phase and voltage of the one winding in reference to the other. In order
to assure a synchronous limited maximum speed_ the motors will be selected
to have the required torque near the full-speed point_ thus any reduction
in load torque could give only a very small increase in speed. The high-
speed insertion motor is a single-phase_ replusion-induction A.C. motor
so wound and connected that only a single direction of rotation is possi-
ble. The motor will have a single-shaft output so that it cannot possibly
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be assembled to deliver power in the reverse rotational direction. In
addition, the high-speed insertion motor is :oupled to the self-locking
worm-gear by meansof a one-way clutch. Standard operational procedure
prior to a normal reactor-startup will require that the fast-insertion
be checked by the operator at the reactor-console. These precautions
ensure no possibility of the fast-insertion becoming a fast withdrawal
as a result of failure of the driving mechanism, short-circuit or error
in the electrical wiring_ wrong assembly of the drive-rod actuator_ or
reactor-operator error.
Interlocks will be incorporated in the ,:ontrol circuitry of the two
motors so that only one of the two motors c_l drive the shim-safety rod
at any given time. Actually, no hazardous condition is involved because
the high-speed insertion motor will pull the rod into the reactor irre-
gardless of the speed and rotation-direction of the low-speed motor.
I
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2.3.6 Shim-Safety Rod Position Measurements and Travel Limits
Information on the instantaneous positic_ns of the shim-rods is trans-
mitted by selsyn units to the operator. Li_t switches are used to limit
the travel of the drive-rods (by interruptio_L of current to the drive-
motors) and to transmit to the operator such information as the seating
of the shim-safety rods in their shock abso_ers or the engagement of the
bottom latch in the quick-release mechanism.
2.3.7 Developmental Tests of Shim-Safety Rod System
A full-scale mockup of the shim-safety rod drive system and quick-
release mechanism is being constructed and w_ Ii receive thorough testing
under the simulated water-flow and purity conditions anticipated in actual
operation. The mockup will be subjected to _everal thousand hours of rep-
etitive testing running through many different cycles of shim-safety rod
withdrawal, insertion, and scram-release. V_riations will be made in the
design described herein in order to arrive at a "best" design from the
standpoint of ruggedness, performance, and alsolute reliability. The per-
formance and endurance testing will involve _etermination of the relia-
bility and speed of response of the quick-release mechanism, the degree
of misalinement and distortion of the assemb]y grids relative to each
other and to the lower bearing grid which wi]l not (i) interfere with the
scram-action, and (2) prevent the pulling-do_n of the shim-safety rod by
the drive-rod, and the leak-tightness of the drive-rod seal assembly under
repetitive cycling motion of the drive-rod. Final testing will be per-
formed with water-crudding conditions much mere severe than expected in
actual operation.
!o
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2..3.8 Regulating - Rods
No details of rod construction and drive-mechanism are presented
herein. Basically_ the design objectives for the regulating-rod action
are the same as at the Materials Testing Reactor. The regulating-rod
drive is actuated from the subpile room. The maximum reactivity control-
lable by the regulating rod will be limited to not over 0.6 percent. The
regulating-rod motion will be velocity-limited. The accidents due to the
regulating-rod are discussed in section 6.1.6.
2.3.9 Emergency Power Cutbacks
As in the Materials Testing Reactor control and safety system_ various
modes of corrective action other than the ultimate scram are used_ the se-
verity of the action depeading on the degree of hazard involved in the ab-
normal condition requiring the safety action. Hence_ many potentially
dangerous situations may be corrected before the scram action is involved.
The types of emergency reactor-power cutbacks in the order increasing se-
verity of the accident involved are: (i) slow and fast setbacksj (2) slow
and fast reverses_ and (3) slow and fast scrams. Figure 2.39 gives some
indication of the rates of power-reduction resulting from these safety
actions. The reverse at 0.04 percent AK/K per second corresponds to
the slow-reverse for shim-rod effectiveness equal to 40 percent of its
maximum value_ the power-reduction rate corresponding to maximum effective-
ness (0.i percent Z_K/K per sec) can be estimated by interpolation be-
tween the curves for 0.04 and 0.15 percent. The reverse at 0.i percent
Z_K/K per second also corresponds to the fast-reverse for shim-rod ef-
fectiveness equal to 1/3 of its maximum value. The scram to -30 percent
_(/K corresponds to the full scram for shim-rod effectiveness equal to
about 1/3 maximum effectiveness. It is obvious that the fast-reverse is
vastly inferior to the full scram insofar as rate of power reduction is
concerned.
2.3.10 General Considerations of Safety System
Basically_ the control and safety system is comparable to the MTR
system. The important safety features of the MTR have been adopted with
relatively little change. However_ in some phases of the design, it was
desirable to take advantage of the improvements in instrumentation and
control equipment made since the design of the MTR system and of the ex-
perience accumulated at MTR. It is basically in this respect that the
design differs from that at MTR.
No specific components are described inasmuch as an investigation
is still in progress to obtain more complete information on the performance
and reliability that can be expected from presently-available components.
Hence, only the general principles and design objectives are presented.
It is to be expected that someof the design objectives maybe modified
as more complete information on available componentsis obtained. How-
ever, with the more important basic features of the MTRincorporated, as
a minimum, in the present design, such design changes as maybe required
should have little effect on the over-all safety and control of the re-
actor. Prior to its adoption, the critical c:omponentsof the control and
safety system will be assembled and tested (using simulated ion-chamber
signals) to evaluate its over-all performance and reliability.
2.3.11 Regulating-Rod Servo-System
The power-level control system provides for automatic control of the
neutron flux level as sensed by a suitable ion chamber located close to
the reactor core so as to give nearly maximum1signal at full power. This
system will cover the top three decades of the reactor power spectrum.
The reactor will then be on "servo" during the last decades of the period
range and for the full power range. As indicated in figure 2.40, the out-
put of the ion chamberfeeds into a logarithmic amplifier whoseoutput is
proportional to the logarithm of its input. The output of this circuit
is comparedwith the output of a similar circuit and if the difference
between the two outputs exceeds a preset minimum, a warning of this con-
dition is indicated to the operator at the r_actor control console. By
meansof a switch the operator can select eilher of the two logarithmic-
amplifier outputs for the servo signal. The signal from the selected
log N amplifier is compared, in a servo error-circuit, with a reference
(setpoint) signal to give an error signal which, in turn, is fed to the
regulating-rod servo-control system. The output of the error circuit is
approximately proportional to the logarithm cf the ratio of the measured
and setpoint flux; the servo-loop gain is th_s independent of power level.
!
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2.3.12 Setpoint Action
As indicated in figure 2.40 the setpoin_ signal for the error-circuit
is obtained by means of a speed-limited motol-driven setpoint on a linear-
resistance slide wire. The setpoint can be _riven, through appropriate
interlocks, by either the slow-reversible motor or the fast-reversible
motor. The manual setting is accomplished b_ the operator setting the
demand-power on the power controller which results in the driving of the
setpoint. This results in a power change to the new setting on a 20-
second period when the fast-reverslble motor is used and on a 90-second
period with the slow-reversible motor. The slow and fast setbacks are
the result of the automatic lowering, by the control-safety system, of
the servo setpoint. The slow setback reduces reactor power on a constant
90-second period) the fast setback causes power-reduction on a 20-second
period. These controlled decreases in power occur only within the servo-
range limits of full-power to l0 -3 full power. When the trouble causing
oa
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the setbacks has cleared, the power can be increased to the original or
desired value by operator action.
Setback error circuits, similar to the one forming the error-signal
for the servo-control system, will be provided to place limits upon the
motion of the motor-driven setpolnt and to cause full-corrective and/or
fail-safe power reductions dependent upon certain error-minimum require-
ments. The error-clrcuits will perform the following functions:
(a) If the indicated reactor flux exceeds the setpoint by:
1.2 Warning
1.5 Shim-rod out motion will be stopped and locked out (no
manual override possible until causative condition cleared).
1.4 Slow-reverse will be initiated.
1.5 Slow scram will be initiated.
(b) If the setpoint exceeds the indicated reactor flux by:
1.2 Warning
1.5 Motor-driven setpoint increase will be stopped and be
locked out.
1.4 Shim-rod-out motion will be stopped and locked out.
1.5 Fast setback initiated.
Of the preceding circuits_ two will be provided with backups on a
separate independent system (by setpoints on the recorder indicated in
fig. 2.40). These are:
(a) When measured power exceeds setpoint by more than 1.5, full
scram will be initiated.
(b) When setpoint exceeds measured power by more than 1.5 3 setpoint
will be stopped and locked out and all shim-rod-out motion will be stopped
and locked out.
Recovery from these conditions_ except for full scram can be made
through the proper corrective action.
By such close supervision of the error-signal at all levels in the
servo-control range_ the corrective-action of the control system is
initiated at flux levels close to the level where the "accident" or ab-
normal condition occurs. This system supplements the usual fixed-level
and period trips.
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Whenthe reactor is started from a power below the lower limit of
the motor-driven setpoint system3 the motor-d:'iven setpoint must be at
its lower limit thus providing a over-power s.:ram at 1.5×10 -5 of full
power. When a power "sag" occurs that is within the range of the motor-
driven setpointj recovery to higher power can be made only by first driv-
ing the motor setpoint down to the "sag" power.
2.5.15 Regulating- and Shim-Rod Actions
The regulating rod and servo system will be of the high speed type
required for proper control of experimental r._actors of this type and
power capabilities. The system will be of th_ continuous signal type (as
opposed to the on-off type) using an amplidyne driven D.C. motor or simi-
lar power system. A tachometer feedback will be used and local and remote
position indication will be provided. The usual switches will be provided
for travel limits_ shim control_ and interlocks. Two complete regulating
rod assemblies will be provided with one requ_Lred for operation. Arrange-
ments for transfer of control from one rod to the other during reactor
operation will be provided. The regulating rod in control will call for
both insertion and withdrawal of the shim rod_. The insertion (lowering
power) will not require manual supervision bu, the withdrawal will be
subject to both interlock and manual agreement. The regulating rod will
be maintained in its area of highest control effectiveness, i.e., near
mid-travel during normal operation. The rod ilot in servo-control will
always be withdrawn from the core prior to st_ting.
A wide range of speed control is availab_.e for movement of the shim-
safety rods. Manual control of any single sh:m-safety rod will be possi-
ble and both intermittent and very slow shim-:.'od withdrawal rates will be
provided. The usual limit switches will be p:'ovided for limiting rod
motion and for interlocking. A safe reactor-c_ff position has been pro-
vided by the drive-rod relatching system. In the shutdown (or "off")
position, the reactor is in the "scram" condi-;ion with the drive rods in
the full-down position) hence_ any motion of -;he drive rods is incapable
of moving the control rods should some accide1_ occur. In order to be
able to move the shim-safety rods out of the reactor_ the operator must
first go through a specific mechanical proced_Lre for rod relatching. To
effect the rod relatching, it will be necessa_'y (with manual override re-
quired) to drive the rods below the bottom limit_ reset the solenoid
catch, and reverse the drive to the bottom liTlit position.
The reverse is a motor-driven insertion c,f all shim-safety rods, the
action being initiated either automatically bl_ the safety system or manu-
ally by the operator. When initiated by the :_afety system_ the reverse
continues until the condition causing the reverse has cleared and the
operator has removed the reverse command of the safety system. In the
slow-reverse, the shim-rods are driven at the maximum speed of the low-
speed shim-drive motors; the command is transmitted to the motors through
!
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the closing of contacts indicating some abnormal condition. In the fast-
reverse_ the shim-rods are driven at the maximum speed of the high-speed
insertion motors.
The scrams are achieved by reducing or shutting off the current to
the shim-rod holding solenoids. Exactly as in the MTR safety system (fig.
2.41)j the output of the amplifiers supplying power to the holding sole-
noids is controlled by a sigma-bus potential which in turn is determined
by power-level and period signals originating from ion-chambers. When
any one of the duplicate signals of power-level or period is abnormal_
the sigma-bus potential changes resulting in a reduction of power to the
holding-solenoids thus resulting in the fast scram. This action is elec-
tronic so that the fast scram is a quick-response action.
In the slow scram_ the current to the holding solenoids is shut off
by the action of normally-energized relays whose contacts are in the power
supply circuit of the magnet amplifiers. Failure of any relay causes
scram.
Every scram action is immediately followed by the fast-reverse.
2.3.14 Activity - Measuring Instrumentation
The reactor activity measuring instrumentation will consist of paral-
lel circular plate and compensated ion chambers_ fission chambers_ boron
thermopiles 3 and miscellaneous air and water activity measuring instru-
ments. The parallel circular plate and compensated ion chambers and the
fission chambers cover 3 in combination 3 the entire range of flux levels
from that produced by a neutron source to that corresponding to 1.5 full
power. The flux range of the fission chambers is increased by making
provisions for their movement during reactor startup. The fission-chambers
are especially useful in the source-level range and, by moving them to sev-
eral established fixed positions during startup_ can cover the entire flux
range of the reactor. The information obtained from the fission chambers
is indicated in figure 2.42 which shows the galvanometer system. The par-
allel circular plate and compensated ion chambers will be of commercial
manufacture following the Oak Ridge designs_ or fully equal equipment of
proven design and operation. The fission chambers and boron thermopiles
will also follow 0s_ Ridge designs with whatever modifications are re-
quired to fit this reactor design. The other air and water activity meas-
uring devices will be of standard types now in use or under development.
Those activities in the air and the water systems directly associated with
the operation of the reactor will be part of the warning and reactor power
setback circuits.
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2.5.15 Other Instrumentation
Instrumentation with indication, time records, warning circuits and
reactor shut-down capabilities will be provided as required for measure-
ment of flow_ pressure, temperature, power (heat release) electrical power,
etc. In general, these systems will use commercially available equipment
with only such modifications as maybe necessary to perform the required
task.
Water flow measurementswill be madein the primary water system both
in the main flow and the head-tank makeupline. Flow measurementswill
also be madein the shut-down cooling system. Air flow into and out of
the containment vessel will also be measured. Standard flow measuring
methods will be used (i.e., flow nozzles, pitJt tubes 3 venturies_ etc.).
An indication of secondary (heat-exchanger) w_ter flow will be provided.
Manypressure measurementswill also be made. These will include the
critical operating pressures in both the primary and secondary water sys-
tems. The head tank pressure (which is also an indication of tank water
level) will also be measured. This pressure will be comparedwith actual
tank level as indicated by float gages and an_zdeviation will call for
reactor shut-down.
The commercial (purchased) power system _s well as the diesel gener-
ator and the guaranteed (battery) power systeQs will be surveyed for
indications of off-normal conditions. Loss o_fpower in these systems
shall call for automatic corrective action and failing that will shut
downthe reactor. Under someinstances, emergencywater flow systems
would be brought into play.
Very manytemperatures will be measured. Only the more important
ones are covered here. In the primary water :_ystem, the reactor inlet
and outlet temperatures will be measuredand _he temperature difference
computed. Also the water temperatures enteri_ig and leaving the heat ex-
changers and entering the primary deionizer will be measured. The sec-
ondary system temperatures will also be monitored. Other temperatures
affecting the operation of the reactor will be measuredon a scanning
monitor. Such temperatures, as shield water, solid shield, pumpmotor
winding and bearing, containment tank air, etch., would be typical of
these. The product of the water flow and the water Z_T for both the
primary and shut-down systems would be comput,_dto give an indication
of the power output (heat release) of the rea_:tor.
2.5.16 Power Cut-Back Table
Table 2.6 is indicative of the emergencymeasures that will be in-
corporated into the reactor safety system. In table 2.6 is presented a
compilation of the automatic corrective actior, invoked by the control and
safety system for various abnormal or hazardous conditions which may arise
!
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in the operation of the reactor and reactor supporting systems. The table
is arranged according to the source of the trouble. The severity of the
power cutback depends on the degree of abnormality involved. As the ab-
normal condition worsens_ the emergency action becomes more drastic_ final-
ly culminating in the scram.
!
!
O
5O
TAgLK ',.4".. _ POWER CUT, A{ KS
IFS_ : Frost scr'_1; S_ : SIGw suzv_m; FFi' Fast m-v{r'se; SR . Slow r'everse; F_3B = Fz_st ;_i:!% b_<zk;
3S[_ :]!.ow set b_ick; Wa_' = Waun!rL[_.]
,:, -- -- 7- [ "" Z:
, , -, • -! ,r
]
t
•r
_,r• L:L. :,I ,,"
k •
L._ : t_ T,'._'_ _ _ ,.._'
-• , ,',_L,,', I<,. [ r_ ×
]. :rLll_ll_,] t-_._r.,±t,.v _.i ]_
. . r u_ . ,
!
O
_O
51
0
,-4
I
0
!
L'_
rO
I
J
L_
F _
,
52
2.4 REACTOR AND CONTROL ?_NETICS
Detailed studies of the material in thi_ section are presented in
reference 2.%.
2._. i St art up
A detailed description of the startup procedures is in preparation.
This will include check-out and monitoring procedures before startup_
source level considerations; allowable rod motions; and instrumentation
for the various types of startup conditions. The role of the servo and
the nature of the coupling between the shim-_afety and regulating rods
will be discussed as well as the degree of altomatic and manual control
to be used.
!
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2.4.2 Restart Times
The Xe buildup after a shutdown has serious consequences in the
operation of the reactor as continuity in op(ration is desired. The build-
up will be linear in time and proportional t( the operating flux before
the scram. The minimum time in which to stol the Xe rise is taken up
by (i) a waiting period to ascertain and cor:'ect the difficulty and to
insert the rod drive and lower the servo set point; (2) the time to with-
draw the rods to near critical; and (3) the _ime to increase flux level
high enough to stop the Xe rise.
In a typical startup at constant rod sp(ed; the allowable period (T)
is reached subcritically about T seconds b_fore criticality would be
reached if rods continued at constant speed. At this time the rods must
be slowed down to maintain the allowable period. As the flux level must
rise almost to its original value before scr_m in order to stop the Xe
rise_ maximum rod speed cannot be used to full advantage.
Figure 2.43 shows the potential ability to restart the reactor after
a scram in terms of the maximum allowable down time 3 from full scram to
starting rod withdrawal_ at each day of operation over the lO-day cycle_
for various excess reactivities allocated fo_ Xe override. The decrease
in excess reactivity available was assumed a_ 0.625 percent f_K/day. A
maximum rod withdrawal velocity of 3 in./min and a minimum reactor period
of 20 seconds were used. A typical lO-day c_cle characteristic at rated
conditions for flux level and Xe concentration was assumed; the rate
of Xe rise after shutdown being proportion_l to the product of these
two quantities. The shim-rod positions giver in figure 2.23 were used.
Figure 2.43 shows that each one percent f_K allocated for Xe over-
I
ride is worth about i[ days extra operation, or 3 to 3.5 min extra down
time. If 2 percent AK were allocated for Xe override 3 there would be
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a 2 min allowable down time at the end of 8 days 3 and a 19 min allowable
downtime at the end of 2 days.
The long term Xe and Sm effects are given in reference 2.4. Of
special interest is the behavior of Sm at high thermal flux. After
shutdown from a flux level of 4xI014_ the Sm rise will compensate for
the Xe decay at about 105 hours after scram) ultimately reaching a
quasi-equilibrium value of -5.88 percent AK/K.
2.4.5 Maximum Xenon Burn-Out After Restart
The rate of Xe burn-out is proportional to the product of the Xe
concentration and the thermal flux. After a restart_ with Xe buildup,
the possible Xe burn-out relative to formation from I decay_ even at
normal flux levels 3 is a factor in setting control rod speeds. If the
rods cannot keep _ with this burn-out 3 a nuclear excursion will start
and the only protection to the reactor are the scrams. This incident
would not give large power overshoots if the reactor scrams.
The maximum rates of Xe burn-out_ after a restart with Xe build-
up3 are tabulated below_ for restarting at the maximum thermal flux level
of 4x1014 •
MAXIMUM Xe BURN-0UT RATES AFTER RESTARTS
Reactivity effect
of Xe at
restart
-8 percent 29[
-2O
Restart on Xe rise
Thermal flux level before scram
4x1014 .1014
0.3 percent 0.6 percent
L_K/min g_K/min
1.2 1.4
Restart on
Xe decay
0.6 percent
AK/min
1.5
MINIMUM CONTROLLED AK REVERSE RATES
Rod velocity
3 in./min
9
Minimum rod effectiveness
0.4 percent ZkK/in.
0.4
Controlled £_<
reverse rate
1.2 percent
AK/min
3.6
The extreme possibility of restarting with -20 percent ZiK due to
Xe in the core was used. The worst case is restarting around peak Xe
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or on Xe decay where 1.5 percent _K/min m6ybe inserted by Xe burn-
out at rated flux level. This reactivity insertion rate must be con-
trolled by the reverse speeds of the shim-ss/ety rods. The minimumcon-
trolled reactivity reverse rates are also shcwn above for rod speeds of
3 in./min and 9 in./min 3 at the minimumrod effectiveness of 0.4 percent
Z/K/in. (20 percent of maximumeffectiveness 3 as estimated from fig. 2.23).
The 9 in./min insertion rate is adequate to insure control of Xe burn-
out at all times.
2.4.4 Cut-Backs
The effect of various cut-backs on flux level was shown on figure
2.393 for scrams_ reverses_ and set-back. These results were obtained
on a differential analyzer including the effects of five delayed neutron
groups. For scrams 3 the prompt drop is obtained in 0.25 to 0.5 second.
For a total of -30.0 percent Z_K/K_ a cut-back to 2 percent is obtained
in 1.16 seconds. If only a total of -I0 percent ZkK/K is inserted, it
takes ii seconds to reduce flux level to 2 percent.
Cut-backs by reverses are very sensitive to reverse speeds. For a
reverse of 0.7 percent Z/K/K/second, a one decade drop is obtained in 5
seconds at which time -3.5 percent Z/K/K has been inserted. Immediate
recovery from this level is always possible if there were about 0.7 per-
cent Z_K/K excess before the reverse. The slower reverse_ at 0.04 per-
cent _/K/second_ is only slightly more effective than a 20 second period
set-back.
O
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2°4.5 Kinetic Parameters
The prompt neutron lifetime_ temperature coefficient_ and void co-
efficient were discussed in section 2.2 and appendix B. The effective
delayed neutron fraction was calculated from an analysis consistent with
the group diffusion equations. The minimum value of this parameter was
found to be 0.0085_ as compared to the actual yield of 0.0075. The in-
creased effect of the delayed neutrons is caused by their lower average
age_ about 35 cm2_ as compared to the average age of the prompt neutrons_
64 cm 2 .
2.4.6 Stability
In normal operation 3 the inherent stabilLty characteristics of the
reactor determine the ease or difficulty of o_eration in manual control
and the dependence on and requirements of the servo in automatic control.
Xenon effects are always unstabilizing. The delayed neutrons and nega-
tive temperature coefficient are stabilizing Lnfluences. Assuming
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linearization around the operating condition of interest_ the combined
equations for reactor kinetics using one average delay group_ temperature
effects_ and Xe effects were analyzed for inherent stability.
The stability criterion was found to be _ > P0_ where _ is the
negative temperature coefficient_ AT is the difference between the aver-
age coolant temperature in the reactor and the average coolant temperature
at the inlet to the reactor_ and P0 is the total reactivity effect of
Xe; all conditions at the operating point of interest. For this reactor_
cU_T _ 0.15 percent Z_K/K and P0 _ 4 percent Z_K/K_ and the reactor is
inherently unstable. This Xe power instability is manifested as a slow_
positive exponential drift in flux level_ increasing or decreasing. The
time constant of this unstable mode is shown in the following table_ for
an operating flux of 4×10143 effective delayed neutron fraction of 0.0085_
and average mean life of the delayed neutrons of 12.47 seconds.
TIME CONSTANT OF Xe POWER INSTABILITY
aZ_T Xenon concentration
4 Percent Z_K/K_ during 20 Percent Z_K/K 3 during
normal operation restart with maximum xenon
Z_K/K 16.0 sec0 percent
0.043
_.15
.3
43.5 sec
49.8
67.0
96.6
20.4
_Approximate condition at rated power.
The negative temperature coefficient only increases the time constant
of the Xe power instability from 43 seconds to about 60 seconds. The un-
stable period could be as low as 20 seconds after a restart with maximum
Xe buildup. On a restart_ this period is also that which would develop_
at first_ if the control rods do not keep up with Xe burn-out.
2.4.7 Controlled Reactor
A controlled system was analyzed under the same assumptions regard-
ing kinetics as in the preceding section. For pure integral control ac-
tion_ the gains and regulating rod speed requirements to stabilize the
Xe power instability are easily met_ the speed chosen being about 200
times that required for stability under all conditions.
56
The requirements on the regulating rod for constant period setbacks
are tabulated below:
Setback
period
20.0 sec
90.0
Maximum speed of
regulating rod
required
-0.04 percent ZkK/K
sec
-. 01
Maximum insertion
of regulating rod
required
-0.24 percent AK/K
-.08
Time to reach maximum
insertion of
regulating rod
15.6 sec
28.5
Using one average delayed neutron group indicates that to maintain
a constant period setback 3 there is a maximum insertion of the regulating
rod after which the rod will withdraw and approach its original position.
The table shows that the regulating rod speel (given below) is adequate
for setbacks but that the range required for a 20 second period setback
may be critical. If the regulating rod trip3 the bottom limit switch,
the reverse action called for would be adequate to maintain the 20 sec-
ond period setback or put the regulating rod back into range.
The regulating rod can control step-wis_ insertions of reactivity
within its range capabilities. For step-wise disturbances in reactivity
less than prompt critical_ the peak flux wouLd be the irreducible (almost)
prompt rise. The required rod velocity is proportional to the reactivity
inserted and inversely proportional to the required settling time for the
transient. The maximum rod speed chosen 3 fu_l travel in about one second
or 0.6 percent ZkK/K/second 3 could control a step reactivity disturbance
of 0.15 percent for a requirement that the flux level return back to its
original value in about one second. In addi_ion_ the regulating rod_
which must be fully withdrawn before startup, can override all possible
shim-safety rod withdrawals and can stop or ,[elay a startup accident.
!
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SECTION S. - SITE
S.I ACCESS TO SITE
The proposed site_ in the Plum Brook Ordnance Works, lies three
miles south southeast of the city limits of Sandusky, and approximately
four miles from the center of population. The site is surrounded by ex-
cellent major highways (see fig. 2.1). Immediately to the west of the
site and serving the site area with a spur, is the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, entering Sandusky from the south.
Travel and truck movements to and from Sandusky and the reactor site
on any side appear feasible during an emergency.
!
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3.2 EXISTING USES OF SURROUNDING AREA
3.2.1 Plum Brook Ordnance Works
The Plum Brook Ordnance Works was constructed in 1941 and 1942 for
the U.S. Army and was used for TNT and pentolite manufacturing and for
ammunition storage. The area is presently inactive except for the ammuni-
tion storage area which is being used by the Erie Ordnance Depot, Port
Clinton_ Ohio.
The relation of the reactor facility to the Plum Brook Ordnance Works
is shown in figure S.I. The reactor facility is located in what formerly
was the pentolite manufacturing area. This area will be decontaminated
to a condition SX (fit for civilian use). The areas designated "A, ....B_"
and "C" were formerly TNT manufacturing areas and are now inactive. Area
"A" has been decontaminated by Ravenna Arsenal, Inc., 16_000 pounds of
I
TNT being removed in the process.
The magazine storage area is also shown on figure S.I. This area
contains 99 igloos _ich are of reinforced concrete construction and
earth covered. They are limited in storage capacity to 250;000 pounds of
TNT (or equivalent) each. 2 The ground shock accelerations and displace-
ments and the air blast which would be produced at the reactor facility
due to an accidental explosion of one of the igloos are discussed in sec-
tion 6.S.7.
5.2.2 Area External to the Plum Brook Ordnance Works
As is shown on the aerial mosaic (fig. S.2), to the west, south, and
east of the Plum Brook Ordnance Works the land is used primarily for
Ipersonal communication from Mr. H. M. Krengle; General Manager_
Ravenna Arsenal_ Inc., Apco, Ohio.
2Personal communication from Mr. Joseph Fernan, Erie Ordnance Depot.
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farming. North of the reactor site is a suburban residential and manu-
facturing area of Sandusky.
The following list of manufacturers was compiled from "Directory of
Ohio Manufacturers_ 1954_" as published by the State of Ohio, Department
of Industrial Relations. Of the companies l_sted for the immediate area
29 employ 50 or more people and are listed in the table. Fifty-six com-
panies employ less than 50 each and have a t,)tal employment of 731 (7
percent of total) for an average of 15 employees each.
TABLE S.i. - MANUFACTURERS IN SA_NDUSKY AREA
I
O
_O
Company
Waldock Packing Company
l_ke Erie Canning Company
General Motors Corporation_
New Departure Division
Ford Motor Company a
Industry
Meat Packing
Canning
Dall and Roller
Bearings
Auto Parts
Number o£
employees
91
85
2671
2000
Esmond Dairy Company
American Crayon Company
Flexible Conveyor Company
Brown Industries_ Inc.
Sandusky Baking Company
Diamond Fertilizer Company
Universal Clay Products Company
Farrell Cheek Steel Company
Apex Electrical Mfg. Company
Lyman Boat Works_ Inc.
Armour Fertilizer Works
Barr Rubber Products Company
Industrial Nut Corporation
Stephens Printing Corp.
Sandusky Newspapers_ Inc.
Sandusky Foundry &Machine Co.
G & C Foundry Company
Union Chain and Mfg. Company
A. }i. Vo <',i and Company_ Inc.
Sandusky Metal Products_ Inc.
Hiude & Dauch Paper Company
Scott Paper Company
Aluminum & MaL_qesimn _ Inc.
Celotex Corporation Paper
Medusa Portland Cement Company
Dairy
Art Supplies
Conveyors
Foundry
Baking
Fertilizer
Electrical Insular D_
Foundry
Appl lance s
Boat Building
Fertilizer
Rubber
Bolts and Nuts
Print ing
Print in g
Foundry
Foundry
Power Transmissio:_
Candy
Metal Furniture
Paper
Paper
Smelting
Paper
Cement
72
279
52
108
56
71
116
429
697
161
]05
510
155
72
69
171
65
272
95
72
681
119
272
56
207
Distance !Direc-
from site_ tion
miles
5.15
5.33 NIIW
5.44 NW
5.50 NW
5.72 NNW
5.93 ITNW
4. O0 1114
4. O0 NW
4.15 IINW
4.25 5_]W
4.36
4.36 NNW
4.40 N
4.44 NNW
4.45 NNW
4.45 NNW
4.59 NW
4.83 NW
4.86 NNW
4.94 NNW
4.97 NW
5.00
5.05 ITNW
5.05 NNW
5.i0 ITNW
5.10 }_{W
S. 50 NW
5.50 SE
8.60 1114
Total Estimated Worker_ 9583 Q
_Plant currently under construction. Employees est_ated.
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The New Departure Division of the General Motors Corporation Bearing
Plant employing more than 2500 persons is being followed by a Ford Motor
Company small parts plant now under construction which it is estimated
will have over 2000 employees. This trend is expected to continue partic-
ularly after completion of the St. Lawrence Seaway which will result in
increased shipping on the Great Lakes and greater commercial and manu-
facturing activities in and around the lake port cities.
3.3 POPULkTION DISTRIBUTION SL%94ARY
The population distribution for different directions and distances
from the reactor site is indicated in table 3.2. These values are esti-
mated from the 19S0 Census Bureau Tabulation.
TABLE 3.2. - POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
Radius_ NE Quad SE Quad SW Quad NW Quad Totals
Mi
0 i
i - 2
2 - 3
3 - 4
4 - S
S - 6
al00
500
800
bSlo
b320
540
2570
i00
8O
310
450
680
1620
--- 50 150
i00 200 700
250 c2,300 c3,430
280 b6,150 b7,250
300 b21_870 b22,940
Z30 b2,430 b3,980
1260 333000 38_450
aDistance to nearest residence is 3200 feet.
blncludes a part of Sandusky.
Clncludes State of Ohio Soldiers and Sailors Home.
Five to six mile areas to the northwest_ the direction of greatesl
population_ are largely in Sandusky Bay_ to the northeast_ downstream of
the prevailing winds_ they are largely in Lake Erie.
The city of Sandusky as presently constituted has a very limited urea
available for new commercial or housing construction. A recent attempt to
enlarge the city limits to the south in Perkins Township was defeated by
vote. Since waterfront areas are already built up; new manufacturing
plants are bein!_ located south of the city. The lardest of such exp_n-
sion has been to the southwest Genera] Motors_ New Departure Bearing
Division Plant, and the Ford Motor Company small parts plant under con-
struction. As new industries are established_ additional <<ommercial and
housing construction will be required to serve the people drawn to the
area. It appears that such construction being_ in effect_ an enlargement
of Sandusky would be uniformly distributed in _n arc to the south of the
city and lying north of the Plum Brook Ordnam'e Works.
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No attempt to estimate the future growth of the area is madebut the
census figures for the city of Sandusky(goiug back to 1900) are listed
below:
1900 19,664
1910 19,989
1920 22,897
1930 24,622
1940 24,874
1950 29_375
The total county population for 1940: 43,20[ and for 1950: 52,565,
which indicates that for this ten year perio.l the rate of increase in
population in the county as a whole was sligitly greater than for the
city of Sandusky.
!
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3.4 METEOROLOGY SUMMARY
The U.S. Weather Bureau_ Scientific Services Division; has prepared
a report on the meteorology for the proposed site. This report is in-
cluded as appendix C.
Figure 3.3 summarizes the frequency of surface winds from various
directions for each season of the year and flgure 3.4(a) shows the annual
average for all observations. Due to the lo,:ation of the recording sta-
tions in an urban area and the high percentage of low velocity readings
the corresponding mean wind velocities have been omitted. It will be
noted that southwesterly winds are predominant with SS percent of the
winds occurring from the directions south thz'ough west. Downwind of the
site southwesterly winds pass over relativel_ r sparsely populated areas
I
and reach Lake Erie within 4[ to 5 miles. W:nds from the southeast which
would present the greatest hazard to Sanduskz" have the smallest frequency
occurring S percent of the time for all season. During summer nights this
increases to 7 percent and for winter nights to 6 percent.
As pointed out in the meteorological re],ort 3 there is no major shift
in surface wind patterns during precipitating; weather. Since the frequency
of wind, by directions, is virtually identic_.l with the annual frequencies,
no special consideration has been given the Cirection of travel of "washed
out" material or accelerated "fall out." Fi_iure 3.4 shows annual wind
frequencies for (a) all observations and (b) annual wind frequencies dur-
ing precipitation.
Atmospheric stability has been examined using measurements made at
Toledoj Ohio. Since inversion and wind dire(tion data are from different
stations no plot of frequency of occurrence with wind direction is pre-
sented. However, this data is believed to give a fair qualitative picture
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of conditions at the proposed site. It is apparent that daytime inver-
sions while not too infrequent are almost entirely eliminated by daytime
heating during the summer seasons and probably occur less than I0 percent
of the time from the south and southwest for other seasons. Night-time
inversions are more frequent with the greatest frequency from the south
through west similar to the wind direction frequency.
Upper air wind roses recorded at Cleveland, Ohio (ref. 5.1), are
shown in figures 3.5(a) and (b) for different al_itudes and seasons. It
is seen that during fall and winter the prevailing wind directions change
from the southwest to the west with increasing altit_des. During spring
and summer the change is from the southwest to the northwest with increas-
ing altitude. The average upper air wind velocities are greatest during
the winter season.
More than 75 percent of the recorded surface wind speeds are between
4 and 12 mph with an average speed of 9.7 mph. The strongest winds occur
in the winter and spring. Peak wind speeds exceeding 50 mph have been
recorded for all months except May with the highest recorded speed of 77
mph occurring in June.
The area is subject to summer thunderstorms and a rare storm may
cause winds in excess of 50 mph, i to 3 inches of rain in an hour and
hailstones 1/2 inch or larger in diameter. Similarly tornadoes are a
probability in the area. The Weather Bureau report notes that over a 35
year period III tornadoes occurred in Ohio with the largest percentage in
the northern and western portions of the state.
3.5 GEOLOGY SUMMARY
The U.S. Geological Survey, Water Resources Division_ has prepared
a memorandum on the geology and hydrology for the site. This report is
included as appendix D.
The site area is situated in the Lake Erie drainage basin on a very
flat plain at an elevation of about 630 feet_ 65 feet above Lake Erie.
The surface drainage from an area of approximately 23 acres immedi-
ately surrounding the facility will be impounded by dikes and released to
Plum Brook through a monitored discharge.
Test borings taken at the site indicate that limestone bedrock lies
twenty-five (25) feet below the surficial deposit of lacustrine clay and
glacial till. At 61 feet below the surface the bedrock becomes sandstone.
The lower level of the excavation will be 52 feet below grade.
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5.1 Airway Meteorological Atlas for the United States. U.S. Department
of Commerce_ Weather Bureau_ Washingto_ D. C._ 1941.
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SECTION 4. - EXPERIMENTS
The large variety of in-pile experiments necessary to the development
of a nuclear reactor for flight application calls for a large variety of
test holes in and around the research reactor core. For materials devel-
opment and radiation effects work 3 relatively small experiments in high
fast neutron-flux fields are desirable. Small pumped loop experiments in
which ionizing effects on corrosion compatibility of materials and cool-
ant are simulated also require high fast neutron fluxes and relatively
small test space. Experiments such as these are best conducted within
the active lattice of the critical assembly. On the other hand 3 experi-
ments on complete fuel elements or representative sections of a prototype
reactor require simulated heat generation rate and radiation effects. For
such experiments high thermal neutron fluxes and relatively large test
volumes are required which are generally available outside of the active
lattice.
As described in section 2.13 the 9-inch diameter horizontal through
hole (HT-I) is the prime irradiation facility outside of the active lat-
tice. The proximity of the water quadrants permits the insertion of com-
plete self-contained experiments into this through hole with auxiliary
equipment installed in the quadrant under water. Such experiments do not
necessarily use the through-hole feature but are likely to have a two-
pass primary coolant system so that only one quadrant need be used. The
smaller in-pile experiments may be inserted in the center test space
vacated by a shim-rod fuel element in the LC-6 position of the active lat-
tice. These consist of 5-inch square special experimental assemblies.
There are in all some 45 test holes around the core into which ex-
periments may be inserted. The designation, number, and size of these
are listed in table 4.1.
TABLE 4.1 - EXPERIMENTAL TEST HOLES
Type
Horizontal through hole
Horizontal beam hole
Vertical center hole
Vertical hole
Thermal column
Reflector hole
Hydraulic rabbit
Pneumatic rabbit
Designation
HT
KB
LC-6
V
TC
R
RH
RP
Number Size,
in.
2 9 ID
5 6 ID
1 5 sq.
2 8 ID
1 41 0D
28 S ID
4 .75 ID
2 .75 ID
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4.1 DESIGNOFTYPICALEXPERIMENTS
The testing of fuel elements to failure requires that the failure of
the element presents no hazards to the safety of operation of the facility
and that all radioactivity be contained with:_n the experimental equipment.
Whenthe test loop becomescontaminated_ it must be readily removedfrom
the test hole and handled by remote operating techniques.
These requirements are fulfilled by using a closed coolant loop with
the test fuel element located in the horizontal through hole and the aux-
iliary pumping and heat removal equipment se_led in a large container
located in one of the water filled quadrants. With a closed circulating
coolant loop of satisfactory design, the act:.vity maybe contained within
the loop. The coolant flow maybe maintained during removal of the ex-
periment from the facility to prevent further damageto the test. The
entire loop experiment may then be movedto the reactor canal and allowed
to cool as long as required without interfering with the installation of
a new experiment in the sametest hole.
Three representative experiments have been conceptually designed and
are herein described. Two of the experiment_ an air-cooled and a liquid-
cooled fuel element pumpedloop test have be,_ndesigned for the HT-I hole.
A third capsule experiment for determining r_diation effects on corrosion
has been designed for insertion into a refle_:tor test hole or in the ver-
tical center hole. The first two experiment_ were chosen as being typi-
cal of the larger gas and liquid-cooled fuel element tests that would be
conducted in the HT-I hole and were selected to point up the problems and
attendant hazards.
The reactivity effects and heat generat:on distributions for the air-
cooled experiment in the horizontal through l ole and for a fueled and un-
fueled experiment in the vertical center tes_ hole have been evaluated.
To augment the present reactivity calcu'ations, an experimental
program with the Bulk Shielding Reactor at 0_ Ridge National Laboratory
was jointly planned and executed by BSRand IIACApersonnel. In these ex-
periments the NACAcore loading wasmocked_ to within the limits of ex-
cess reactivity and materials available to Bf.R. A 7x3 slab loading of
140 gram fuel elements reflected by rows of cannedberyllium oxide fol-
lowed by water provided S.S percent excess r_activity. This loading per-
mitted the measurementof reactivity effects of compositional changes in
the location of the center fuel element corresponding to the center test
hole location in the NACAcore. The worth oi fuel plates_ water passages,
and void spaces at various positions along tle reactor height were ex-
perimentally determined. A complete descriplion of these reactivity meas-
urements and the results obtained is presented in supplement III (ref. 4.1)
to this report.
_o
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It is recognized that the safe and efficient operation of an air-
craft reactor component research facility requires that the reactivity
effects of all experiments be known accurately. The theoretical evalua-
tion of reactivity effects of experiments is analytically difficult and
limited. It is 3 therefore_ essential that the worth of experiments are
determined in temporary position in the reactor proper at zero power, or
that another facility_ such as a Reactivity Measurement Facility_ be made
available at the reactor site. The characteristics of such a facility
are being explored.
In this section_ the experiments_ auxiliary loop equipment_ and loop
operation will first be discussed. This will be followed by a presenta-
tion of the reactivity effects of these experiments3 the reactor neutron
flux distributions_ and the specific power distributions in the experi-
ments for normal operation.
OD
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4.1.1 Air-Cooled Fuel Element Experiment
The air-cooled fuel element considered is presumed to be a representa-
tive subassembly of an air-cooled reactor. The fuel element may be com-
posed of metallic fuel plates surrounded by a suitable solid moderator.
The element may be about 3 to 4 inches in diameter and 2 to 3 feet long
and is cooled by air which is recirculated in a closed loop.
The arrangement of the experiment in the horizontal through hole is
shown in figure 4.1. This particular experiment is smaller than the diam-
eter of the HT-I hole and hence an eccentric beryllium collar is inserted
to position the experiment in the hole. The fuel element and moderator
is surrounded by three concentric stainless steel tubes. The air for cool-
ing the element enters the annulus formed by the inner and middle tubes at
the quadrant end of the thimble and flows past the test section where it
reverses direction and flows back through the fuel element. A honeycomb
and screen combination straightens the flow before entering the fuel ele-
ment. Part of the air bypasses the fuel element to cool the moderator.
The middle and outer tubes are sealed at both ends to form a double clos-
ure to prevent any fission fragments or gases from escaping outward into
the water cooled clearance space between the experiment and the permanent
aluminum thimble. By the same token_ these stainless steel tubes prevent
the water from entering the cooling air annulus and cooling passages of
the experiment. In the event of a melt down of the fuel element3 the
steel tubes prevent, the molten metal from making contact with water.
The volume enclosed by these tubes is filled with a monitoring gas
and a porous media such as carbon or beryllium oxide powder. The thermal
conductivity of these materials is sufficient to conduct the heat gener-
ated by gamma absorption to the cooling water flowing between the outer
stainless tube and the aluminum thimble. These porous media also permit
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the after-heat generated in the fuel element to be conducted awaymore
readily when the experiment is removedto the canal. If a better insulat-
ing material were used, the cooling air would have to be kept circulating
for longer periods until the after-heat had decayed to a lower value.
In order to size the auxiliary equipment and to design the experiment
so that the temperature of the outer stainless steel wall is well below
the boiling point of water in the annular water passage, a nominal sub-
assembly operating power of 1 Mwwas selected with operating temperatures
consistent with material limitations.
In order to determine the temperature profiles across the experiment
and the amount of heat to be removedby the cooling water, it was assumed
that the materials in the experiment exclusive of the test element were
subjected to a uniform combinedneutron and gammainternal heat generation
rate of 12 watts per gram. For these conditions the amount of heat trans-
ferred to the water is 0.15 Mw.
4.1.1.1 Description of auxiliary equipment. - The equipment for cir-
culating the cooling air and removing the heat from the air is sealed in
a tank 6 feet in diameter and lO feet long Located in the quadrant as
shown in figures 4.1(b) and (c).
The pumping system includes two centrifugal compressors operating in
parallel, pumping twice the required flow rate. One-half of the flow is
bypassed through a throttling valve and cooler 3 which removes the heat
produced in compressing the air. The air required to cool the fuel ele-
ment passes through a pressure regulating valve and flowmeter to the test.
The heated air leaves the test# passes through two water-cooled# shell-
and tube-type heat exchangers connected in :_eries, and then flows through
a monitored filter. The air then returns to the compressors. Some of the
air bypasses the coolers and is used to regulate the compressor inlet
temperature.
The size and required utilities for th_ loop components are listed
in table 4.2. A block diagram of the safet_ and control instrumentation
is shown in figure 4.2(d).
4.1.1.2 Operation of air-cooled experirlent. - The experiment is as-
sembled and the equipment operated prior to installation in the quadrant.
The experiment is then lowered into the qua(_rant and fastened to the rails
which align the experiment with the thimble The instrumentation and con-
trol leads and the utility lines are connected, and the equipment further
checked. The experiment is moved forward i_.to the thimble and sealed with
a lock ring, shown in figure 2.11(a), that (Jan be operated remotely. The
cooling water is connected and the flow rate checked. The circulating
air system and the gas volume inside the exlJeriment containment tank are
precharged with air via the main supply system to the operating pressure
level at the compressor inlet. With cooling water for the experiment set
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at the design flow rates_ the quadrant is flooded with water. The air
compressors are started and the system is checked at design conditions
of flow rate and pressure. The experiment is then ready for the start-
up of the reactor.
O
!
O
TABLE 4.2 EQUIPMENT SIZES AND UTILITY REQUIREMENTS
Pumping unit:
Number required
Over-all length
Maximum diameter
Compressor tip diameter
Compressor ratio
Compressor speed
Drive motor type
Power required at 480 volts
Motor speed
Cooling water flow rate
Main cooler :
Number required
Diameter
Length
Cooling water flow rate
Bypass cooler:
Number required
Diameter
Length
Cooling water flow rate
Filter:
Number required
Diameter
Length
Equipment container:
Diameter
Length
Piping size
Over-all length of experiment
2
5 ft
2 ft
17 in.
1.2
7200 rpm
Induction
45 kw
3600 rpm
I0 gpm
2
i ft
8 .ft
80 gpm
i
i ft
6 ft
30 gpm
i
i ft
2 ft
6 ft
i0 ft
4 in.
19 ft
The various tie-ins of the experiment with the reactor and the al-
ternatives available to the operators for normal operation and in case
accidents occur or equipment malfunctions during the experiment will be
described in an operating manual for the experiment to be prepared upon
completion of the design of the experiment.
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Upon completion of the test, the reactor is shut down, the thimble
quadrant seal is removed and the experiment is backed out of the thimble.
The experiment is then movedto the rear of the quadrant with the com-
pressors and coolers still in operation. The after-heat will have decayed
sufficiently 3 180 hours after the reactor has been shut down3 that the air
compressors can be stopped. The after-heat i:i then transferred to the
stagnant water by conduction.
After a suitable cooling-off period, the experiment is movedto the
hot lab where an approved procedure is followed for dismembering the ex-
periment and removing the test fuel element for inspection and analysis.
Methods of disposing of used experimental fue] elements is discussed in
Section 5.2.4 and methods of decontaminating the loop equipment before it
is used for another test is discussed in Section 6.2.5.
!
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4.1.2 Liquld-Cooled Fuel Element Experiment
A representative liquid-cooled fuel element irradiation experiment
is shown in figure 4.2(a). The fuel elements consist of metallic pins
which may be as long as 2 feet. The liquid coolant indicated is metallic
sodium which is recirculated in a closed loop. The fuel pin assembly is
located inside an annulus of beryllium moderatgr. The fuel pins and
moderator are enclosed by three concentric stainless steel tubes. The
successive annuli making up the test are: 5/l_-inch sodiumpassage_ 1/16-
inch stainless steel container 3 I/8-inch monitoring gas and porous medium
of carbon or beryllium oxide powder, and i/8-iuch stainless steel con-
tainer. Sodium flows through the annulus and -_hen over the fuel pins.
To establish temperature distributions in the experiment and to size
auxiliary equipmentj a nominal subassembly_operating power of one Mw was
selected. Operating temperatures were selected to be consistent with
material limitations.
Again a combined neutron and gamma internal heat generation rate of
12 watts/gram of materials in the experiment e_clusive of the test was
assumed.
Primary water at 160 pounds per square inch pressure is used to cool
the experimental insert. The outer surface teuperature was held at 250 ° F.
This clearance space coolant makes a once through pass over the test
entering at one end of the HT-1 hole and discharging at the other end.
Other coolants which do not react with sodium sre being studied. Approxi-
mately 0.15 Mw are removed with a water flow rste of 19 gpm and a corre-
sponding temperature rise from 80 ° to 145 ° F. The water velocity in the
1/8-inch clearance annulus is 5.5 feet per second.
4.1.2.1 Description of auxiliary equipment. - A schematic of the
sodium loop are shown in figures 4.2(b) and (c). The system is charged
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from the sump tank which contains i0 gallons of filtered sodium. Liquid
sodium is circulated through the system at the rate of 40 gallons per
minute by two canned rotor pumps connected in parallel. Each pump is
capable of maintaining full flow rate in the loop so that failure of one
pump may be tolerated. Since the canned rotor pumps are driven by induc-
tion motors, flow rates must be controlled by throttling. Valves are
located before and after each pump so that either can be isolated from
the loop.
After flowing through the test, sodium passes to a pair of sodium-
to-air heat exchangers connected in parallel. The heat exchangers are of
the shell-and-tube design with sodium as the shell fluid and each is cap-
able of transferring 1.3 Mw of heat. A total of 350 tubes, I/4-inch out-
side diameter by 1/16 wall, is required for each heat exchanger. Spaced
in a triangular array on 3/8-inch center-to-center distance, the heat ex-
changer dimensions are 7 inches outside diameter by 21 inches long.
Valves located before and after each exchanger control the fluid flow and
can isolate either heat exchanger from the system in event of a tube fail-
ure.
Sodium enters theheat exchangers and is cooled by counter-flow air.
Piping connecting the components is 1.75 inches outside diameter. The
entire system is welded, with expansion loops located before each pump
and between the test and heat exchangers. All piping and components con-
tainiug sodium are wrapped with beaded nichrome wire to preheat the sys-
tem. The test tank is connected to the thimble by a lock ring shown in
figure 2.11(a).
Each sodium pump has a capacity of I00 gpm, which is approximately
twice the design sodium flow rate. Each heat exchanger has a capacity
of 1.3 Mw at design temperatures and flow rates. These oversize units
are to be installed to allow for normal shutdown in the event of a fail-
ure of one component. Total air, water, and electric power required are
listed below:
Air
Water
Electricity
7 pps at i00 psi
2 pps at 160 psi
30 kw at 220 volts - 5 phase
A block diagram of the safety and control instrumentation is shown
in figure 4.2(d).
4.1.2.2 Operation of sodium-cooled experiment. - The test loop must
be thoroughly inspected during assembly. A Freon leak detecting unit is
used to insure that the system had been properly welded. All piping and
component exposed to sodium is then cleaned. The loop is purged with argon
and filled with an initial charge of sodium. Liquid sodium is circulated
to remove all oxides and foreign matter within the loop. The sodium is
drained from the loop and disposed of.
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The loop is again purged and filled with _lean sodium and circula-
tion is started. All instrumentation and controls are checked. A sample
of sodium is extracted from the system and analyzed for its oxygen content.
After all checks on leaks_ sodium purity_ and operations of instru-
mentation and controls have been made_the hea%edloop with sodium in
circulation is inserted into the HT-I hole. Tue sodium flow is adjusted
for a flow rate of 40 gallons per minute. CooLant flows in the experi-
ment clearance space are set and the quadrant Filled with water. The re-
actor is started and as the power level is incceased_ the air flow to the
heat exchangers is proportionately increased to remove the heat generated
in the core of the test. Final adjustments are madewhenthe one megawatt
power level has been reached.
After completion of the test_ the reactor is shut down and the sodium
flow is maintained for an additional 1.5 hours, at which time the power
level has dropped to I0 kilowatts. The experinent is then removedfrom
the hole and allowed to cool in the quadrant. To prevent the fuel pins
from melting down_sodium must cover the fuel Dins. Before the pumpsare
shut off_ the valves before and after the test are closed. Heat is trans-
ferred to the water in the quadrant by boiling until the after-heat gen-
erated has reached the 8 kilowatt level; then all the heat is transferred
by natural convection.
The sodium-cooled experiment can be removedfrom the water 50 hours
after the reactor has been shut down_and cool_d by natural convection in
air. The power level will then be approximately 2.5 kilowatts and the
temperature of the outer stainless steel and cDre will be 1050° and 1150°
F_ respectively. After the experiment has coo_ed sufficiently_ the valves
are opened and the sodium is drained into the sump_and the experiment is
removedto the hot lab.
!
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4.1.5 Reflector Test Hole_ Capsul_ Experiment
A representative capsule experiment has been designed to determine
the effect of a corrosion inhibitor in the presence of a radiation field.
An experiment containing d capsules was selected. Weight loss of corro-
sion specimens from in-pile tests is compared to tests conducted out of
pile.
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4.1.3.1 Description of equipment. - A cross sectional view of the
experiment is shown in figure 4.3. Each capsule is 3/8-inch diameter by
1/16-inch wall by 6 inches long 3 and contains 3.2 grams of the test
media plus a corrosion specimen. Two of the capsules have an addition
of a corrosion inhibitor. The remaining two capsules are control
capsules.
The capsules are heated over their filled length by four furnaces.
Each furnace consists of a -inch diameter, by -inch wall_ 2_ inches
long Inconel tube wound with two Calrod type heating coils. The first
coil is wound from the bottom of the furnace tube to within 3/4 inch from
the top_ while the second coil is wound about the remaining 3/4 of an inch
and acts as a guard heater.
3
The four furnaces are fixed to a 2_-inch diameter Inconel plate, and
I
are equally spaced about a circle of IF-inch diameter. The plate is then
3
welded into the bottom of a 2_-inch diameter Inconel can 3 9 inches long to
form a sealed unit. A 3-inch diameter hole bored in a beryllium reflector
a S----inch cooling annulus_ receives the unit for the test.piece 3 allowing 16
Cooling is provided by a capsule cooling line which enters through
the top of the can and an annulus cooling line which is vented to the
space between the plate and the bottom of the test hole. The capsule
cooling air exits through a line welded to the center of the plate_ which
vents to the space above the can.
Electrical connections for the heaters are brought through the plate
by means of machine screws which are insulated from the plate.
Temperature measurements are taken by ten chromel-alumel thermocou-
ples. Each capsule has one thermocouple imbedded in its base and another
fixed to the wall to correspond to the test media interface. Two
additional thermocouples are attached to the outside of the Inconel can.
A 3/4-inch aluminum tube carries all lines from the test hole out of
the reactor tank. At this point the exit air goes to the stack and the
remaining air_ electrical_ and thermocouple lines go to the control point.
Instrumentation consists of a strip chart recorder to read tempera-
tures_ a bank of eight variable autotransformers connected in parallel to
give eight variable lines and one common line_ and valves and pressure
gages for control of the cooling air.
72
4.1.5.2 Operation of the capsule experiment. - The test is completely
assembled and checked in the shop, moved to the reactor, rechecked and
lowered into the reflector. Connections are made at the control point and
the test given a final check. Once the reactor comes to steady state, the
heater power and the cooling air are adjusted to give the required
temperatures.
If the duration of the test is less than that of reactor power cycle,
the furnaces are shut off and the capsule temperatures are held below 600 °
F by the cooling air until reactor shutdown. At the end of the reactor
power cycle_ the test is removed to a hot lad where the specimens are ex-
tracted for weighing.
4.2 REACTIVITY EFFECTS OF EXPERIMENTS
The air-cooled and liquid-cooled experiments_ as modified for two-
group diffusion-theory calculations on the two-dimensional reactor simu-
lator are described. The reactivity effects of the air-cooled experiments
as normally inserted in the horizontal through-hole are presented. The
reactivity effects of a liquid-cooled experinentj with and without fuel,
inserted in the center test hole are also presented. Illustrative neutron
flux and specific power distributions are giTen for some of the experiments.
The excess reactivity required by these experiments must be considered
in the light of the $_{ available. The particular loading for the ref-
erence core has tentatively allocated a Z_K of 0.05 for experiments. It
will be shown that some of the experiments _lich have been discussed use
up the greater part of this allocation. In _his case, only one of these
experiments would be the major experiment in a particular core loading.
4.2.1 Air-Cooled Through-Hol,_ Experiment
For purposes of calculation on the two-c[imensional simulator, the
experimental space comprising HT-I facility _as modified to a square geom-
etry 9-inches on a side with 3/4-inch thick :_ones of different composition
as shown in figure 4.4. The HT-I facility i:l taken as being separated
I
from the face of the core by i_ inches of a ]Jeryllium-water region simu-
lating the water-cooled beryllium box surrou_Lding the core. Annular zone
1 contains the aluminum thimble walls and cl_arance space cooling water.
Zone 2 simulates the eccentric water-cooled ],eryllium insert used to lo-
cate the experiment. Annular zone 5 contain_ the stainless steel experi-
ment container walls_ the first pass for the experiment cooling air, and
a porous material. This porous material is assumed to have the nuclear
properties of beryllium oxide of 20 percent _heoretical density. Annular
zone 4 contains a portion of the test fuel-element moderator. Finally,
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the central fertile zone S_ which is 5 inches on a side_ contains the air-
cooled fuel elements. Fully enriched uranium fuel is present in zone
5 in the concentration of 0.00050×1024 atoms per cc of experiment.
In each zone the contents were homogenized and the two-group dif-
fusion solutions obtained on the two-dimensional simulator. The two-
group diffusion parameters used for each zone are given in table B.2 of
appendix B.
The over-all geometry of a vertical section of the reactor is shown
in figure 2.24. Two positions of the air-cooled fuel element test were
taken: the first in which the stainless steel container (zone S) and
contents were directly against the wall of the HT-I thimble_ as shown in
figure _._ the second in which zone 3 and contents were further separated
from the face of the core by the eccentric beryllium insert. The partic-
ular air-cooled test studied was assumed to be at appropriately high aver-
age temperature. Because of the relatively small size of the experimental
region_ it was not considered likely that the thermal neutrons would be
in equilibrium with this high temperature. The average temperature of
neutrons were taken therefore_ to be the same as the neutrons in the re-
actor core.
The values of Kef f for the unperturbed case and for the two posi-
tions of the air-cooled experiment in the horizontal through-hole are shown
below. (The calculations have assumed the experiments to be effectively
the same length as the 27-in. length of the core):
Configuration Kef f
Unperturbed reference core 1.185
Air-cooled test in HT-I closest to core 1.158
Air-cooled test in HT-I farthest from core 1.163
The fast and thermal neutron flux distributions obtained for the air-
cooled fuel element test closest to the core are shown in figures 4.5(a)
and (b). The thermal fluxes in the core on the side of the experiments
are depressed. The fluxes at the opposite core-reflector interface are
relatively unperturbed. In the vicinity of the experiment 3 the signif_-
cant fission rate of the fertile region boosts the fast fluxes in the re-
flector around the through-hole. There is a subsequent slowing down and
conversion to thermal flux in the surrounding primary reflector. The
relatively high absorptivity of the experiment shows up as a sink for the
thermal neutrons.
These flux distributions may be compared to the unperturbed flux
distributions which have been shown in figures 2.26(a) and (b). The
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unperturbed fluxes at the position of the experiment indicate significant-
ly higher thermal fluxes and significantly lower fast fluxes than exist
in the core. Therefore 3 it would appear that an experiment inserted here
would not be exposed to a desirable spectrum of fluxes. This maybe true
for an experiment which did not contain fuel. However_for the fertile
experiments studied_ which contain fuel concentrations representative of
their prototype reactor, the flux distributions of figures A.5(a) and (b)
indicate a significant increase in fast flux and a strong depression in
the thermal neutron flux in the experimental regions. It is interesting
to note that the excellent moderating properties of the beryllium-water
reflector surrounding the experimental throu_-hole feed thermal neutrons
into the experiment from all sides. This reduces the asymmetryof thermal
flux across the experiment. The fast flux ha_ about a 15 percent fall-off
across the experiment.
The variation in specific power for the air-cooled fuel element ex-
periment in HT-I closest to the core is shownin figure 4.6(a). The
specific power is shownrelative to an average specific power in the re-
actor core of unity and has an average value of 0.49 over the test fuel
element. The minimum specific power occurs s,>mewhat removed from the
geometric center of the experiment. The maximum-to-average specific power
in this experiment is 1.35.
The variation in specific power for the air-cooled fuel element ex-
periment in HT-I farthest from the core is shown in figure 4.6(b). Aver-
age specific power in the test fuel element r_lative to unity in the re-
actor core is 0.58. The maximum-to-average s)ecific power in this
experiment is 1.45.
!
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4.2.2 Liquid-Cooled Center Test H)le Experiment
The reactivity effects of a liquid coole_ experiment for insertion
in the center test hole position of the core have been calculated. The
experiment may or may not contain fuel.
The composition and geometry used is shown in figure 4.7 Two 3
• _-
I
inch zones and a central experiment I_ inches in diameter were selected•
The first outer zone contains an aluminum thimble and cooling water in
the space between the experiment and adjacen_ core fuel assemblies• The
second zone contains stainless steel_ thermal insulation and a cooling or
monitoring gas passage. The central zone cortains a medium consisting of
0.90 liquid and 0.I0 metal by volume. Two c_ses have been condidered:
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i. Fully enriched uranium fuel is present in the concentration of
0.00020x1024 atoms per cc of experiment.
2. The experiment does not contain fuel_ but contains absorber of
the composition cited above. This composition was taken to represent a
passive in-pile irradiation.
The over-all geometry of a horizontal section of the reactor is shown
in figure 2.25. The two-group diffusion parameters used are given in
tables B.I and B.2 of appendix B. Although these nuclear parameters are
based on the experiment at an appropriately high average temperature_
t_ormal neutrons were assumed to be in equilibrium with the average core
temperature.
The values of Kef f for the unperturbed case and for the two com-
positions of the center test hole experiment core are given below:
Configuration Kef f
Unperturbed reference core 1.185
Experiment with fuel 1.165
Experiment with absorber 1.150
The greater depression of both fast and thermal fluxes in the region
around the center test hole for the experiment with absorber results in a
lower Kef f of 1.150. This highly absorptive experiment would use a
large part of the excess reactivity allocated to experiments.
The effect of the fueled center test hole experiment on the reactor
neutron fluxes is illustrated by cross plots taken from the two-
dimensional flux distributions obtained. The fluxes at the midplane of
the core along the core length and core width for the unperturbed refer-
ence core and for the fueled experiment in the center hole are shown in
figures _.6(a) and (b). The fluxes are relative to an average thermal
neutron flux of unity over the core volume. The fluxes are significantly
lowered in the core in the immediate vicinity of the experiment_ the
fluxes are relatively unperturbed outside of the core.
The variation in specific power in the fueled experiment was per-
fectly symmetrical and_ for the fuel concentration employed_ resulted in
an experiment average specific power of 1.0 relative to a core average
specific power of unity. The ratio of maximum-to-average specific power
i
across the l_-inch diameter experiment was 1.07.
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SECTION 5. - HANDLING OF FUEL AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
The disposal and handling problems to be discussed here are those to
be expected in normal operation of the reactor facility. This normal
operation includes those minor accidental situations that must be ex- 1
pected from time to time owing to personnel errors or equipment failure.
All of these problems are both administrative and technical in nature.
The disposal of radioactive materials must be predicated on the phi-
losophy that no undue hazard will be presented to the present or succeed-
lug generations of people in the area. To this end the NASA intends to
abide by the legal maximum contamination limits and exposures as set forth
in the Federal Register (ref. 5.1). NBS Handbook 52 (ref. 5.2) will be
used as an additional guide as well as any other publications of the
National Committee on Radiation Protection which may become available and
are pertinent. Accountability_ safety_ and security provisions of the
AEC license will also be honored. Deviations from any of these provisions
and limits will be made only with the prior approval of the AEC wherever
it is humanly possible to do so. Obviously_ this is not possible for ac-
cidents which are not anticipated and for which inadequate protective
measures are provided.
Disposal problems can be approached from several points of view such
as: administrative procedures, particular operations 3 the legal limita-
tions_ the contamination sources_ the kinds and constitution of the radio-
active material (gaseous_ liquid_ and solid)_ the contamination level_ the
disposal methods available, and accountability requirements. These are
all interrelated_ and there is no simple and unique method of presentation.
Since many aspects of the facility operations have not been fully explored_
it seems best to treat the various kinds of operations in a general way
and indicate how some of the problems can be handled.
5.1 FUEL HANDLING AND DISPOSAL
The NACA fuel elements are substantially identical to those now used
by the MTR (see fig. 2.7). As such_ they can be handled_ stored, and dis-
posed of by procedures similar to those already tested and approved for
MTR assemblies.
5.1.1 Handling of New Fuel Elements
New fuel elements will be stored in movable racks holding 12 units
each with 6 on either side. Each element and each rack carries an identi-
fying number. Cadmium sheets are arranged on 3 sides of each fuel element
ICleanup and disposal problems involving serious failures in the re-
actor facility and experiments are discussed in sections 8.1.9 and
6.2.3.2.
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socket so that there is no possibility of a critical assembly with any
numberof filled racks even whensurrounded by water. Each rack will
have a simple locking device to hold all el_ments securely during trans-
portation. The sametype of rack will be used for underwater transporta-
tion of depleted or partially depleted fuel elements in the reactor shield-
ing quadrants and the canals.
Racks containing new fuel elements will be stored in a locked vault
requiring the simultaneous use of two separate keys for entry. These keys
will be available only to the shift leaders of the Health Physics and the
Facility Operation Sections_ respectively. The vault will be located on
the main floor of the reactor building. All fuel element receipts and
releases_ together with dates and identities thereof_ storage rack number_
radiation levels_ order numbers_etc. will be entered in a bound log book
(kept within the vault) by the Health Physicist responsible at the time of
transfer. The vault lock design will permit key removal only whenthe
door is closed and locked. Whennot in use_ the two keys will be kept in
separate door type safes provided with 3-tumbler combination locks_ the
combinations of both of which will not be krown to any one individual.
This arrangement mayprovide a higher level of security and safety
than is ordinarily required at isolated AECreactor sites. Since the
NACAreactor does not have such a large exclusion area_ this added com-
plication seemsadvisable as a precaution against deliberate mishandling
by dementedpersonnel. Suchpeople do develop in every organization oc-
casionally. These precautions are not interded as a substitute for good
administrative controls_ but they can assisl these controls with very
little added complication.
The new fuel elements are taken from t_e storage racks and individu-
ally placed in the reactor lattice grid positions by meansof long-handled
tools.
5.1.2 Fuel Unloading PIocedure
At the completion of a reactor operation cycle_ the reactor is shut
downand the main coolant pumpsare shut ofi. The shutdown cooling system
continues to operate with a flow rate of ll(O gpmin order to remove the
after-heat. The 5000 gallon head tank is t_en isolated from the coolant
system to permit reduction of pressure in t_e reactor tank. Any gases
liberated by the water in this reactor tank at the lower pressure will be
vented to the stack through a valve in the tank cover. The tank is then
flushed out by opening the "high" drain and then admitting deionized water
from either the 50,000 gallon head tank or (ne of the purge tanks men-
tioned in section 5.2.1.1.
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The high drain is designed to prevent uncovering the core during the
flushing operation_ thereby ensuring the continued removal of after-heat
by the shutdowncooling system. The reactor tank can be completely drained
by the "low" drain.
After flushing_ the SOLO00gallon head tank or purge tank is isolated
and the water level allowed to drop to the level of the high drain. The
shrapnel shield is then removedand the hatch to the reactor tank opened_
allowing access to the fuel elements. The ii00 gpmshutdown cooling sys-
tem continues to run during the entire unloading operation.
The fuel elements are individually removedby use of long-handled
tools and are passed through the fuel element discharge chute shownin
figure 2.9(b) to the receiving tube. The receiving tube is then rotated
to a vertical position and the fuel element is removed and placed in an
underwater transfer rack. Partially depleted fuel elements can be re-
placed in the reactor lattice by reversing these steps.
S.I.S Spent Fuel Element Handling
The underwater transfer racks containing spent fuel elements are
movedunder water from quadrant C to the canal extension in the reactor
building. The fuel elements are then placed in stationary underwater
storage racks.
The underwater storage racks are also cadmiumlined and are designed
so as to allow adequate free convection cooling of the fuel elements.
These racks will be locked except when inserting or removing elements.
The lock on each unit will require the use of a special key near the end
of a metal pole for its operation_ the samepole being used to handle the
fuel elements under water once the rack is unlocked. The suggested key
will consist of a simple combination of lugs attached to the pole such
that a duplicate cannot be madereadily and unnoticed. Each rack will
have its own key pole. These poles will be stored in a locked holder ad-
jacent to the canal whennot being used for handling fuel elements. Two
people with separate keys will be required to unlock this pole holderjust as has been described for the fuel vault. A record will be kept of
all element transfersj uses_ and history.
The spent fuel elements will be allowed to cool in the underwater
storage racks in the canal. A second rack will be used in the canal where
spent fuel elements can be arranged for gammairradiation experiments.
The fuel elements will be kept until they can be transported safely
in MTRtype coffins to a reprocessing plant. Before transfer of spent
elements to a coffin_ water samples from the vicinity of the storage rack
will be monitored as a check on possible fission product leakage.
8O
The off-site transportation of spent fuel elements will be in accord-
ance with any applicable AECrequirements as outlined in the Handbookof
Federal Regulations applying to Transportation of Radioactive Materials
(ref. 5.5). Each shipment will be recorded and all fuel elements identi-
fied in the log book kept in the vault for _nused fuel elements. This
record will be maintained by the Health Physicist responsible for fuel
element security and safety on the particular shift.
5.2 DISPOSALOFRADIOACTIVEWASTEIN NORMALOPERATION
5.2.1 Primary Water Contaminants
Aside from the very short lived N16 aclivity which determines the
shielding requirements around piping, pumpsj etc., the activity of the
primary water is determined by its impurities, both solid and dissolved.
Traces of these impurities are found in the supply water_ other impurities
result from corrosion within the primary system3 and still others are due
to recoils from the surfaces of core materials. No definitive informa-
tion as to the attainable lower limits of these activities seemsto exist
for practical operating conditions. In most instances the reported activ-
ities pertain to systems in which the feed _ater was not deionized as
well as present day practice will permit, nor was dissolved air removed
before startup.
Using what are considered to be conservative values for supply and
by-pass demineralizer effectiveness_ corrosion rates 3 and recoil contri-
bution, the equilibrium ionic concentrations in the reactor cooling water
were calculated. These results 3 together w_th the individual activities
due to these impuzities for a lO00 hour run_ are presented in appendix E.
The big uncertainty lies in the assumedcorrosion rates for the primary
system components_plus the fact that there maybe someactive colloidal
material which can pass both the strainer azd the mixed-bed. If the
corrosion rates chosen are conservative and a minimumof colloidal material
is present, then the actual long lived acti_'ities should be less than
those indicated. In this event, moderate dilution of the primary system
water, after a reasonable holdup time 3 should render this waste suitable
for off-site discharge.
MTRexperience has demonstratedj howev_,r3 that fission product leaks
must be expected. 0uce this occurs, the primary system is likely to be
so grossly contaminated that this simple disposal procedure maynot suf-
fice. Available data on demineralizer effectiveness in removing the last
traces of activity are not very encouraging in this respect. For this
reason3 provisions are madefor re-using the bulk of the primary system
water over and over again so as to minimize the actual volume of primary
water which must be discharged.
I
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S.2.1.1 Activity retention. - All primary system leakage and excess
purge water will be discharged to one of the retention tanks shown In fig-
ure 2.1_. The bulk of the flush water will be discharged to one of a
pair of purge tanks not specifically shown in this figure and which may
replace one of the retention tanks. Ordinarily one of these tanks will
be empty and the other filled with purge water from the previous cycle.
At the end of a new cycle the full tank will supply the purge water and
the second tank will receive the corresponding primary system discharge.
These purge tanks can be vented to the facility stack.
This arrangement minimizes the amount of feed water which has to
be demineralized, and also retains the bulk of any fission products which
may be in the primary water. Moreoverj it reduces the amount of long-
lived corrosion or fission products which would otherwise appear in the
laboratory waste water system.
When fission leaks occur_ the primary system will first be cleaned
up to a practical level by the by-pass demineralizer and degassifier units
before the purge operation is attempted. In this way the bulk of the
fission products will be removed in these units which are suitably shielded
and otherwise arranged for eventual disposal of the activities involved.
Any residual activities which this procedure contemplates will not be ob-
jectionable In the primary system in subsequent operating cycles. As a
matter of fact_ the primary system will always be contaminated by some
fission products once a leak has occurred because some of these materials
adhere most tenaciously to metal surfaces (see ref. 5.4).
The installed plumbing will also permit discharge of primary water
to the hot retention tanks shown in figure 2.14, should this become ad-
visable. This water can be further demiueralized by the mixed-bed units
shown in this drawing as explained in section 2.1.
5.2.1.2 By-pass degassifier. - All makeup water for the primary sys-
tem w_be dei_dt-o _c resistances of between lO 6 and 10" ohms
per cm by the mixed-bed units shown in figure 2.14 at the right of the
150-foot head tank. This water will be deaerated in the by-pass unit
shown on the right slde of figure 2.14 before or during the early part of
each cycle. The flow capacity of this degassifier is about 200 gpm. The
unit is designed for reducing the air concentration to l0 percent or less
of the saturation value at one atmosphere. This reduction is believed to
be greater than necessary for normal operation. Removal of the oxygen
should lessen corrosion problems during most of the operating cycle. Re-
moval of nitrogen should reduce nitrate formation and thus reduce the load
on the by-pass demineralizer discussed in the next section.
The degassifler is also intended to remove hydrogen and oxygen during
reactor operation should this prove necessary. It can also be used to
remove fission gases resulting from a fuel element leak or from possible
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diffusion through the cladding (ref. 5.5, p. 239). All such gases can be
released to the facility stack at an acceptable rate. In the absenceof
these situations, the degassifier unit will not be used during the actual
operating cycle.
In the event a serious fission leak does occur, careful handling of
the gas activities evolved in the degassifier will be required. The de-
mineralizer will serve to remove someof the iodine and bromine, but not
all. Somewill appear in the degassifier aiDng with the radiokrypton and
radioxenon. Becauseof the small volumes of these gases, their removal
by the degassifier might be a slow process. In this case, their direct
discharge to the facility stack maybe feasf_le. Otherwise, they will
have to be scrubbed out with cooled activated charcoal (ref. 5.6) after
removal of water vapor in a C02 cold trap. The gases caught in the char-
coal trap can later be further concentrated in a smaller volume charcoal
trap and held for decay and then slow release to the stack.
!
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5.2.1.3 By-pass demineralizer. - This bj-pass circuit is shown in
figure 2.14 to the right of the reactor tank. It includes a cleanable
filter, a heat exchanger, a combination of r_sin beds_ and a discharge
filter, all connected across the primary pumps. 0nly one resin bed is
shown for illustrative purposes. The filter will remove solid suspended
matter, thereby reducing the chance of serious blockage of the resin
beds. The heat exchanger serves to reduce t_ water temperature below
that at which resin damage occurs. Space fo_ three resin beds is pro-
vided: One anion (which may not be installec), one cation, and one
mixed-bed having a flow capacity of about i0( gpm. The first two are
intended for pH control as in the E.T.R. s_stem (ref. 5.7) with the
mixed-bed serving the principal role of contamination and activity control.
The single resin units need not handle the f_ll flow except possibly the
cation unit. At high water activities, a calion unit does reduce anion
resin damage in the mixed-bed (ref. 5.8, p. _09), but this situation is
not expected to develop unless a serious fisEion leak occurs.
Some of the primary system corrosion products will not be water
soluble. Such materials either adhere to the system walls or eventually
enter the demineralizer by-pass circuit. The strainer should serve to
remove most of this material. Provisions foz cleaning this strainer in
a safe manner during an operating cycle will be incorporated. The refuse
can be caught on spent resin as a filter and the combination disposed of
as described in the next section.
5._.i.4 Resin disposal. - The regeneration of all resins used for
decontamination purposes is not contemplated. These resins will be flushed
into suitably shielded disposable containers and, after a practical decay
period, will be shipped out for off-site burial. Resins can be burned to
achieve further volume reduction_ but in the absence of cost data, this
method is not being given serious consideration. It is true that consid-
erable combustible waste is expected from other facility operations
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(section 5.2.4). If the volume of such wastes becomes prohibitive 3 then
burning in a properly designed incinerator will be considered at a later
date.
Water used in handling spent resin and strainer refuse will pass to
one of the purge tanks for reuse in a subsequent cycle.
5.2.1.5 Sampling ,provisions. - In order to keep tab on primary system
activities and fission leaks, several sampling stations must be provided:
I. Reference 5.9 presents a method of using radiolodine picked up by
au anion resin as a means of detecting the presence of fission products
in the water. This type of monitor can supplement evidence of leaks de-
rived from the degassifier monitor and may well serve to give an earlier
warning of fission product leakage. Four sampling circuits across the
main heat exchangers will be provided, starting Just before the degasser
by-pass and ending at the pump inlet. Two of these will serve for H2,
02, H202, conductivity_ pH, and water analysis. The other two will
serve for leak detection.
2. Two circuits across the by-pass demineralizer for determination
of activities entering this unit.
3. Two connections at the demineralizer exit for effluent activities,
pH 3 conductivity, and water analysis. Purging water will be discharged
to the retention tank system.
4. Two circuits across the repressurizing pumps on the exit side of
the degassifier for gas content sampling.
5.2.2 Contamination of Shielding Quadrant and Canal Water
No important direct generation of activities in the shielding quad-
rant water is expected because of the concrete shield (see f_g. 2.9)
interposed between the reactor core and this water. Quadrants and canals
will be charged with clarified water and demineralized thereafter at a
rate of 100 gpm.
All concrete surfaces will be painted with Amercoa_ to minimize leach-
ing and make decontamination somewhat easier.
As explained in section 5.1.2 the primary tank will be purged with
fresh water before exchanging fuel elements. The same is true of the
water in thimble passages before insertion or removal of experiments and
equipment. With these precautions_ the activity of quadrant and canal
water should remain reasonably low. The chief source of contamination
may well be corrosion products adhering to thimble walls and experiment
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surfaces which are dislodged during transfer operations. Also someleak-
age of thimble water mayoccur. Contamination attributable to ruptured
experiments (section 6.2.3) is likely to be far more serious than the
normal conditions considered here. Water from the canals and quadrants
can be discharged to hot retention tanks and decontaminated if necessary
by passage through the mixed-bed demineralizer shownin figure 2.14.
5.2.3 Ventilation of Contait_mentShell
The ventilation system for the containment shell is outlined in sec-
tion 2.1 and shownin figure 2.21. No appreciable contamination of the
atmosphere in this shell is expected during _ormal operating conditions.
Otherwise the shell interior would not be h_itable as assumed. A serious
accident_ particularly one involving a fueled experiment, could result in
excessive contamination as discussed in section 6.2.3 and appendix J.
Adequate monitoring equipment will be i_stalled, both within the shell
at selected locations and in the exhaust system3 for promptly shutting
downthe ventilation system should the air becomecontaminated for any
reason. The procedure to be followed thereafter will depend upon circum-
stances. If necessary the contaminated air can be filtered and discharged
at an acceptable rate to the stack.
As presently conceived all air filled passages passing near the core
will be sealed and vented to the stack 3 possibly after suitable hold-up
in tanks provided for this purpose. As long as these connections re-
main _ntact 3 the containment shell atmospher¢should not experience any
contamination from this source. However3 in view of the fact that the
air in such passages constitutes the only gases subject to high flux_
the most likely source of containment shell contamination during nor-
mal operation must be associated with their _resence. Obviously this
is no longer true if an experiment rupture should occur (section 6.2.5).
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5.2.4 IIandling and Disposal of Experiment Wastes
These wastes include all scrap metal, de0ris from machining opera-
tions_ air-borne dusts and gases 3 and all chenicals derived from experi-
ments. Fission products may or may not be involved, depending upon the
nature of the experiment. In the absence of fission products the total
activity wiil generally be of a lower level b_t will otherwise present
very nearly the same disposal problems. Ther_ are two exceptions. Fueled
experiments will generally release fission gases. They also require the
recovery of virtually all of the unburned fuel which in turn necessitates
recovery of most of the fission products as well.
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Upon removal of experiments from the reactor_ the irradiated material
will be placed in the wet or dry hot storage areas (see fig. 2.20) and
left there for some appropriate time. Large experiments will then be dis-
membered in the hot cutting and dismantling room and the portion of re-
search interest transferred to the hot cells. The rest will go either to
dry storage or to the decontamination shops. Smaller items will be trans-
ferred directly to an appropriate hot cell from storage.
A detailed presentation of hot cell operations and methods requires
consideration of the kind of investigations contemplated. This type of
discussion must await further consideration of the experimental program
plus additional experience in conducting operations of this type (see
section 7.2). The major operations will presumably be: (I) cutting oper-
ations to obtain specimens for metallographic or other study_ (2) dis-
assembly and assembly of equipment too radioactive for direct manual oper-
ations, (3) recovery of valuable materials or one kind or another_ and
(4) flushing out or decontaminating experimental apparatus or materials.
Best contamination control is obtained by proper segregation of
constituent materials as to type and probable activity level_ by keeping
all wastes in as concentrated a form as possible_ and by minimizing the
required cutting operations through good experiment design. Except for
small samples_ most structural components of experiments will have no
further value. The same is true for the bulk of coolant fluids. All
such materials can be placed in dry storage and later packaged in some
appropriate manner for off-site disposal.
Concentrated liquid wastes will generally be so acid or caustic as
to require neutralization before packaging for disposal. Such wastes_
as well as those of high activity_ will be discharged to a special sys-
tem terminating in a small tank. Here the solid matter can settle out
and the liquid be periodically neutralized..Supernatant water from this
tank will be evaporated at a low rate directly from disposable containers.
These containers will be directly heated in a ventilated enclosure under
conditions which promote evaporation without splashing_ bubbling 7 etc.
The off gases will be cooled to condense the water vapor and the air
filtered before discharge to the facility stack. Condensed water will
be discharged to the retention tank system.
Lower level wastes will generally be in the form of chips and dust
from machining operations_ or as water solutions and suspensions. The
smaller dust particles can be picked up by a vacuum system with a nozzle
very near the work point. This dust must then be caught in suitable fil-
ters amd the filtered air vented to the facility stack. Larger chips and
pieces can be caught in suitable trays or receptacles which permit remote
handling and packaging. Low level water wastes must be filtered, pumped
to one of the retention basins_ and then discharged_ with or without demin-
eralization, as the nature of the waste dictates. Discharge from these
basins will be monitored and diluted as necessary to acceptable activity
levels.
86
In the case of apparatus contaminated with_ or containing fission
products_ an intermediate barrier within the _ot cell maybe required as
a meansof keeping all wastes as concentrated as possible. (The sameis
true of work on somevery hazardous chemical uaterials such as beryllium.)
This barrier is usually a transparent plastic container which surrounds
the sectioning equipment (ref. 5.10). Its soLe purpose is to confine all
fission products to as small a volume and are_ as possible. Similar
covers can be attached to items containing fi3sion products to prevent
the spread of contamination during transportation. Arrangements can be
madeto flush all gas-borne activity out of s_ch barrier cells through
recovery devices such as filters and chilled _ctivated charcoal traps to
remove inert fission gases (ref. 5.11, p. 371). Another possibility is to
store the flushing gas under pressure in tanks where it can be monitored
and released gradually to the stack. The extent to which these addedpre-
cautions are necessary depends in part upon the post irradiation decay
time which can be tolerated by those responsible for the research program.
These barrier cells can be supplied with an inert gas for cases in-
volving combustible and especially pyrophoric materials. Relatively minor
fires can promote the spread of excessive amomts of activity.
In addition to experiment wastes as such, hot cell operation will
ordinarily result in secondary wastes of all _orts. These include ab-
sorbent and masking paper3 plastics (sheet and film)_ stripable paints 3
worn out tools_ cleaning reagents_ filter elements3 and a host of other
materials of this character. Combustible materials having a low order of
contamination might be burned locally_ but al_ other trash will require
packaging for off-site disposal. Any secondary wastes exhibiting high
activity will have to be handled as are the d rect experiment wastes.
!
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5.2.5 Evaporation of Intermediate L,_vel Water Wastes
As outlined in the preceding section, th_re are some high level
concentrated wastes which can be further conc,_ntrated most expeditiously
by evaporation in small scale equipment. Thi:l procedure minimizes shield-
ing requirements 3 which on large equipment ar,_ cumbersome and expensive.
Also_ there are some "warm" solutions which c<,ntain short lived activities
which by a combination of retention time and c_areful demineralization can
be rendered suitable for offsite disposal. T]_ere are other solutions
containing high concentrations of inert solub[es and dilute long lived
activities for which demineralization may be _oo expensive and ineffective
for activity concentration (ref. 5.123 p. _58 _ .
Concentration by vapor compression evapoJ'ation seems to offer the
cheapest method of handling such intermediate wastes. This method has
proven satisfactory at Brookhaven National L_,oratory (ref. 5.133 p. 194).
Any evaporation method is inherently expensiw_ both from a capital and
O!
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operating cost standpoint. Available information suggests that vapor com-
pression is the cheapest of these 3 at least in terms of operating costs.
Demineralization; even if adequate; may actually cost more because of the
heavy load of inert solutes likely to be present. Some combination of the
two methods may be even cheaper; i.e._ demineralization with regeneration
and evaporation of the regenerant solutions.
5.5 REFERENCES
5.I. Federal Register; July 16; 1955; p. 5101.
S.2. National Bureau of Standards Handbook 52; Maximum Permissible Amounts
of Radioisotopes in the Human Body and Maximum Permissible Con-
centrations in Air and Water_ March 20; 195S.
5.S. Handbook of Federal Regulations Applying to Transportation of Radio-
active Materials - U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; July 1955.
5.4. Campbell; D. 0.: Decontamination of Stainless Steel; Survey and
Proposed Program. CF S3-S-2SZ.
S.S. Research Reactors. TID 5275.
5.6. Browning; W. E.; and Bolta; C. C.: Measurement and Analysis of the
Holdup of Gas Mixtures by Charcoal Absorption Traps. ORNL 2116.
5.7_ Safeguards Report; Engineering Test Reactor GEAP 0554; ICE 56-19-R.
5.8. Cox; J. A.; Costo; W. R.; and Tabor; W. H.: Continuous Repurifica-
tion of the L.I.T.R. Cooling Water. TID 2018.
5.9. Heath; R. L.: Fission Product Monitoring in Reactor Coolant Streams.
IDO 1621S.
S.10. Sullivan; L. 0.: Problems and Costs Encountered in the Handling
of Irradiated Fuels. KAPL 144S.
S.ll. McHenry; R. E.: Radioactive Gas Processing Equipment. TID 5280.
5.12. Nachrod; F. C.; and Schubert; Jack: Ion Exchanger Technology.
Academic Press; Inc._ 1956.
5.1S. Manowitz; Bernardj Richards; Powell 3 and Horrigan 3 Robert: Vapor
Compression Evaporation Handles Radioactive Waste Disposal. Chem-
ical Engineering; March 1955.
88
89
D
-4
I
.%s
I
[D
SECTION 6. - HAZARDS
In exploring the possibilities of unplanned release or uncontrolled
dispersion of radioactive materials, an analysis of the consequences of
failure or malfunction of equipment has been made. The analysis has con-
cerned itself with accidents which introduce hazards from the following
sources:
i. Hazards from failure or malfunction of component parts of the re-
actor or of component parts of the reactor cooling, electrical, or control
system.
2. Hazards from failure or malfunction of experiments in any of the
radiation facilities of the research reactor.
3. Hazards resulting from acts of God, sabotage 3 or negligence.
4. Maximum credible accident.
Each of the foregoing categories is itemized and discussed in detail
in the following respective sub-sections: 6.1, 6.2, 6.5, and 6.4.
6 .i HAZARDS CREATED BY FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION OF COMPONENTS
OF THE REACTOR FACILITY
6.1.1 Pump Failure
Both the main primary cooling system and the main secondary cooling
system have three pumps, each of which has a capacity equal to one-half
of the system flow requirement. Thus_ in each system two pumps will oper-
ate to provide normal flow with the third pump available to replace a
malfunctioning unit.
Separate primary and secondary shut-down systems are available to
provide cooling after the reactor is shut down for any cause. Two pumps
are installed in each shut-down system with each pump having capacity to
fulfill its system flow requirement. These four pumps are powered by one
of two diesel-generator sets which are backed up by the commercial power
supply. The shut-down cooling systems will be in operation continuously
during normal operation and shut-down operation.
Pump failures may be caused by failure of the pumps themselves I fail-
ure of the pump motors, or loss of electrical power. A decrease in cool-
ant flow caused by the loss of one pump in either the primary or secondary
systems will effect a power cut-back. A third standby pump is available
to restore the coolant flow to normal. It is unlikely that bot h main
pumps will fail at the same time unless the electrical power fails. How-
ever# if two pumps do fail simultaneously 3 the reactor will scram and the
shut-down system will provide cooling.
9O
Failure of the electrical power supply to the facility will cause
failure of the pumpsin both the main primary and secondary systems. The
electrical power is supplied by two independent power lines which mini-
mizes the possibility of loss of electrical power. Should both power
supplies fail the reactor will automatically scram. The coolant flow
rate to the reactor will then decrease to the flow rate supplied by the
primary shut-down system which is powered b} the diesel-generator set.
This flow rate is sufficient to cool the reactor two seconds after scram.
Coast down of the main pumpswill take care of the first few seconds.
6.1.2 Pipe Failure
I
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Inasmuch as complete loss of coolant would expose the core and re-
sult in melting of the fuel elements accompanied by release of the ac-
cumulated radioactivity all precautions must be taken to safeguard against
this occurrence.
The results of a break in the primary water system naturally depends
upon the location and severity of the break. A break in the line at any
position 3 however_ will be indicated by a loss in water from the 5000
gallon overhead tank riding on the line. A signal from a flowmeter in
the pipe from the 5000 gallon tank will warn the operator of loss of
water from the primary system. A low water level in the 5000 gallon tank
will automatically scram the reactor and open a valve in the line running
from the 50_000 gallon overhead tank to the reactor pressure tank. This
line enters the reactor pressure tank at a l_vel above the core. The
valve in this line will open fully in 15 secgnds.
A severe break in the primary water system will be postulated at all
points adjacent to a cavity which can receiv_ water° There are two gen-
eral locations of this type; one in the pump house and one at the sub-
pile room.
A pipe break inside the pump house upstream of the pump will allow
water to flow from the 50_000 gallon tank th:ough the core and out the
break into the pump house. The resistance ii the eight inch pipe from
the 50_000 gallon tank is designed for a pressure drop of 150 feet of head
for a flow rate of 5000 gpm. Therefore the naximum flow from the 50,000
gallon tank and out the break is 3000 gpm which would drain the 503000
gallon tank in a minimum of 17 minutes. The reactor pressure tank would
remain full of water and the shut-down loop could continue to cool the
reactor.
A pipe break inside the pump house down3tream of the pump will also
allow water to flow from the 50,000 gallon tank through the core and out
the break into the pump house. In this case the pump head will add to
the tank head if the pumps were not shut off. The head which the pumps
can add is equal to their maximum suction lift. This additional head
would increase the flow a negligible amount and the 50,000 gallon tank
would again empty in about 17 minutes. The main pumps are located above
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the core a distance which exceeds their maximum practical suction lift
and therefore they cannot expose the core. The centerline of the main
pumps is 29 feet above the top of the core. With the core still covered
the shut-down loop will continue to cool the reactor.
The pipes adjacent to the sub-pile room are encased in five feet of
concrete for shielding purposes. While this concrete reduces the possi-
bility of a severe break 3 the results of such a failure will be discussed.
If the break is in the main inlet or outlet pipes of the reactor
tank the water will flow through the core and out the break. Again the
friction head in the supply line from the 503000 gallon tank limits the
flow rate to a maximum of 3000 gpm which will last for 17 minutes. There
is also a I00_000 gallon overhead processed water tank available which
will supply water to the reactor pressure tank for an additional 33 min-
utes. The cavities available to receive the water from the break are the
sub-pile room and the passageway leading to this room. This passageway
connects the SUblpile room with the annulus surrounding the 70 foot tank
by means of an elevator and stair shaft. The combined capacity of the
sub-pile room and passageway is approximately _63000 gallons. In addi-
tion it requires 180_000 gallons to bring the water level in the annulus
to one foot above tile level of the top of the core. Therefore motorized
valves are provided between the annulus and each of the quadrants to al-
low water to flow into the annulus. These valves are manually controlled.
The resulting water level when these valves are open would be about nine
feet above the top of the core. The shut-down loop will continue to cool
the reactor.
In the case of a break in both inlet and outlet lines or a break in
the bottom of the reactor pressure tank_ some of the water from the 80_000
gallon tank will also flow through the reflector and out the break. It
is desired to have lO00 gpm flow through the reactor lattice. The ratio
of the pressure drop through the lattice to the pressure drop through the
reflector during normal operation is 3:1. Assuming the flow proportional
to the square root of the pressure drop_ the ratio of the flow through the
reflector to the flow through the lattice for the same pressure drop will
be 1.7:l or a total flow of approximately 2700 gpm will be required. The
3000 gpm from the 50_000 gallon tank satisfies this requirement. The re-
sulting water level when the quadrant valves are open will be 9 feet above
the top of the core as before. The shut-down loop will continue to cool
the reactor. If the shut-down loop was to fail also_ the fuel elements
would cool by free convection after the overhead tanks were drained. Ac-
cording to reference 6.1 the maximum heat flux from the fuel plates with-
out vapor binding is 19_650 Btu/hr-sq ft with free convection restricted
to the channel itself. It is estimated that the heat flux reaches this
value approximately one minute after shut-down.
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A severe break in the pipes or reactor tank would therefore not re-
sult in any subsequent failure but could spread radioactive water into
the sub-pile room and quadrants. Unless accompaniedby a fission break
the activity would decay rapidly and would offer no difficult clean-up
problem. The core would not be exposed unless an explosion or earth-
quake were to open up additional cavities t,_ receive water. It is esti-
mated that it would take from lO to 14 seconds to melt the fuel elements
after the core has been exposed.
6.1.5 Startup Accident
The maximumrod rates were set by reference to the startup accident 3
where it is assumedthat all control rods _'e being withdrawn at their
maximumpossible speeds and the reactor is protected only by the level
scrams. It is well knownthat the higher the rod speed the shorter the
period at any level and thus the larger the overshoot after a power level
scram.
In the transient heat transfer analysis of reference 2.4 it was found
that 3 for the periods involved 3 there is a static correspondence between
the fuel plate surface heat flux and surfac_ temperature 3 both lagging the
heat release rate with a time constant of A{I milliseconds at normal heat
transfer conditions. During nucleate boili1_ this lag decreases consider-
ably. Neglecting this lag is pessimistic iJ' the plate temperature is well
below melting as any additional heat stored would attenuate peak surface
heat flux and surface temperature.
Thus 3 a safe and conservative criterion for the startup accident is
that the peak heat release rate for the tral.sient correspond 3 statically 3
to a heat flux which is below the burnout h_at flux. The burnout heat
flux for the reactor is not known although _rom existing burnout data a
value of 2.2xi0 6 Btu/hr-sq ft appears to be a conservative limit. This
value would allow an overshoot to 2.5 times rated power. Pressure build-
up on nucleate boiling for the periods involved are not harmful 3 section
6.4.1.
The analysis of the startup accident requires only the period at the
scram level from which overshoots in power can be easily calculated. The
overshoot after a one g rod drop is shown or figure 6.1 for a lifetime of
9×10 -5 seconds and a range of control rod e_fectiveness. The power level
rise during the dead time can be calculated by assuming that the period
changes very little during the dead time duxation.
For the cases where the scram level is much higher than the initial
level where the accident begins, a Newson-type analysis 3 reference 6.23
was used. In this reference and reference 2.43 it is shown that
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Minimum possible period at scram signal =
t  1/2R _ss }
log ¢in/
where Z is prompt neutron lifetime; R is rod rate in AK/K per second I
and _ ss/gin is the ratio of scram signal level to initial level. This
equation is plotted in figure 6.2 for a lifetime_ Z3 of 9×10 -5 seconds
and a range of R.
For cases where the scram level is close to the initial level 3 the
reactor kinetic equations with 5 delayed neutron groups were solved on a
differential analyzer for a case of constant rod withdrawal rate and a
case of a 0.5 percent _K/K step in reactivity followed by a constant
rod withdrawal rate. The results are plotted in figure 6.2 and also on
figures 6.4 and 6.5. For a power increase of i00 fold; the Newson-type
analysis is far too pessimistic giving a period of about I00 milliseconds
when the actual period would be about 400 milliseconds. The minimum value
of _ss/_in where the two analyses give the same results is about 104 .
Figure 6.3 gives the power overshoot as a function of dead time for
various values of _ss/¢in; for a maximum rod withdrawal speed of 3 in./
min and a maximum control rod effectiveness; the worst case 3 of 2 percent/
in. Various startup accidents are also tabulated below.
@@
STARTUP ACCIDENTS
[ Rod velocity, 3 in./min; rod effectiveness; 2 percent ZkK/in.]
Initial
level
10 -14 _fi
i0-14 _ f
I0-14 cpf
Accident conditions
Scram
signal
level
10 -3 _f
i0 -I _f
1.5 Cf
Ratio of
scram
signal to
initial
level
i0 II
l0 I3
1.5×i014
2.25
i000
4000
Dead time
in scram
80 Millisec
80
40
80 Millisec
80
40
Period at
scram
signal
level
42 Millisec
59
37
1.8 Sec
170 Millisec
i00
Ratio of
peak
level
to scram
signal
level
9.7
12
4.6
i .66
1.66
Peak
level
10 -2
f
1.2 _f
6.9 @f
Slow scram inoperative_ four simultaneous failures.
Note: If period scram operates with dead time < 3 sec then peak
level always < 2.5 _f.
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For _he accident beginning at a very low source level and scramming
at the lowest protection level of lO-3 _f, where _f is the rated power
level, the period at scram would be 42 milliseconds. Using a dead time of
80 milliseconds for this slow scram gives an overshoot of 9.7 times, which
is very safe. If we consider the protection _evel not acting until lO-1
rated power3 the period at scram would be 39 milliseconds and the over-
shoot 12 times which is still very safe. If the slow scram protection
does not act at all3 the minimumperiod at scram would be 37 milliseconds
andj with a dead time in the fast scram of 40 milliseconds 3 the peak power
would be 6.9 times rated. This accident involves four simultaneous fail-
ures: uncontrolled rod withdrawalj failure of the slow scram system and
its back-up, and failure of the period scram. Also3 as discussed in sec-
tions 6.4.1_ periods of 37 milliseconds are cc_ntrollable by the self-
regulating features of the reactor 3 which are not included in this analy-
sis. Also 3 the conservative limit on peak power of 2.5 times rates is
the static burn-out limit; allowable transient peaks being muchhigher.
In the power range3 above lO-3 rated power_ the protection will be
very close whereby the scram level should not exceed the operating level
by more than 2.25. The minimumperiod that c(,uld develop from a control
rod withdrawal would be 1.8 sec. If this pro_ection takes a level rise
of as muchas lO00 to act_ instead of 2.253 t_e period at scram would be
170 milliseconds and the excursion would be s_fe. The fast level scram_
set at 1.5 _f with a dead time less than 40 milliseconds_ is always in
effect. If the slow scram protection does no_ act at all, a level rise
of as muchas 4000 would give a period of lO0 milliseconds 3 which_ for
the fast scram would give a safe peak power.
All cases discussed above were for the p_riod scram inoperative. If
only the period scram operates with a dead ti_e less than 3 seconds_ then
the excursions for any startup accident would be safe.
The drive system providing the rod insertion speed of 9 in./min is
designed to insure one-directional operation. Even if this speed should
somehowbecomeeffective as a withdrawal 3 and uncontrolled withdrawal
should occur_ the scram system would keep the excursions safe. In addi-
tion 3 the minimumperiod that can develop frou this higher rod speedj
about 21 milliseconds_ can be controlled by the self-regulation of the
reactor as discussed in section 6.4.1.
I
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6.1.4 Maximum Xe Burnout after Restart
The hazard with respect to Xe burnout st normal flux levels was
discussed in section 2.4.3. The insertion speed of the rods is more than
adequate.
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6.1.5 Controllable Accidental Insertions of Reactivity
One of the basic criterions on the design of the reactor I experiments 3
and control systems is that no possible accident can introduce changes in
reactivity which cannot be safely handled by the reactor control system.
The basic safety feature of the control system is the level fast scram
which is set to trip at a level 50 percent or less above the maximum re-
actor operating level required for the particular reactor cycle. This
safety trip is backed up by the one second period fast scramj the inter-
mediate level slow scrams, as well as reverses and set-backs which are
triggered at the first indications of malfunction.
Figure 6.1 can be used to find the minimum allowable period at the
scram signal power level. In order to relate these restrictions on re-
actor periods to allowable reactivity insertions, the transient reactor
periods must be considered as well as the stable periods. For step or
ramp-wise insertions of reactivity 3 the transient periods are always
smaller than the ultimate stable period. To obtain these effects 3 the
reactor kinetic equations 3 using 5 delayed neutron groups, were solved
on a differential analyzer for cases of continued insertion of reactivity
at constant rates. The results are shown on figures 6.4 and 6.5.
In general, the period at the scram signal is determined by the level
at the start of the accident, the rate of reactivity insertion 3 and the
total reactivity inserted. For any reactivity insertion rate_ figure
6.5 shows that the period decreases continuously until the total reactiv-
ity is inserted. At this time the period is the minimum for the transient
as, past this point, the period would increase toward the stable period
corresponding to the total reactivity inserted. If the smallest allowable
period during the transient is set according to figure 6.1j which only
specifies minimum periods at scram, a definitely safe and pessimistic re-
lation between reactivity insertion rate and total reactivity inserted
can be obtained from figure 6.5.
Ramp-wise accidents are assumed: Each such accident is represented
by a point on figure 6.6 corresponding to the reactivity and time at the
corner of the ramp. Accidents which so map into a point below the curve
under consideration can be safely handled by the control system for that
curve. The curves apply to the least favorable power levels at the start
of the accident, up to the 60 mw power level_ and for the least effective
control rod position_ and for the conservative criterion on any excursion
that the peak power be less than 2.5 times rated.
If only the level fast scram system in operative, a step of 0.5 per-
cent _K or a slow insertion up to 0.9 percent 2_( is always control-
lable. If only the set-point level scram system is operative, a reactiv-
ity insertion of 1.2 percent in 0.6 second is always controllable. If
only the one second period scram system is operative, with a dead time
less than 40 milliseconds 3 a reactivity insertion of 1.35 percent in 0.23
second is always controllable.
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It is emphasizedthat these limits are for the least favorable power
levels at the start of the accident. If, for example_considering only
the fast scram operative, a 2 percent ZiK per second accident starts
at power levels greater than 20 mw3 the reactor scrams before the limit-
ing total reactivity of 0.74 percent is inserted. If the sameaccident
starts at power levels less than 20 mw3 then a somewhatlarger total in-
sertion of reactivity is controllable as the reactor scrams after the
minimumperiod of the transient. If the accident starts at 60 mw3 a re-
activity insertion rate of 4 to 5 percent _K per second is controllable.
6.1.6 Hazards Due to Regulating Rod
The regulating rod will be calibrated to insure reactivity worth of
less than 0.6 percent _K. The rod is velocity limited to give full
travel in about one second. This would give fgr full travel at maximum
speed a minimumtransient period of 400 milliseconds (fig. 6.5) and a
stable period of 1.7 second3 which is not at all hazardous. The hazard
in the regulating rod is shownon figure 6.6 f3r full travel of 0.6 per-
cent _kK in one second. The regulating rod cDuld be worth as muchas
0.87 percent ZkK for only the level fast scram system operative or as
muchas 1.2 percent ZkK for only the set-point level scram system oper-
ative and still be safe.
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6.1.7 Xe Burnout on Nuclear Excursion
The possibility of burning out an appreciable fraction of the Xe
in the core in a short time on a nuclear excursion was investigated.
Reference 2.4 shows that this burnout is a furction of nuclear energy
release only. In order for this burnout to add as little as 0.i percent
f_K, it takes a 1250 mw second nuclear excursion at normal Xe concentra-
tion 3 and a 250 mw second nuclear excursion at maximum possible Xe con-
centration as during a restart. These nuclear energy releases on a fast
excursion are not probable 3 section 6.4.13 and this type of burn-out haz-
ard is not a factor.
6.1.8 Removal of Fuel Element or Breakage )f Fuel Element Plate
The reactivity effects of individual fuel plates or of an entire fuel
element accidentally falling out of the active lattice have been experi-
mentally obtained by Oak Ridge personnel at th_ Bulk Shielding Reactor.
These data were obtained for a variety of fuel loadings and reflector
compositions incidental to the principal purpoBe of the experiments and so
have not been published. The data were made available to the NACA by
personnel at the Bulk Shielding Reactor.
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The results indicated that removal of fuel plates and replacement
by water introduced negative reactivity for all positions of the lattice,
Removal of a single fuel plate in a position of high statistical weight
is worth less than 0.I percent reactivity. For examplej a single fuel
plate from a standard 140 gram fuel element near the center of a 5 by 6
critical fuel element array was removed. This introduced negative re-
activity of 0.067 percent. The loading was designated as no. 35 and was
water reflected.
Another experiment involved removal of an entire standard 140 gram
fuel element from a critical 5 by 5 fuel element array which was sur-
rounded on three faces by canned beryllium oxide primary reflector and on
the fo_:th side by water. The element removed was adjacent to the central
fuel element toward the side reflected by water. A negative reactivity
of 3.2 percent was introduced by replacing the fuel element by water.
This loading was designated no. 6.
A third series of experiments on a 5 by 5 critical loading removed
a fuel element at the cornerj its two neighbors along one core-reflector
interface were also individually removed. It was found that the 140 gram
corner fuel element was worth -0.75 percent 2_KI whereas a 70 gram corner
fuel element was worth -0.45 percent 2_<. Replacement of the corner fuel
element and removal of its neighbor introduced negative reactivity of
1.25 percent for a 140 gram fuel element and 0.70 percent for a 70 gram
fuel element. Removal of the next fuel element along the core-reflector
interface resulted in introduction of negative reactivity of 1.9 percent
for a 140 gram fuel element and 1.02 percent for a 70 gram fuel element.
Additional information concerning the worth of fuel has been obtained
from an NACA-requested experimental program at the Bulk Shielding Reactor.
A description of the reactivity experiments and the results obtained are
presented in supplement III to this report (ref. 6.3). In these experi-
ments a slab loading of 7 by 3 - 140 gram fuel elements reflected by rows
of canned beryllium oxide followed by water was used. The center fuel
element was removed plate by plate_ and successive changes in reactivity
measured. This program also determined the worth of removal of water
between fuel plates_ and the worth of voids at various positions along
the reactor height. Results confirmed the negative fuel plate worth as
mentioned above. An interesting finding was that replacement of water
by void near the center of the core introduced positive reactivity.
6.1.9 Fuel Element Cladding Failure
Fission product contamination is caused by two basic types of fuel
element cladding failure. In one case a small hole develops somewhere
in the fuel element cladding because of some initial imperfection or by
slow corrosion. The other type_ caused by local or general overheating
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of one or more fuel elements, is likely to be more serious 3 and in the
worst conceivable case, can be catastrophic. This last situation is dis-
cussed in section 6.4.
The small leak type of failure has been experienced in the MrR (ref.
5.5). Such leaks release somefission gases plus such solid fission prod-
ucts as may corrode and leach out. The resulting contamination presents
disposal and cleanup problems but does not constitute a major personnel
hazard. The actual weight of radioatoms released is quite small if the
faulty fuel element is removedpromptly after the leak is detected by the
water monitors. Prompt removal may not always be practical, in which case
the contamination maybuild up until the reactor is shut down and the
source of the leak removed. Fortunately MrB experience can serve as a
guide for failures of this kind.
Leaks caused by overheating can be very serious even though the prim-
ary cooling system remains intact. The dosage rate outside those portions
of the system adjacent to inhabited work areas will increase approximately
i0_000 fold if all the fission products in oae fuel element are released
uniformly into the primary water. This is a rough estimate 3 assuming
rated burnup in each fuel element.
Fission products that do escape into th_ primary cooling system will
consist of dissolved inert gases, water soluole material 3 and insolubles
which either remain suspendedin the water or settle out on various sur-
faces. The inert gas content of any one fuel element probably does not
exceed 50 ml N.T.P. (ref. 6.4). Inert gases will not be removedas such
by the deionizer. The separation of these g_ses as a separate phase is
unlikely at normal operating temperatures unless other gases (as from
water decomposition) are also present.
The water soluble material can, in prin:iple_ be removedby the de-
ionizer unit although somedata (ref. 5.8) i%dicate that the removal of
last traces is difficult. The addition of ilactive ions of the sameele-
ment can be used to improve the removal of t le last traces of radioions(ref. 6.5). The deionizer resins cannot be _xpected to remove colloidal
material very effectively. Larger sized material in suspension maybe
removed either by screens preceding the mixel bed or by the resin itself
acting as a filter.
The ability of the delonizer resin to r,_movecontaminating material
from fuel element leaks depends upon the cou._entration of such material
and the extent to which the bed capacity is depleted before the leak oc-
curs. Fresh mixed-bed resins will absorb th._ equivalent of 500+ grams
of CaCO3 per cubic foot of resin. Since the fission products have higher
atomic weights than calcium, and since a gooa fraction of the material
released by a major leak probably will not be ionized, the bypass deioniz-
er should have sufficient capacity for the major portion of the soluble
!
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fission products released in any non-catastropic accident. Even so_ the
demineralizer will not reduce the water activities to permissible dis-
charge levels because of the fantastic decontamination factors required.
At the same time it should serve to reduce the water borne radiation to
levels where mechanical work on the system becomes practical except near
the screens and bypass deionizer. These concentrated sources can be re-
moved and disposed of after a reasonable decay period. There is evidence
(ref. 6.6) that some fission products are prone to adhere or combine very
tenaciously with metal surfaces. Since it will not be practical (because
of size and cost) to decontaminate the interior surfaces of the primary
system 3 some degree of surface contamination will have to be accepted
after a major fission leak. The degree of contamination allowed to remain
will have to be consistent with the performance of necessary mechanical
operations.
The fact that mixed-bed resins probably are incapable of reducing
fission product activities to acceptable discharge levels 3 gave rise to
the primary water re-use system described in 5.2.1.1. After a major
fission product leak_ the required cleanup operations may well require
the disposal of some excess water. This can first be discharged to one
of the hot retention tanks and then either diluted and discharged or
possibly concentrated by evaporation.
The problem of cleanup after a major accident has not been thoroughly
investigated at this time. The following procedure may be used to handle
radioactive material for purposes of disposal:
i. Concentration of radioactive ions on the mixed-bed resins by re-
circulation after shutdown. More rapid removal of activity could be ac-
complished by forcing the mixed-bed discharge through the system as a slug
with a minimum of intermixing with the contaminated water.
2. Concentration of suspended particulate matter by the filter in the
demineralizer circuit.
5. Removal of fission gases by continuous circulation through the de-
gassifier described in section 5.2.1.2. As in (i) above_ the degassed
water should preferably move through the system as a slug.
4. Concentration of contaminants in all excess water, which must be
discharged_ by evaporation as outlined in 5.2.5.
5. Dilution of water after sufficient contaminants have been removed.
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6.2 HAZARDSFROMFAILUREORMALFUNC'?IONFEXPERIMENTS
It is strongly emphasizedthat the experiments discussed have been
chosen as being typical of the larger and potentially more dangerous ex-
periments that would be considered for testLng in the reactor. Certainly
such experiments would not even be considered for testing until a suf-
ficient amount of operating time and experience had been accumulated to
insure a thorough knowledge of the characterLstics of the reactor facil-
ity. During this interim period, experiment _ would be limited to rela-
tively small experiments of unquestionable integrity. It is felt, how-
ever, that eventually it will be essential to perform experiments of the
samegeneral type as described in section 4. It is for these reasons
that these particular experiments have been ,_hosenfor discussion. All
experiments will be rejected, however, which by conceivable accident may
introduce potential positive excess reactivities which cannot be safely
handled by the reactor control system.
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The design of experiments on prototype fuel elements cooled by air
or liquids has been based on the concept of rzinimizing the possibilities
of fission product escape from the experime_; containers. On the other
hand 3 if the experiments are to yield data o3' value to the Aircraft Nuclear
Propulsion program 3 they must be operated at high temperature and stress
levels. The probability of fission product leakage within the experiments
is accordingly large. In fact# there are e_,eriments which will intention-
ally be operated with gaseous fission products escaping from the test ele-
ment} the detection of particulate matter, hc,wever# may call for immediate
cessation of the experiment by cut-back of the reactor.
The degree of contamination and dose rates accompanying dispersion
of fission products associated with a one megawatt experiment operating
for lO days is very high. These fission procucts dispersed in the shield-
ing pool and in the alr-filled dome of the containment tank would produce
dose rates of 550 r/hr just outside of the reactor containment tank (dose
rates at other locations are discussed in appendix J). It is essential
therefore, that the experiments are structur611y designed to contain
failed fuel elements under all forseeable corditions.
To insure that malfunction of experimen±al equipment or failure of the
fuel element do not proceed to completion, scram signals from as many in-
dependent detectors as practical will be trazsmitted to the reactor safety
system. It is also essential that accidents causing changes in composi-
tion and geometry of the experiment shall no± cause positive step changes
or ramps in reactivity which can place the reactor on unsafe periods.
A discipline for the design of experimerts should therefore incorpo-
rate the following:
i. Absolute local containment of experiment.
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2. Accidents to experiments shall not introduce changes in reactivity
which cannot be handled safely by the reactor control system.
3. Multiple reactor scram signal tie-ins from experiment instrumenta-
tion.
The ways in which the foregoing design discipline has been conceptu-
ally applied to an air-cooled and a liquid-cooled experiment are discussed
in the following section. Hazards associated with failure of experiments
and methods of cleaning up are discussed in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.33
respectively.
6.2.1 Operational Accidents to Experiments
6.2.1.1 Air-cooled experiment. - The air-cooled fuel element experi-
ment in normal operation has been described in section 4.1.1 and shown
in figure 4.1(c). The integrity of the experiment is maintained by a
multiplicity of stainless steel containers maintained at acceptable tem-
peratures and stresses by water coolant in the clearance space. The cool-
ing water is supplied from the 50,000 gallon overhead, primary-cooling-
water tank. This flow is independent of the operation of any other equip-
ment of the reactor facility.
The scram signals can originate from:
i. Activity due to accumulation of particulate matter in a filter
downstream of the test fuel element exceeding a prescribed level. The
level may be set to cause scram for fission gases passing through the
filter. If the experiment calls for operation with cracked fuel elements,
fission gases in the airstream may be accepted.
2. Overtemperature on fuel-plate surfaces and in strategic locations
in the pumped loop which indicate overheating of element due to distortion
of air flow or fuel plates_
3. Failure of an air compressor as indicated by a cooling-air flow
reduction iu the bypass loop and a change in compressor speed.
4. Loss of water coolant flow in experiment clearance space.
5. Loss of cooling water flow in main coolers.
6. Reduction in air pressure at fuel element due to a leak or break
in au air line in the equipment coutalner.
An important accident is failure or reduction of air or cooling water
supply and subsequent overheating of the fuel element. The experiment has
been designed to handle these accidents in the following manner:
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If one of the compressors fail, the reactor is cut-back 3 and the
compressor is isolated from the system by valves located before and after
the compressor. The bypass throttling valve is closed and all the flow
is diverted through the main loop, removing the afterheat of the fuel
element. About 180 hours of forced cooling are required to remove after-
heat after which the afterheat can safely be transferred by conduction.
If the second compressor fails before 180 hours after reactor shutdown#
the fuel element will melt. The remaining afterheat is then transferred
to the surrounding water# in which the experiment has been stored, by
conduction through the wall of the experiment and by boiling and free
convection from the experiment outer container surface.
If a break occurs in one of the air lines inside the experimental
tank_ changes in the flow rate or air pressure cut-back the reactor.
The degree of flow deviation depends upon the location of the break. In-
asmuch as the pressure in the tank is maintained at the same level as the
compressor inlet_ a break downstream of the _uel element would result in
very little flow deviation. The contents of the containment tank could
become contaminated but still present no hazard since the experiment is
contained.
A larger flow adjustment occurs if the _reak is located upstream
of the fuel element because part of the flow is diverted through the
break into the experiment containment tank. It is possible to design the
system so that sufficient air is circulated ever the test fuel elements
to remove the afterheat.
If the flow of cooling water to one of _he main coolers fails_ the
reactor is cut-back and the afterheat of the experiment is removed in the
remaining cooler. If water flow to both coo] ers stops simultaneously the
reactor scrams; the test fuel element melts (own due to afterheat. The
remaining afterheat in the molten elements i_ transferred to the clearance
space coolant to maintain containment.
Another hazard is that involving excursJons of the main reactor.
With the fuel element operating near its pe_. heat-transfer performance,
an excursion of the reactor could result in (verheating and consequent
failure of the fuel element. Integrity of t_e thimble is maintained by
the clearance space cooling water. ExcursioILs in reactor power resulting
in pressure increases in the core large enou_ih to break the thimble and
the containment tank for the experiment will contaminate the quadrant.
The experiment containment tank 3 however_ is designed to withstand pres-
sures consistent with the design value for t_ e reactor pressure tank.
6.2.1.2 Liquid-cooled experiment. - A representative liquid-cooled
experiment using sodium to cool metallic fuel elements has been described
in section 4.1.2 and shown in figure 4.2(c). Several stainless steel con-
tainers maintained at acceptable temperatures and stresses by water
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coolant in the clearance space enclose the experiment. From a safety
point of view, it is desirable to have as many sensing elements as practi-
cal to detect failure. For this reason additional systems 3 such as a
helium gas monitoring system between two stainless steel concentric con-
tainers may be used to detect sodium leaks. In addition, a boiling de-
tector_ which acoustically measures the growth and collapse of vapor
bubbles, may be installed in the sodium loop.
The reactor scram signals can originate from:
I. (a) Temperatures of sodium leaving the test element above a
prescribed limit
(b) Temperatures of beryllium moderator surface near outer fuel
elements exceeding prescribed limits
Both of the foregoing temperatures closely follow fuel element plate
temperature since temperature lags through sodium and beryllium a_'e rel-
atively small.
2. Helium gas-monitor circulating through porous media to detect
sodium leak through inner stainless steel containment shell
3. Bare-wire 3 continuous-twin conductors in parallel in porous media
to detect sodium leak by shorting
4. Boiling detector to indicate overheating in fuel elements
S. Electromagnetic flowmeter to detect reduction of sodium flow rate
6. Failure of sodium pump
7. Loss of water coolant flow in experiment clearance space
8o Loss of coolant flow in sodium-to-air heat exchangers
If one pump fails; the reduction in flow is noted on the magnetic
flowmeter in that line. At a predetermined drop in flow rate the valve
controlling the flow rate is completely opened and the pump that failed
is isolated from the system. The reactor is scrammed and the afterheat
is removed by sodium circulated by the remaining pump. Forced cooling is
required for a period of 1.5 hours after scram before the afterheat may be
removed by conduction to the water in which the experiment is being stored.
If the second pump fails during the latter part of the afterheat forced-
cooling period; the experiment will cool by convection to the ambient
water. However, failure of the second pump early in the afterheat forced
cooling period will result in boiling of both sodium and storage water.
The detailed transient heat transfer calculations have not been made -
but it is expected that the fuel elements may melt.
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If the facility air flow to the heat exchangers stops, a pressure
sensitive 3 cut-out switch will cut-back the reactor. The time required
to boil sodium if no heat is removedby the heat exchangers is 50 seconds.
The fuel elements maymelt down, but the afterheat will be removedby the
clearance space cooling water.
An additional hazard exists with this s¢dium-cooled experiment. If
a sodium leak should occur in the air-cooled heat exchangers3 the hot
walls will corrode very rapidly. This meansthat such leaks must be de-
tected promptly and the reactor scrammedwithout delay. Otherwise the
leak may quickly enlarge and release enough sodium to prevent adequate
cooling of the fueled test section. Presumably, enoughof the leaking
radioactive sodium will be carried out of the experiment by the cooling
air to permit early detection. A leak in either of the heat exchangers
is picked up by the leak and flame detector. This signal closes the
valves 3 isolates the heat exchanger, and scr_ms the reactor.
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6.2.2 Reactivity Effects of Accidents to Experiments
In order to evaluate the hazards due to reactivity changes associated
with accidents to the experiments, the effects of several compositional
and geometric changes to the experiments and consequent interaction with
the reactor core, have been studied. A series of reactivity calculations
have been made for:
I. An air-cooled experiment in the horizontal through-hole HT-1 in
two positions relative to the face of the core
2. A liquid-cooled experiment in the center test hole for two cases
of this experiment; with fuel and without fuel but with an ab-
sorber equivalent to the fuel concentration
It is again emphasized that the compositions and locations of these
experiments were selected as representative o_ the type of desirable ex-
periments. The sizes were chosen in order to explore reactivity effects,
and because of the complexity of the two-dime%sional diffusion solutions,
a limited number of configurations were consilered.
It is recognized that the most elegant c_iticality calculations are
at best a relative guide. In order to augment the present calculations
and to establish effects of fuel worth and void worth in the central fuel
element of the active lattice, an experimenta_ program was negotiated with
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and performed at the Bulk Shielding
Reactor. The critical loading consisted of a 7 by 3 array of 140-gram
aluminum fuel elements surrounded by rows of canned beryllium-oxide prim-
ary reflector elements followed by a water secondary reflector. This was
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the best simulation of the NACA reactor possible at the BSR. NACA per-
sonnel assisted with the experiments and subsequently analyzed the results.
Analysis of these experimental results has provided evidence of the re-
activity changes associated with removal or addition of fuel platesj
flooding of void spaces with water_ and void coefficients due to localized
voids in regions of high statistical weight. A complete presentation of
these experimental results can be found in supplement III (ref. 6.5).
Analysis of these experimental results permit the estimation of some
third-dimensional effects, that is, the finiteness in the length of ex-
periments proposed for the center test hole. It is recalled that the re-
activity calculations performed on the two-dimensional simulator assume
that the experiments in the critical configuration extend the full height
of the core in the case of the center test hole, and the full length of
the core in the case of the horizontal test hole.
Insofar as diffusion theory calculations are concerned_ there is a
reasonable measure of confidence in the group analyses herein employed.
The analytical techniques used calculated satisfactorily the criticality
of the Oak Ridge homogeneous enriched uranium oxy-fluoride-water solution
cylindrical reactor critical mass studies. This analysis has been pub-
lished as reference 6.7.
6.2.2.1 Reactivity effects of accidents to air-cooled experiments in
horizontal through hole. - The various two-dimensional configurations con-
sidered for the air-cooled experiment are shown in figure 6.7.
Configuration I shows the normal air-cooled experiment in the closest
possible approach to the face of the core.
Configuration II postulates a break in the outer container of the ex-
periment with complete flooding by water of the cooling-air passages in
zones 3 and 5.
Configuration III shows the normal air-cooled experiment in the
farthest possible position from the face of the core.
Configuration IV postulates a break in the outer container of the
experiment with complete flooding by water of the cooling-air passages in
zones 5 and 5.
The values of Kef f obtained for each of these configurations rela-
tive to the reference core are listed below:
i06
Configuration
Unperturbed reference core
I Air-cooled test closest to core
II Cooling-air passages in I f]ooded
III Air-cooled test farthest frcm core
IV Cooling-air passages in III flooded
Keff
1.185
1.158
i .158
i .165
i .164
It may be seen that complete flooding oz" the cooling-air passages
and 3 as such 3 all of the effective void spac,_ in the HT-I hole with the
air-cooled fuel element experiment in place 3 introduces no change in re-
for configuration I and only +0.001 _K/Kef f for configurationactivity
III.
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The two-group neutron flux distributions across the reactor hori-
zontal midplane with the air-cooled fuel element experiment in HT-I are
shown in figure 6.8. The distributions for both configurations I and II
are shown. The effect of complete flooding with water of the cooling-air
passages in zones 5 and 5 results in a large change in fluxes in HT-I 3
but in a small change in fluxes in the core z_tself. The effect on reactiv-
ity is therefore small. The effects of the stainless steel absorbers in
zone 3 and of the moderator in zone 4 in perturbing the local fluxes are
readily apparent in figure 6.8.
It has been shown in section 4.2.1 that an average relative specific
power of from 0.49 to 0.38 can be obtained in the air-cooled fuel element
experiment in HT-I in respective positions closest and farthest from the
face of the core. This specific power is reZative to an average specific
power of unity over the entire core volume. Inasmuch as the air-cooled
fuel element experiment described herein was designed for a total power
of one megawatt 3 and the test fuel element contains about 4000 cc 3 the
average specific power required in the experiment is 250 watts per cc.
The core average specific power required to produce this specific power
in the experiment is less than the core desi_ value of 600 watts per cc
for the position closest to the core.
Specific powers in the experiment may b_ increased somewhat by in-
creasing the uranium concentration in the experiment. On the other hand_
the effective fission cross section may be reduced by neutrons coming into
equilibrium with the higher temperature in the immediate vicinity of the
experimental fuel element. There is also th_ possibility of locating the
experiment in HT-I at various distances from the face of the core; move-
ment of the air-cooled experiment by one-inc_ near the center of HT-1 al-
tered the average specific power by 20 percent.
6.2.2.2 Reactivity effects of accident to liquid-cooled experiments
in center test hole. - The compositional changes to the liquid-cooled ex-
periments in the center test hole are shown in figure 6.9. Configurations
I and II are the experiments with and without fuel respectively in zone 3.
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Configuration II without fuel contains a macroscopic absorber equivalent
to the fuel. Configurations III and IV postulate a break in both thimble
and stainless-steel containers_ and a complete flooding of the gas passage
in zone 2.
Configuration V was calculated to estimate the worth of accidental
removal of the entire S-inch square center test hole experiment 3 or of
the core shim-rod fuel element_ which ordinarily occupies this space.
The values of Kef f obtained for each of these configurations are
listed below:
Configuration Kef f
Unperturbed reference core
I Fueled experiment
II Unfueled experiment
III Flooded fueled experiment
IV Flooded unfueled experiment
V All water in test space
1.165
1.165
1.150
1.179
1.154
1.157
It may be seen that the increase in reactivity accompanying flooding
of the monitoring gas passage introduces a zhK/Kef f of +O.012 for the
fueled experiment_ and +0.004 for the unfueled absorptive experiment.
Response of the reactor to accidental reactivity insertions introduced
as ramps is covered in section 6.1.5 in which a discussion of safe ramps
for various reactor powers is presented. Precisely how steep a ramp in-
crease in reactivity may be introduced by a specific experiment must be
determined by a detailed analysis of how failure of the experiment may
proceed. The present calculation for an experiment extending the full
height of the core indicates a relatively large positive ZhK/Kef f due
to the complete flooding accident. However_ the results of the experi-
ments at the Bulk Shielding Reactor 3 reported in reference 6.5_ indicate
that filling of air space with water near the center of the core introduces
negative reactivity. This would imply that experiments_ which are shorter
than the full height of the core and which experience accidents in which
air passages are flooded_ may not introduce as large a positive reactivity
as that calculated.
On the other hand_ the calculated reactivity effect of flooding an
but unfueled experiment introduces a __ZkK/Kef of +0.004absorptive
which is controllable even if introduced as a step increase at any oper-
ating power and so is completely safe. Of course_ the experiment con-
sidered is very absorptive_ using up a ZhK of 0.035.
Very careful studies will be made before any fueled experiment will
be considered for insertion into the center test hole. However_ materials
I08
irradiations experiments appear to be reason_ble for the center test
space.
Configuration V estimates the effects of removing a standard fuel
element from the center of the lattice and replacement by water. The
contribution of this fuel element is calcul_ied to have ZhK of 0.028.
Removalof the fueled experiment would introduce negative reactivity of
2_/Kef f of -0.007. On the other hands removal of the unfueled experi-
ment would introduce positive reactivity of 2_K/Keff of +O.006. This
reactivity insertion is controllable.
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6.2.3 Failure of Experiments az1d their Cleanup
6.2.3.1 Failures. - The design of equipment for fueled experiments
must be such as will minimize the possibility of fission product escape
from the experiment container. 0u the other hand 3 if these experiments
are to yield data of value to the ANP program s these units must be oper-
ated at temperature and stress levels such that the margin of safety is
much less than that incorporated in the reac_or proper. Moreover_ there
will be less experience on which to base the_3e individual designs of ex-
perimental units. The probability of fission product leakage within an
experiment is accordingly large. The chance of leakage into the clearance
coolant space is presumed to be much lower sunce the fuel element coolant
fluid will tend to carry any molten fuel element material away from in-
fluence of the reactor core s thereby reduci_ the heat release in the ex-
periment in the small interim prior to scram of the reactor.
If leakage to the experiment exterior does occur_ it follows that
very serious damage to the fueled portion of the unit must have occurred.
Minor fuel element rupture in the experiment is unlikely to result in any
external leakage because of the protective f,_atures inherent in the de-
sign. The monitoring and scram instrumentatuon normally provided are
intended to limit the fuel element damage to as low a level as possible.
The possibility of external leakage is very remote unless the interior
damage is both violent and extensive. Under these circumstances 3 the
external contamination is likely to include 1_oth the primary system and
the pool water. A major cleanup job must be expected for any external
experiment leakage. The activity of the air in the containment tank can
be very high if the explosion is sufficiently severe (see appendix J).
If s however_ the accident is less violelt, such that no large gas
bubble rises to the pool surface_ then some _f the fission gases could
remain dissolved in the huge volume of pool "_ater. In this event s the
handling of the air activity in the reactor ,_ontainment tank could be
much less of a problem than appendix J indicates.
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In the case of the sodium-cooled experiment, the possible hazard and
cleanup problems are somewhat different. Should the sodium ever succeed
in escaping through the double-walled experiment test section, the rate
of escape is likely to be high because of the extensive interior damage
which must precede the leak. If this situation does occur 3 very high
thimble pressures can develop as a result of the sodium-water reaction.
The experiment assembly is much too heavy to be blown back quickly enough
for any practical thimble protection. The inclusion of a rupture vent at
one or both ends of the thimble may offer some protectlon 3 but this is
problematical. Obviously, a thimble burst must be avoided because of
possible damage to the reactor core and the control system. The decon-
tamination required after such an accident is substantially the same as
that required for the air-cooled experiment except that a larger fraction
of the fission gases is likely to reach the pool surface along with the
escaping hydrogen. Any type of external rupture of an experiment will
require prolonged and tedious decontamination, the details of which will
doubtless depend upon the particular circumstances.
Even though all the fission products released by ruptured fuel ele-
ments are within an experiment_ the cleanup and disposal programs will
not be easy. The detailed procedures will depend upon each design. Some
general procedures are discussed in the next section. These are essen-
tially an extension of those presented in section 5.2.4. The activity
levels are comparable, the principal difference being that the activity
is not as well confined. This tends to make all decontamination procedures
more exacting and time consuming. The control procedures are substantial-
ly the same.
To what extent the two kinds of experiments considered herein are
typical# is problematical. Other types of experiments are likely to pre-
sent other failure and contamination problems.
6.2.3.2 Cleanu_ of fueled experiments. - As already stated, the rup-
ture of the fuel elements in any kind of fueled experiment designed for
high-level operation is likely'to be rapid and the coutaminatlon severe
throughout the coolant passages. The first trace of a leak can doubtless
be detected as soon as the added activity is comparable to that normally
present in the coolant stream. The details of this detection have not
been worked out but will depend upon each type of coolant. The normal
gamma activity of the coolant stream is likely to be high throughout the
coolant passage, particularly for sodium. For this reason delayed neu-
trons might offer the best basis for detection (ref. 6.8). Whether any
kind of detection will be rapid enough to permit reduction of reactor
power before extensive fuel element damage occurs, is not yet known. If
not, then the coolant stream will be extensively contaminated with fis-
sion products in the form of metal debris, inert gases, oxides, nitrldes,
and to some extent 3 bromides and iodides. The size of these particles is
problematical and will depend in part upon the rate of temperature rise
and the temperature overshoot that occurs.
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The replacement cost, plus that of dispgsing of such bulky apparatus
as these experiments entail_ will generally oe far greater than the cost
of decontamination to a re-use level. This meansthat a decontamination
program will have to be devised for all such experiments and provision
madein the original design to facilitate these operations.
Once an experiment has had its interior contaminated by a fission
leak_ there are several steps which will be _enerally applicable. These
will differ in detail between types of experiments and the extent of the
contamination_ the latter being a factor whizh maynot be easily evaluated.
These steps can be enumerated as follows:
i. The usual instrumentation will scram the reactor once a leak has
been detected.
2. Cooling fluid flow must be maintained for a short time thereafter
to remove decay heat. After this, the experiment can be pulled back into
its quadrant at the earliest opportunity. There will be no particular
virtue in minimizing the cooling period because the contamination level
within the experiment is not likely to increase once the reactor is shut
down. Normal instrumentation will indicate _hether any activity has pene-
trated the experiment walls.
3. After removal of the experiment test piece from the thimble 3 and
resealing of the thimble, the reactor is once more operable for other
research. The experiment can be left in its quadrant or moveddirectly
to the hot laboratory canal extension (see s_ction 2.1.9 and fig. 2.20)
for such time as is required for activity decay.
4. By this time the experiment can be tcansferred to the Dry Hot
Storage# or directly to the Hot Handling Roon (see fig. 2.20) if prompt
dismantling is desired. Up to this point all steps are essentially alike
irrespective of any internal contamination.
5. Onceready for dismantling, t he expeciment must next be cleared
of coolant fluids. If these are contaminatei# this operation is the first
requiring additional precautions beyond thos_ normally followed. Since
the coolant is either liquid or gaseous, som_provision for removal of
fission gases in a controlled mannerwill be necessary. The required pre-
cautions are substantially like those outlinsd for the degassifier in sec-
tion 5.2.1.2. By straining the coolant flui_ during removal, the greater
part of any unburned fuel contained therein 3hould be recovered. Under
most circumstances 3 the bulk of unburned fuel will remain within the ex-
periment.
6. The next step involves sawing off the experiment test section and
transferring it to one of the hot cells for further dismemberment. Here
the bulk of the unburned fuel must be recovered by a combination of chemi-
cal and mechanical operations. In general 3 the complete separation of
all fuel from container materials will not be attempted.
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7. The other portion of the experiment must be decontaminated to
such a level that any remaining activity will neither interfere with the
next use nor be a radiation hazard during further disassembly I repair, and
reassembly. The initial decontamination will probably be performed in
the Hot Handling Room where adequate shielding exists. The techniques
employed will depend upon the particular coolant being used. Flushing
the system with fresh coolant may be the logical first step3 otherwise
an appropriate wash solution. If the rig contains sodium or other re-
active material, this must be removed completely prior to flushing with
water solutions. The use of inhibited acid solutions may be necessary
followed by a water rinse. Water solutions will have to be evaporated as
for the hot cells as discussed in section 8.2.4.
8. After completion of such preliminary cleaning 3 the rig will be
transferred to the Decontamination Shop (fig. 2.20). Here the contsmina-
tion level must be such that dismantling operations are possible with
close control of exposure times. Workmen will wear such protective cloth-
ing, masks 3 etc. as may be required. Upon completion of dismantling and
further decontamination in this area# the experiment components will be
transferred to the adjacent Repair Shop. Here the rig will be reassembled
in preparation for the next experimental project. The contamination level
should be such that a practical minimum of exposure control is required.
9. All waste and scrap will be controlled rigidly and disposed of in
a manner dictated by the nature of such waste.
6.3 HAZARDS RESULTING FROM ACTS OF GOD, WAR, SABOTAGE,
NEGLIGENCE 3 AND EXPLOSIONS EXTERNAL TO THE FACILITY
6.5. I Severe Storms
Records of extreme weather conditions in the Sandusky area are given
in appendix C and are summarized here. The two most severe types of storms
are thunderstorms and tornadoes. Thunderstorms average 32 days per year
occurring primarily in the summer 3 June and July averaging 7 days apiece.
Thunderstorm activity is extremely variable but a rare severe storm may
cause winds in excess of 50 mph, 1 to 3 inches of rain in an hour and hail-
stones 1/2 inch or larger in diameter.
Situations favorable for the formation of severe thunderstorms are
also conducive to tornado formation. ASS year study of the tornadoes in
the United States shows that lll tornadoes occurred in Ohio during this
period. The largest percentage of these storms occurred in the northern
and western portions of the state. One tornado has occurred in Sandusky
in 73 years, that occurring in 1924. The highest wind speed ever re-
corded at Sandusky# 77 mph 3 occurred during this tornado.
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A tornado is not expected to result in _ hazard to the reactor itself
although considerable damagemaybe inflicted to the reactor building (out-
side the containment tank), the auxiliary buJldings, and the water towers.
The pumproom and the hot labs are both of heavy reinforced-concrete con-
struction so it is extremely unlikely that they will be damagedin a
tornado.
Lightning damagemight possibly disrupt electrical power but two sep-
arate power lines supply the facility. If b(th of these lines are dis-
rupted, the reactor will scram. A diesel gererator runs continuously to
supply i000 gpmthrough the shutdownwater s_stem which is adequate for
reactor afterheat. A second diesel generato_ will automatically take
over the load in event the first one fails.
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6.5.2 Floods
The land surface in the vicinity of the reactor is 65 feet above Lake
Erie I sloping gently towards the lake, so fl¢oding of the complete area
is unlikely. However, the reactor building _s located within a diked area
to prevent surface water runoff in the event of a catastrophe. The heav-
iest rainfall ever recorded in 24 hours is 6 inches and the heaviest snow-
fall in 24 hours is 14 inches. In the event of a severe rainstorm (such
s_ 6 it. in a 24 hr period) it is possible t_at the culverts will be in-
a_'quate to keep the area drained. This is rot expected to be a hazard
because all radioactive waste tanks are cove_ed and the integrity of the
containment tank is maintained. To prevent floating of the waste tanks
in the event of a flood they will be purposely flooded when this danger
exists.
The floor above the handling canals is 1.5 feet above grade so a
flooding to this depth is necessary before flood water mixes with canal
water. In the unlikely event that radioactivity does appear in the flood
water, the monitors on the culvert valves will shut off these valves and
prevent the r_dioactive water from leaking t¢ populated areas.
6.3.5 Earthquakes
Earthquakes having epicenters in the Sandusky area have never been
recorded. According to Dr. Edward J. Walter, Seismology Laboratory, John
Carroll University (personal communication) earthquakes have been centered
to the south, east, and west of Sandusky and the maximum intensities of
these have been 7 to 8 on the Modified Mercalii intensity scale. The oc-
currence of such earthquakes is roughly about one in every five or ten
years. According to Heck (ref. D.2) there are ii earthquakes reported
having epicenters in Ohio to 19473 including 5 important ones. Table
6.1 lists the major earthquakes reported in Ohio. An additional discus-
sion is given in the geology report (appendix D).
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TABLE 6.1. - MAJOR EARTHQUAKES HAVING EPICENTERS IN 0HI0
Date Hour
June 183 1875 0745
Sept. 19; 1884 1414
Sept. 20_ 1951 1705
March 23 1957 0948
March 9, 1957 0045
Locality
North
latitude
40.2
40.7
40.2
40.7
4O .6
West
longitude
84.0
84.1
84.5
84.0
84.0
Area felt,
sq mi
40,000
125;000
40jO00
90;000
150;000
Intensity,
Rossi-Forel
scale
6-7
6
8
8
8
to
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The earthquake of 1875 caused minor damage at Sidney 3 Ohio. The
earthquake of 1884 was centered at Columbus_ Ohio, and effects of it were
felt as far as Washington; D. C.; and Michigan. Some property damage was
caused by an earthquake at Anna and Sidney_ Ohio_ in 1931. Two earthquakes
which occurred one week apart in March 1957 centered around Anna and Sid-
ney and caused property damage in those towns; in Lima and Bellefontaine;
Ohio_ and in Ft. Wayne and Indianapolis_ Indiana. The second shock was
felt in the upper stories of buildings in Chicago; lllinois_ Milwaukee_
Wisconsin_ and Toronto_ Canada. The center of this region of earthquakes
is approximately II0 miles southwest of the reactor site.
The earthquake hazard to the reactor facility is sufficiently low
that no seismograph-operated scram circuit is considered to be necessary.
6.5.4 Bombing
The only bombing considerations will be for bombs of a nonnuclear
type. To release fission products would require a direct hit in which
the bomb would pierce the containment tank and explode at the bottom of
one of the quadrants.
The most serious situation would occur if the bomb exploded in a
"wet" quadrant and demolished both the reactor tank wall and the shield-
ing pool wall in one quadrant only. In this event the 5000 gallon head
tank would supply water immediately and a 50,000 gallon head tank would
supply water automatically in 15 seconds. In addition to this a i00,000
gallon head tank is available which is supplied through a manually ac-
tuated valve. Further emergency water is available from the reservoir
on the NACA site and from the domestic and fire main systems to prevent
core meltdown.
If any of the walls between the quadrants ruptured or if the entire
reactor vessel ruptures in addition to either of the walls mentioned
above, the core would not be drained. If the motorized valves between
the quadrants and the annulus (mentioned in section 6.1.2) were opened,
the core would not be drained.
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A conservative calculation shows that the core would melt in approxi-
mately i0 seconds in event of a complete loss of water at the same time
the reactor scrams. If melting occurs_ a metal-water explosion conceiv-
ably could result (see section 6.4). This would disrupt the core and
release a considerable amount of fission products.
6.3.5 Sabotage
Sabotage is probably the most difficult hazard to provide for in a
design. It would be difficult for a saboteur to gain entry from the out-
side since he would be required to first bre_k through the area security
fence and then gain access to the containment tank. The entrances to
the Plum Brook Ordnance Work area and to the NACA area will be guarded
at all times.
A more likely occurrence would be sabot_ge by a demented or sub-
versive employee. The philosophy which has _een adopted is to protect
vulnerable points in the facility by maintai:ling an efficient security
force and by using protective methods which _equire the actions of two
individuals to gain access to critical areas.
It is foolhardy to state that a reactor cannot be sabotaged through
malicious mishandling of the control system _nd its wiring. The discus-
sion must, therefore, rest upon how difficul_ it is to produce damage.
The only way to destroy the reactor through _ts control system is to
cause the control rods to withdraw from the lore and to remain withdrawn
until the reactor destroys itself. In order to do this for the reactor
herein described, it is necessary to overrid_ all the interlocks placed
upon rod-out motion by the power set-back circuits (reverse, fast set-
back, slow set-back, and rod stop) as well a_ the regulating-rod and shim-
rod interaction limits. Also_ it would be n_cessary to abrogate all the
"slow" scram circuit interlocks that would s_nse reactor run-away through
secondary effects, e.g., temperatures_ pressures, N16 activity_ etc.
Lastly_ it would be necessary to completely inactivate the "fast" scram
circuits in such a manner that the sigma bus did not collapse and so that
all units in the period and safety circuits would remain normal and sound
no alarm. If there would be dynamic experiments (e.g., pump loops, etc.)
in the reactor flux, it would also be necessary to prevent them from
causing the reactor to scram.
The above outlined changes, modificaticns, and rewirings would in-
volve no small effort upon the part of a saboteur and would limit his
employment to that of reactor operator_ since, during times when the re-
actor is shut down_ the control system is dcuble locked-out in a full
scram condition (i.e._ driving rods not latched to control rods). The
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saboteur would be required to have considerable knowledge of the wiring
and would have to violate locked cabinets (not under his key control).
The necessary rewiring would have to be done without error because a
misstep would cause reactor scram.
The spent or new fuel elements could possibly be arranged in the
water of the canal to form a supercritical assembly. Therefore_ the new
fuel elements will be stored in movable racks which will be kept in a
locked vault requiring the simultaneous use of two separate keys for
entry as described in section 5.1.1. The underwater storage racks will
be individually locked as described in section 5.1.3.
Sabotaging the main power lines will not result in a hazard because
the reactor will automatically scram and the diesel generator will supply
a ii00 gpm water flow. It would be necessary to cut out both main power
lines and the diesel generator in order to introduce a hazardous condi-
tion. Even if the fuel plates do melt as a consequence and cause a metal-
water reaction with a resultant explosion the integrity of the contain-
ment shell will not be violated. For a discussion of the metal-water
reaction and resultant explosion see section 6.4.2 and appendix G.
It is realized that it is impossible to design for complete protec-
tion against sabotage. 0nly the more obvious methods of protection have
been considered and a practical limit is reached when the ease of oper-
ation of the facility has been impaired.
6.5.6 Negligence
The history of accidents in atomic energy activities has shown that
negligence is one of the largest contributing factors to accidents. The
most difficult task in preventing negligence is that of promoting con-
tinued safety consciousness even though no accidents have occurred.
The operation of the nuclear reactor itself is most hazardous during
startup and shutdown operations. It will be required that the shift
leader of reactor operations and the console operator both be present
in the control room during these operations. When the reactor is on servo
control the console will normally be manned by the console operator with
the shift leader of reactor operations available for relief° An oper-
ating manual for reactor operations will be prepared which will include
standard operating procedures and operating restrictions imposed by nu-
clear safety considerations. A check list will be prepared for startup
and shutdown operations which must be checked by the console operator
and initialed by the shift leader of reactor operations. During opera-
tion_ the console operator will be required to maintain a log book and to
take meter readings periodically.
The operation of experiments will be handled in a manner similar
to that of the reactor except that potentially hazardous experiments must
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be very carefully tended. An operating manual which must be rigidly ad-
hered to will be prepared. Check lists will be used for startup and
shutdown operations. If there are any changes in the experiments which
affect the reactor in any way3 the shift le_ler of reactor operations
must be notified.
6.5.7 Explosions in the Magazine Area
Located in the Plum Brook OrdnanceWorks is an ammunition storage
area described in section 3.2.1 and shownon figure 3.1. The 99 igloos
located there are each of 2503000pound TNT (or equivalent) capacity and
range from 8000 to 163000 feet from the reactor site. The igloos are
spaced 400 feet apart. It is a matter of coucern what effect an accident-
al explosion in one of these igloos might h_re on the reactor facility.
This matter was discussed with Mr. J. A. Bately, Jr., Safety Branch
Chief of the Intelligence 3 Security 3 and Safety Office of the Office of
the Chief of Ordnance of the Army. He gave an opinion that the earth
tremor would be of insufficient intensity to cause any structural damage
to the foundation of the reactor building. He also stated that the air
blast would be very low but possibly may cau3e window damage.
Experimental data on large HEexplosion_ (250,000 and 500,000 ib)
in igloos are available from tests madeat k'co, Idaho in 1945 and 1946
(refs. 6.9 and 6.10). The horizontal accelerations at the ground surface
for various distances from the explosion are shown on figure 6.10. These
igloos were situated on about 20 feet of san.l and gravel over volcanic
rock. The horizontal displacement of the ea'th at a distance of 8500 feet
from these blasts was approximately 0.025 in:hes.
The air blast was measured in the Arco Jests (refs. 6.9 and 6.10) and
a slight extrapolation of these data indicates that the peak overpressure
would be about 0.4 psi. It is concluded in _eference 6.10 that the air
blast at distances over 6000 feet from this _ize explosion should cause
very little flying glass from window breakage.
These experimental data indicate that tlie accelerations in the ground
at the reactor site from a 250,000 pound TNT explosion in an igloo will be
less than 0.002 g's and the air overpressure will be about 0°4 psi. This
acceleration is so low that no damage of any type is expected to the re-
actor. The air overpressure is likely to ca ise slight window breakage.
These conclusions substantiate those of Mr. Bately.
The probability of an explosion in one igloo setting off another
igloo is considered to be very low. In the Arco tests (ref. 6.10) an ig-
loo containing 5003000 pounds of TNT (twice rated capacity) was set off
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next to another loaded igloo at a clear distance of 185 feet without caus-
ing a sympathetic explosion. It is concluded in reference 6.10 that:
"...there is small probability of propagation of explosion from one
igloo magazine containing 500,000 net pounds of TNT to another parallel
to the first 3 at a clear distance of 185 feet..oobservers with long ex-
perience in military high explosions_ after examining the condition of
the target magazine and its contents were unanimous in the opinion that
there was little likelihood of a detonation."
6.4 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The accident considered here is the excursion resulting from the in-
ability of the control system to compensate for the addition of a large
step-increase in reactivity to the reactor. I In this excursion_ the re-
actor power and temperatures increase rapidly until some inherent self-
limiting process in the reactor stabilizes the situation or until the
reactor disassembles itself. The runaway to destruction in a reactor of
this type would probably include the melting of the fuel plates_ an ex-
plosion in the reactor pressure vessel_ and the scattering of radioactive
materials. It is an event which could create a considerable hazard both
for the operating personnel and the general populace.
For the sake of convenience the type of accident described in the
above paragraph will be called a Borax-type accident. Analyses (based on
limited information and uncertain theories about the nuclear excursions)
have been made of various aspects of a Borax-type accident in the NACA
reactor. Some of the results of these analyses are presented in the fol-
lowing order:
i. The nuclear excursion including estimates of the energies released
and temperatures attained
2. The chemical reactions which may result from the nuclear excursion
3. The concept of an equivalent TNT explosion
4. The forces acting on the containing structure of the reactor
5. The ability of the reactor containing structure to resist these
forces
IThe inability of the control system to compensate for this change
in reactivity might occur because of some failure of the control system or
because the nuclear events in the reactor occur too rapidly for the con-
trol system to be effective. The large step-increase in reactivity is as-
sumed_ even if it is difficult to conceive of its actual occurrence_ be-
cause it represents the worst possible condition.
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6. Additional analysis of 4 and 5 above carried out by Armour Re-
search Foundation for the NACA.
7. The radiological hazards from the release of the fission products
8. Emergencyprocedures in the event of serious fission product re-
lease
6.4.1 The Nuclear Excursion
The only inherent self-limiting process, other than reactor disas-
sembly_ which will appreciably affect a Bora(-type excursion is the forma-
tion of steam in the reactor core. The effectiveness of steam formation
as a self-limiting process was demonstrated in the series of Borax and
Spert tests and is reported in references 6.11, 6.12, and 6.13. Various
attempts have been madeto predict analyticslly the results of Borax-type
excursions, in water moderated reactors with Borax (MTR)type fuel ele-
ments, considering the effect of steam formation as a self-limiting pro-
cess. Four of these attempts are reported in references 6.14, 6.15, 6.16,
and C.17. All four attained somelimited degree of success in predicting
the results of the Borax experiments. There is considerable question as
to the general validity of any of these anaJyses, but they were used to
evaluate the results of Borax-type excursior s in the NACAreactor because
no better analyses were available. A discussion of the application of
these analyses to the NACAreactor is preselted in appendix F; someof
the results are discussed below.
The variation of maximumfuel plate temperature with stable reactor
period as computedby the four different methods is shown in figure F.2.
The variation of nuclear energy release with stable reactor period as com-
puted by three different methods (the metho_ of reference 6.17 did not
permit the calculation of energy release) is shown in figure F.5. The
variation of maximum pressure with stable reactor period as computed by
two different methods (the methods of refs. 6.16 and 6.17 did not permit
the calculation of pressures) is shown in figure F.4. The table below
summarizes some of the results of figures F.2 3 F.3_ and F.4 of appendix
F. The Z_K/K corresponding to the various stable reactor periods was
calculated in the same manner as was used tc obtain figure 6.5.
Stable
reactor
period 3
msec
4O
2O
I0
5
I.i
1.5
1.8
2.9
Maximum
fuel plate
_emperature 3
OF
550-750
400-800
900-1200
1500-2700
Nu< lear
e_ ergy
re_ ease 3
M_-sec
5-35
10-40
20-60
30-120
Maximum
pressure in
the reactor
core_ psia
135-200
145-300
200-400
500-950
!
F-J
Q
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Two important assumptions in the analyses described above are the value
of the void coefficient of reactivity and the effectiveness of the reactor
hydrodynamic system as a means of pressure relief. Both of these topics
are discussed in appendix F.
It s_ppears that for periods longer than about I0 milliseconds (£_K/K
less than about 1.8 percent) the fuel plates would probably not reach the
melting temperature. The maximum predicted energy release for periods
down to 5 milliseconds (Z/K/K up to 2.9 percent) is about 120 megawatt-
seconds. The Borax experiment in which the reactor was destroyed re-
leased about 135 megawatt-seconds; the period was 2.6 milliseconds. The
NACA reactor, in all the various control rod accidents described in sec-
tion 6.1, would certainly not reach a period as fast as 5 milliseconds
because reactor disassembly would occur at somewhat slower periods. Ac-
cidents associated with experiments would cause insertions of reactivity
(see section 6.2), but these would certainly not be large enough to result
in reactor periods as short as 5 milliseconds.
6.4.2 Possible Chemical Reactions
If the fuel plate temperature in an excursion were to become high
enough to melt the aluminum or the aluminum-uranium alloy 3 a reaction
might occur between the metals in the fuel plate and the water in the re-
actor. The possibilities of such a reaction occurring_ the extent to which
it might occur_ and the ener_- released by the reaction are discussed in
appendix G. How much metal in the fuel plates would react with water is
very uncertain. However 3 to give some idea of the magnitude of the energy
releases involved 3 if all the aluminum and uranium in the fuel plates
were to react with water_ the energy release would be about 1350 megawatt-
seconds.
If all the metal in the fuel plates were to react with water, the re-
action products would include about 23 pounds of free hydrogen. The nu-
clear and chemical energy released by the nuclear excursion and concurrent
metal-water reaction would undoubtedly rupture the reactor tank and hurl
a portion of the contents of the reactor tank into the air-filled dome
of the containment tank. The possibility of the hydrogen reacting with
the air in the dome of the containment tank and the energy which could be
produced by this reaction are discussed in appendix G. Calculation of
the final equilibrium conditions indicate that the final hydrogen-air mix-
ture would be well below the fla2mm_bility limits for hydrogen-air mixtures.
The equilibrium concentration of hydrogen would be about i percent by vol-
ume while the minimum concentration required for flammability is about
percent by volume, and the minimum concentration required for detonability
is about 18 percent by volume. The possibility does exist, however, that
during the transient a portion of the hydrogen might form a flammable or
detonable mixture with the air which could be ignited by hot metallic
pieces from the reactor debris.
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6.4.3 Equivalent TNTExy,losion
A Borax-type excursion severe enoughto melt the fuel plates and rup-
ture the reactor tank is sufficiently complex:that it is difficult or im-
possible to estimate theoretically the loads that it would apply to the
containing structure. Further, there is ver_ little experimental inform-
ation on which any detailed estimate could bc_based. The assumption is
therefore madethat the destructiveness of a Borax-type excursion can be
replaced by the destructiveness of a TNTexplosion of the sameenergy con-
tent as the Borax-type excursion. It is felt that this is a conservative
assumption for two reasons: the energy rele_.se in a TNTexplosion is much
more rapid than in a reactor excursion_ an e::plosives expert estimated
that damageto the containment vessels of th(_ Borax reactor caused by the
final destructive excursion could have been (:ausedby about 6 to 17 pounds
of TNT (ref. 6.11); the energy released was _.,quivalent to about 70 pounds
of TNT.
The nuclear energy release predicted by the different methods of
analysis for a Borax-type excursion in the NACAreactor is less than 120
megawatt-seconds for periods downto S milliseconds (fig. F.33 appendix
F). This predicted energy release is less t]Lan the energy release of
135 megawatt-seconds (at a period of 2.6 mil[isec) which accompaniedthe
destruction of the Borax reactor. Let us as_umethat the nuclear energy
release for the NACAreactor is 135 megawatt seconds. Let us further as-
sumethat SOpercent of all the metal in the fuel plates react with water.
This would release an additional 675 megawat%-secondsof energy which is
a very large amount of energy comparedto the assumednuclear energy.
Any energy liberated by the reaction of the hydrogen released by the metal-
water reaction would occur in the air-filled region above the shielding
pool and would not appreciably contribute to the forces in the shielding
pool. The effect of possible hydrogen-air r_actions will therefore
be considered separately. Combining the ass_Lmednuclear energy release
of 135 megawatt-seconds with the assumedene:'gy release of the metal-
water reaction 3 675 megawatt-seconds; we arr:ve at a figure for the total
energy of 810 megawatt-seconds. The weight of TNTwhich would have an
energy equivalent to this is approximately 400 pounds. Wewill; there-
fore, consider the effects on the reactor co:_ainment structure of an
explosion of 400 pounds of TNT at the locati{)n of the reactor.
If 50 percent of the metal in the fuel _)lates were to react with
water; approximately II.5 pounds of hydrogen would be formed. An estimate
of the effect on the reactor containment str_cture of the reaction with
air of this hydrogen in the air-filled regioJl above the shielding pool
will be made.
6.4.4 Forces on the Reactor Containment Structure
Appendix H presents a discussion of the forces on different parts of
the reactor containment structure due to a 400 pound TNT explosion at the
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reactor location. Pressure-time and impulse-time histories for the re-
actor pressure tank and the floors and walls of the reactor shielding
pool are shown in figures H.I and H.2 of appendix H.
The forces which might act on the dome of the reactor containment
tank_ if a hydrogen explosion occurred in the air above the shielding
pool_ are discussed in appendix H_ as is the equilibrium pressure in the
containment tank after an excursion.
6.4.5 Structural Analysis
The ability of the containment structure to resist the forces due to
the 400 ib T_ explosion 3 the concurrent hydrogen-air explosion_ and the
resultant equilibrium pressure is discussed in appendix I. The following
are the conclusions of appendix I.
I. The reactor tank and the concrete adjacent to its sides would fail.
2. The radial quadrant walls would be badly damaged_ particularly near
the reactor tank. The structural steel reinforcement in the outer sec-
tions of the quadrant walls would hold and_ except for fragments and de-
bris_ the outer section of the walls would lift only about 0.15 inches and
shift laterally only about 0.55 inches.
5. The steel reinforcing hoops in the shielding pool wall would elon-
gate about 8 percent. The elongation to rupture of these hoops is about
16 percent and therefore_ though the wall might crack badly_ it would not
fail in a gross sense.
4. The lead and concrete plug underneath the reactor tank would be
broken loose and would fall to the bottom of the sub-pile room. The re-
sulting stress would not exceed 4300 psi at the floor surface and would
not exceed 2150 psi in the concrete just above the containment tank skin.
The dynamic crushing stress ih concrete is about 5000-6000 psi and there-
fore the concrete would not crush through to the containment tank skin.
5. About 8.1×106 ft ibs of energy is required to crush the concrete
in the fillet between the sub-pile room and the shielding pool floor
through to the containment tank skin. The energy available would be about
6.OxlO 6 ft ibs. Therefore the concrete would not crush through to the
containment tank skin.
6. About 4.6xi05 ft ibs of energy is required to crush the concrete
in the shielding pool floor beyond the fillet through to the containment
tank skin. The energy available would be about 3.6xi05 ft ibs. There-
fore the concrete would not crush through to the containment tank skin.
7. Even if the concrete crushed through to the containment tank skin
in items 4, 5, or 6 above, the containment tank would not fail, since it
is backed by pressure grouted limestone bedrock in the regions considered
in these items.
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8. The shrapnel shield would raise abou_ fifteen feet but_ since the
top of tile containment tank dome is about 50 feet above the shrapnel
shield 3 no damage would be done to the containment tank.
9. The maximum debris velocity likely to be encountered would be
about 160 ft/sec. The maximum weight of ste_:l fragment would not be like-
ly to exceed 18 Ibs. The velocity required for an 18 ib fragment to
pierce the containment tank is about i000 ft/sec. Therefore the contain-
ment tank would not be pierced by debris.
i0. The hydrogen-air explosion, even if it occurred with the hydrogen-
air mixture in contact with the containment _ank_ would not rupture the
tank. The maximum biaxial elongation would ]_e about 4.S percent_ if the
area of contact were twenty feet in di_neter If the area of contact were
two feet in diameter, experimental evidence indicates that a 12 gage
(0.109 in.) or 14 gage (0.083 in.) sheet would not be ruptured and there-
fore the 3/4 inch thick containment shell would certainly be safe.
ii. The weakest members of the containm_mt tank from point of view
of the equilibrium pressure of 2 psi_ are th_ doors. These have been
designed for a steady pressure of 5 psi with a safety factor of three.
The containment tank would therefore readily contain the equilibrium
pressures.
12. The containment tank would survive_ its integrity would be main-
tained_ and it would contain all solids 3 liquids_ and gases present inside
of it.
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6.4.6 Independent Analysis Carri_d Out by Armour
Research Foundation for _.he NACA
The problem of containing any possible Borax-type excursion is ex-
tremely important. Consequently 3 a contract was let to Armour Research
Foundation for an independent analysis of th,_ NACA reactor containment
structure. This analysis has been carried oILt and the final report is
added to this report as supplement II (ref. _;.18). The Armour Research
Foundation analyses confirms the analyses c_'ried out at the NACA in find-
ing that t!e containment tank would survive _he 400 Ib TNT explosion 3 the
subsequent hydrogen-air explosion_ and the e<[uilibrium pressure and that it
would contain all solids 3 liquids 3 and gases inside of it.
6.4.7 Radiological Hazards from the Rele_se of Fission Products
The extreme importance of containing a Borax-type excursion which
is sufficient to melt the fuel plates is indicated by a study of the
123
0
!
_k
o
I-
o
hazards associated with the release of fission products in either liquid
or gaseous form. The hazards resulting from the release of fission prod-
ucts to the ground in liquid form_ the hazards resulting from the release
of fission products to the air in gaseous form_ and the hazards resulting
if all fission products are contained in the containment tank are dis-
cussed in appendix J. Some of the results of appendix J will be described
below:
The hazards due to the release of all the fission products diluted
in water was estimated for two cases. The first case_ that of water seep-
age to the ground_ would result in activities of about 0.5 _c/cm 3 at the
nearest well_ and activities of about 0.08 _c/cm S as the water enters Lake
Erie. The second case assumed the worst possible conditions_ including
the assumption that the valves in the dikes surrounding the reactor are
left open by mistake_ the ground is frozen_ and a heavy rainfall occurs
shortly after the explosion. This case might contaminate as much as
4×1010 cubic feet of lake water to the level of 3×10 -2 _c/cm 3.
The hazards due to the release of fission products in the form of a
gaseous cloud was estimated in appendix J for several different sets of
assumptions. The greatest possible doses which an individual could re-
ceive are tabulated below for two locations of interest. The worst dos-
ages for all cases except one occur when fission products from a saturated
core operating at GO megawatts are released instantaneously under severe
inversion conditions. The greatest possible inhalation dose to the near-
est resident occurs when the fission products are released continuously
over 24 hours.
Nearest residence_ 3200 feet
Center of Sandusky_ 4.5 miles
External 3
r
58
Dosages
Depos ition 3
170
3.5
Inhalation 3
r
12.,000
690
The hazards due to the release of large amounts of fission products
which are all contained in the reactor containment tank were also
estimated in appendix J. Dose rates and integrated doses for three loca-
tions of interest_ and for various times_ are tabulated below for the
contained release of fission products resulting from i000 hours of opera-
tion at sixty megawatts.
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Time 3
days
after
release
of fis-
sion
products
0
1/4
I
7
14
25
Just outside the
containment tank
Dose rate 3
r/hr
593000
83600
53700
13700
840
27O
Integrated
dose from
time zero 3
r
2003000
4503000
13200j000
13S00;000
13500_000
Nearest point of NACA
fence - 920 ft
(see fig. J.16)
Dose rate 3
r/hr
In%egrated
dose from
time zero;
r
5O
140
410
470
55O
!Nearest point of Ord-
!nance Works fence -
3000 ft (see
fig. J.16)
Dose rate;
35
6.8
4.0
.91
°34
.i0
0.18
.027
.011
.0013
.00045
.00011
Integrated
dose from
time zero 3
r
0.060
.160
.630
.830
1.080
The following conclusions may be drawn from the above tabulation:
In view of the extremely high initial dose rates just outside the con-
tainment tank 3 it is doubtful that anyone in the reactor building would
survive unless they happen to be shielded. ()ther personnel on the site
farther removed from the containment tank woltld have to be evacuated as
rapidly as possible.
Ti_e dose rates at the nearest point of _,he NACA fence are high and
certain portions of Plum Brook Ordnance Work_; would have to be blocked off.
The portions closest to the site would have <o be blocked off for a period
in excess of twenty-five days. Calculations for longer times indicate that
the period would not exceed ninety days. Th(_re would be ample time avail-
able to warn Ordnance Works personnel who h_}pened to be in the vicinity
of the site since the integrated dose in the first six hours would be
about 50 r. Also_ as may be seen from figur(_ J.16; the sections of the
Ordnance Works which would have to be blocke( off would not seriously
hamper the operation of the works.
The dose rate at the nearest point of t}Le Ordnance Works fence 3 which
represents the closest approach that the gem_ral public can make to the
reactor 3 is not too high. The integrated dme which would be picked up
at this point in the first week (168 hrs) would be about 630 mr which is
only about twice the allowable continuous e_,ose dose of 300 mr/week.
The integrated dose for the second week is dc,wn to about Z00 mr.
6.4.8 Emergency Procedures in Ev(_nt of Accident
Appendix K presents a description of the emergency procedures to be
followed in the event of serious release of radioactive fission products.
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SECTION 7. - ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION
7 .I ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
The diagram in figure 7.1 shows the suggested organization for the
facility. The chief scientist at the facility is the Chief of Research
Operations. He will be in charge of operation of the facility and of the
research activities at the Plum Brook site. He will be assisted in the
consideration and scheduling of experiments for the reactor and of chan-
ges to the facility and its operation by a Program Committee. The Program
Committee will be headed by a Program Coordinator who will call meetings
of this committee and organize the business handled by the committee. The
Safeguard Committee will advise the Program Committee with regard to the
safety and technical soundness of proposals under consideration. The Chief
of Research Operations will also have on his staff a Personnel Training
Officer who will study the educational needs of the organization_ and make
arrangements for the required instruction.
The Chief of Administrative Services at Plum Brook will administer
the shop facilities_ maintenance_ purchase, and plant protection at the
Plum Brook site. He will also serve to coordinate the administrative and
service operation at the Plum Brook site with those at the Lewis labora-
tory for handling the construction or purchase of large items_ and for
handling administrative matters such as records_ payrollsj budget, etc.
The following is an outline of the responsibilities of the Committees and
of the organizational segments shown on the diagram in figure 7.1.
7.1.1 Program Committee
7.1.i.I Function. -
I. Rules on experiments for insertion in reactor with regard to
scheduling and adequacy of equipment.
2. Rules on changes to reactor equipment or operation procedures.
7.1.1.2 Membership of program committee. -
Program Coordinator, Chairman
Chief of Technical Branch
Chief of Operating Branch
Chairman of Safeguard Committee
Head of Project Engineers Section
Head of Health Physics Section
Chief of Technical Services Branch
Chief of Research Operations (ex officio)
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7.1.2 Safeguard Committee
7.1.2.1 Function. -
i. Make recommendations to Program Committee with regard to
adequacy of design of experiment and whether proper tie-
in of experiment with reactor safety system is provided.
2. Make recommendations to Program Committee on proposed chan-
ges to facility or operationah procedures.
7.1.2.2 Membership of safeguard committee. -
Head Reactor Physics Section
Head Engineering Design Section
Head Instrument Research Section
Head Operations Section
Health Physicist
o
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7.1.5 Technical Brauch
7.1.5.1 Reactor Physics Section. -
a. Analyze distribution in reactor of flux, power, temperature,
coolant flow with various rea,_tor fuel and control rod as-
Semblies and various experiments.
b. Operate zero power mock-up or r,_actor to determine Z_K of
reactor components and experi_ents.
c. Study startup and transient beh_Lvior of reactor and prepare
operating manual.
d. Study methods of improving reac'_or performance and utility.
e. Determine parameters needed for reactor analyses.
f. Provide consultation services.
7.1.5.2 Instrument research section. -
a. Research on improved instrument_ for the facility and for
experiments.
b. Improve control systems and safety systems.
c. Provide consultation service.
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7.1.5.5 Irradiated materials laboratory section. -
a. Operate hot cells.
b. Assist in making chemical and metallurgical analyses of
materials irradiated in experiments in reactor.
c. Analyze reactor components.
7.1.5.4 Engineering design section. -
a. Design new equipment for reactor facility.
b. Make engineering analyses of present and advanced facility
operation covering such items as stresses, materials,
coolant flow rates_ coolant pumping requirements, coolant
pressures, and temperatures.
c. Design experimental equipment proposed to he inserted into
reactor.
7.1.5.5 Project engineers section. - Provide project engineer for
each proposed experiment or change in facility design who will schedule
the project through the various stages, arrange for the cooperation of
other groups at the facility, and train operational personnel in the
handling of experimental equipment. He will supervise all personnel spe-
cifically assigned to a project.
7.1.4 Operations Branch
7.1.4.1 Facility operations section. - Operates reactor facility
which includes reactor and all of the accessory equipment necessary for
proper operation of the reactor such as coolant pumps, motors, generators,
etc.
7.1.4.2 Experimental equipment operations section. - Provides test
engineers for assignment to major experiments in reactor who have respon-
sibility for proper operation of this equipment while inserted in reactor.
7.1.4.3 Health physics and safety section. -
a. Provides safety and health regulations.
b. Enforces these regulations.
c. Provides radiation monitors.
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d. Makes periodic inspections.
e. Studies methods of improving safety of the operation and
plant.
f. Supervises cleanup and maintenance of irradiated areas and
equipment.
g. Supervises disposal of radioact_ive by-products.
h. Keep records on health physics.
i. Keep records on radioactive mat._rials on facility site.
7.1.5 Technical Service_ Branch
7.1.5.1 Plant protection section. -
a. Guards
b. Firemen
7.1.5.2 Shops. -
a. Operate assembly and construction shops.
b. Arranges for construction of eq:lipment at Lewis laboratory,
and independent shops.
7.1.5.3 Mechanical services section. -
a. Provide mechanics, electricians, pipe fitters, etc., for
construction and installing experiments or reactor facil-
ity equipment.
7.1.5.4 Plant maintenance section. -
a. Maintaining facility equipment in good repair.
b. Maintaining grounds and building.
7.1.6 Administrative Branch
7.1.6.1 Purchase section. -
a. Arrange for purchase of equipment.
b. Obtain cooperation of Purchase Section at Lewis laboratory
when required.
o
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7.1.6.2 Clerical section.
a. Keep personnel records.
b. Handle payroll records.
c. Keep files on letters and documents.
7.1.6.5 Stenographic section. -
a. Provide typing service.
b. Handle report preparation and tie-in with Lewis laboratory
organization on this subject.
7.1.6.4 Fiscal section. -
a. Prepare budget.
b. Keep records on funds and expenditures.
c. Tie-in operation with Lewis laboratory Fiscal Department.
7.1.6.5 Computing section. -
a. Make computations for staff.
It is estimated that 61 professional and 119 nonprofessional per-
sonnel will be required initially to operate the facility. A breakdown
of this staff is shown in table 7.1. The number of personnel required
will be adjusted or augmented when experience with operation is obtained.
7.2 STAFF TRAINING
This reactor facility_ unlike AEC reactor facilities_ will have to
be staffed largely by people who at present have had little practical ex-
perience with the everyday problems of reactor operation which arise and
demand prompt and correct operational decisions. To compensate for this
situation_ key staff members will be sent to several AEC sites for the
purpose of gaining this type of experience while the NACA reactor is be-
ing built. Obviously_ the number of trainees and the period of assign-
ment will depend upon mutually acceptable arrangements being made with
the AEC. These trainees will then serve as a cadre for training addi-
tional operators and supervisors during the initial performance testing
of the NACA reactor. It is intended that they shall also prepare the
requisite procedure and control manuals to be used for initial operations.
152
E_
I
,
o
o
i
o o
i
0
0
0
t
m_
0a
0 0
o
i
t-
C
133
!
As a minimum, this experienced cadre should include the Program Co-
ordinator, the Safeguard Committee Chairman, the Technical Branch Chief,
the Operations Branch Chief_ and the Heads of the Reactor Physics Section_
of the Irradiated Materials Laboratories, of the Project Engineers Sec-
tion_ of the Health Physics and Safety Section, and as many shift leaders
from the Facility Operations Section as are available. This totals be-
tween 9 and 12 people. Their training periods might vary from 2 to 6
months each. It is hoped that they can be given training assignments
which permit their working closely with their counterparts at AEC sites.
This matter of staff training and development is one that receives
continuing attention in most well-managed laboratories. This is partic-
ularly desirable in a reactor facility because of the necessary and con-
tinuing emphasis on safety and teamwork. For this reason the Chief of
Research Operations will have on his staff a Personnel Training Officer
who has prime responsibility for the proper indoctrination and training
of all new employees assigned to radiation workj both technical and non-
technical.
The present shortage of people with experience and training in nu-
clear technology is likely to continue if the nuclear power field develops
as rapidly as some enthusiasts predict. Under these circumstances the
rate of turnover of qualified personnel is likely to be higher than normal.
Replacements for all group leaders must then be available on short notice,
hence supervisor development will be emphasized and encouraged. There
seems to be no alternative since most of these replacements will generally
come from within the available staff.
7.3 PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING EXPERIMENTS OR CHANGES
IN REACTOR DESIGN AND OPERATION
Experiments for the reactor facility will originate at the Plum Brook
facility 3 at the Lewis laboratory, at the AEC, or with contractors of the
AEC or Air Force. In addition, proposed changes to the reactor design and
operation may originate at the Plum Brook site or elsewhere.
For the purpose of promoting the safety of the facility operation the
following is the procedure through which all proposed experiments and
facility and operational changes must pass:
I. The proposed experiment, facility change, or operation change is
referred to the Program Committee through the office of the Chief of
Research Operations and is presented briefly in conceptional form with
regard to the purpose and method.
2. If the Program Committee approves the proposal# it sets a pre-
liminary test date and it authorizes the appointment of a project engineer
who brings the project to the Engineering Design Section.
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3. The project engineer, together with representatives of the group
that have proposed the experiment, and the Engineering Design Section
develop the final design. The project engineer has the responsibility of
coordinating all of the efforts on the PlumBrook site relating to the
design, construction, and testing of the proposal, and supervises all Plum
Brook personnel assigned to the proposal. _e brings into the project,
as is required, the services of other personnel on the site. He obtains
the guidance of the Safeguard Committee regarding the compatibility of
the design with the safety requirements of the facility, such as the tie-
in of the experiment with the reactor scram circuits.
4. After satisfying the Safeguard Committee, the project engineer
schedules presentation of the completed design to the Program Committee,
and organizes this presentation.
5. On approval of the proposal by the Program Committee with the
advice of the Safeguard Committee, the project engineer arranges for con-
struction of the experiment.
6. Whenthe completed apparatus is del_vered to the site, the project
engineer arranges for the services of experimental equipment operators
and supervises them in the operation of the experiment outside of the re-
actor to obtain familiarity with its handlirg characteristics. The proj-
ect engineer_ the equipment operators, and the proposer of the experi-
ment prepare an operating manual for the experiment which itemizes the
test conditions and procedures and the safety procedures.
7. The project engineer then makesapplication to the Program Com-
mittee for an approval documentauthorizing insertion of the experiment
in the reactor, or the proposed changes to the facility or its operation.
The operating manual is submitted to the Program and Safeguard Committees
for comment. The Program Committee must be shownthat the operators have
obtained the required operational experience with the experiment outside
the reactor_ that the proper tie-ins with t_e reactor scram system are
being provided, and that the experiment has been approved by the Safeguard
Committee.
8. If approval is granted by the Program Committee, an approval docu-
ment is issued which contains the schedulin@ date and must carry the sig-
natures of the Chairmen of the Program and _afeguard Committees, of the
personnel initiating the proposal, of the Chief of the Operations Branch,
and of the personnel specifically delegated to makethe experiment inser-
tion into the reactor, or the changes in facility design or procedure.
9. Items can be removedfrom the reactor only through presentation
of a document which carries the signatures of the Project Engineer propos-
ing the removal_ Headof the Facility Operations Section, and of the Oper-
ational personnel specifically designated to makethe removal.
!
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I0. On removal of an experiment from the reactor, the project engi-
neer arranges for transportation of the experiment to the handling and
storage areas, and for the required operations in the hot laboratories.
A project flow diagram illustrating these steps is sho_ in fig_e
7.2.
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7.4 ADDITIONAL REGULATIONS FOR PROMOTING SAFETY
I. The Technical Branch determines the operational procedure for the
facility but cannot operate the facility.
2. The Facility Operation Section operates the facility according to
the procedure specified by the Technical Branch but cannot change the
procedure, except as specified in the operating manual (see paragraph
73 section 7.3).
5. Insertion or removal of experiments, control rods, fuel elements,
moderator rods, and also repairs to the facility system can only be made
on presentation of a document that as a minimum must contain the signature
of the requester3 the Head of the Facility Operation Section and of the
person designated to make the actual insertion, removal or repair. The
document must contain the date on which the act was completed. (The regu-
lations regarding new experiments or changes to the facility or its oper-
ating procedure have been previously discussed.)
4. The operation of the facility can only be started via written and
signed order of the Head of the Facility Operation Section.
5. Accident reports must be prepared on all accidents by the group
in whose field of responsibility the accidents fall as decided by the
Safeguard Committee. The report should cover the causes of the accident
and the proposed corrective measures.
7.5 HEALTH PHYSICS AND SAFETY
7.5.1 Some General Comments on Safety
Industrial experience has demonstrated repeatedly that personnel
safety cannot be relegated to some subordinate group (or individual) and
forgotten, no matter how dedicated such persons may be. Personnel safety
has to receive the direct support and continuing encouragement of all
supervisors to be successful. This interest must stem from the top-most
eschelons of the organization. In the absence of this interest, the
safety functions (and in the present case Health Physics as well) inevit-
ably become segregated from the main effort with consequent loss of co-
operation, initiative, and good will. Under these circumstances, safety
operations are reduced to police type actions, with typical police at-
titudes_ rather than being an adjunct to good management as they should
be.
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In the ideal case, all safety personnel should assist in getting
assigned jobs done without relaxing safety standards unduly. They should
help to overcomeor circumvent the hazards inherent in a job rather than
interpose endless restrictions or relax the rules beyond good reason.
With a little thought and foresight, most jobs can be performed safely
without too muchextra cost. Delays often occur because of too little
prior planning from a safety point of view.
It is one of the prime functions of good management to recognize this
need for teamwork and to promote proper safety attitudes throughout the
staff. This cannot be done by paying lip service to safety on the one
hand, and encouraging or condoning relaxation of reasonable safety stand-
ards at the same time. The Chief of Research Operations of the NACA re-
actor will have to take a keen personal interest in the safety attitudes
of his staff.
It is true that the safe way of doing a particular job might not be
the quickest or cheapest, but it will lead to fewer heartaches, sick-
nessj and lost time in most instances. As Stokinger and Laskin have
pointed out, "No substance is too harmless tc be disregarded, and no
substance is too toxic to be used, if recognized as such, and adequate
safeguards applied" (ref. 7.1). All too frequently, research people are
intolerant of any restrictions on their freedom of action. In most of
these cases this attitude is grounded in ignorance - either of the poss-
ible hazards, or of the proper techniques for coping with these hazards.
Those few individuals who persist in this attitude, in spite of training
and good supervision, are simply not suitable for work with radioactive
materials.
O
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7.5.2 Functions of Health Physics ald Safety Section
There are two aspects to the protection of personnel employed at any
reactor facility. One involves control of or linary mechanical and chemi-
cal hazards which suitably trained people can and will recognize. The
other involves radiological safety, namely, tile maintenance of radiation
and contamination levels which are consistent with legal requirements
(refs. 7.2, 7.5). This function is commonly :alled "Health Physics."
Those with formal physics and biological dama{e training are called
"Health Physicists" or "Radiological Officers." Those responsible for
routine survey work are Radiation Monitors.
In view of the relatively small staff at this facility, the responsi-
bility for ordinary safety will also be assigned to this group. The mem-
bers of this group frequently visit all parts of the facility and of neces-
sity know what experimental work is underway. With proper supervision and
training, they should be able to assume both functions to advantage.
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In addition to these strictly safety functions_ this group has four
other responsibilities_ all of which have an indirect relationship to
safety. One involves accountability for all source materials_ and radio-
isotopes obtained under license from the AEC. The second is concerned
with cleaning and general maintenance in areas subject to radiation and
contamination. The third involves control of_ and disposal of, all radio-
active or contaminated materials at the laboratory which are not needed
for further work. The fourth is concerned with personnel exposure records.
Accountability for source materials has to be a precise operation.
This is easiest for fabricated units such as reactor fuel elements. It
is not so easy for source materials used in fabricating fuel elements at
the site for test purposes. Here all fabrication scrap, all hot cell
scrap_ burnup, and losses have to be evaluated, and a complete inventory
maintained. In the case of radioisotopes obtained under license_ the
records must show receipts_ locations at all times, and eventual disposal.
Control of low level contamination is a never ending chore wherever
work with dispersible radioactive materials takes place. Walls_ floors,
and furniture must be washed periodically. Filters require replacement,
and provision made for disposal of wastes of all sorts. Such jobs require
nonskilled labor which needs the constant supervision and attention of
someone who can evaluate the radiation hazard levels involved. For this
reason such janitorial and maintenance employees responsible for this type
of work will be assigned as a subgroup under Health Physics. Most of this
work will be of a routine nature although assistance in handling high level
wastes may be required. Individuals responsible for spills or other ac-
cidents may be required to clean up after their error, particularly if vi-
olation of laboratory rules is involved.
Storage and disposal of all contaminated wastes will be under the
control of Health Physics since this group has to provide the monitoring
service_ packaging supervision_and identity information for shipping.
Routine monitoring and control of disposal rate for gases and liquids is
included in this function. All necessary radiation signs are posted and
maintained by this group.
Finally, Health Physics will be responsible for the maintenance of
personnel exposure records, processing dosimeters and badges, calibration
of all monitoring equipment, area and air monitoring_ inspection of radio-
active material received from other sites, and any other duties peculiar
to their interests and responsibilities. Special clothing will be pro-
vided for all those subject to contamination, the issuance and processing
of which will be controlled by the Health Physics group.
7.6 SECURITY
The physical security of the NACA Reactor site is most important both
as a safety measure and for the protection of classified information. Both
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aspects are fully recognized in present NACApractice. The key personnel
will be drawn from the existing NACAplant plotection staff and will be
given further instruction as to the safety provisions peculiar to this
site. These menhold weekly training sessiors in all aspects of their
job.
These security personnel are usually military veterans who have some
minor disability preference but who are nevertheless alert and able to
assumethe necessary responsibilities inherert in their job. All are re-
quired to wear Chief Petty Officer uniforms. Thoseposted at site en-
trances wear side arms, the proper use of which receives constant atten-
tion. The over-all supervision of this grou_ will remain under Lewis
laboratory control.
The Plum Brook OrdnanceWorks is surrounded by a cyclone-type fence
with a guard post at the entrance serving the NACAreactor site. This
entrance is located near the intersection of Taylor Roadand Columbus
Avenue (see fig. 2.3). The reactor site is surrounded by a second fence
shownin this samefigure. The gatehouse at the south end of the wester-
ly north-south road will be mannedby an NACAguard on a continuous three
shift basis.
A secondary fence within the reactor site is shownin figure 2.4.
It encloses auxiliaries which require special safety control, such as
waste water storage ponds_ service terminals such as power, fuel, and
water_ and contaminated equipment which permits outdoor storage.
All employeeswill receive a preliminar_ badge check at both the
Arsenal and NACAentrances. All visitors (salesmen, technical consult-
ants, truck drivers, etc.) will have their cledentials checked at these
points also. In general, all technical visitors will be accorded prior
clearance by the NACAHeadquarters, otherwise, by the Managementof the
Lewis laboratory.
Fire protection will be provided, at least initially, by Ravenna
Arsenal_ Inc._ operators of the Plum Brook O_dnanceWorks. The activities
at the site will be under the immediate control of the particular operat-
ing supervisors with the advice of the Healt_ Physicist in charge at the
time the emergencyarises. Telephonic (and _ossibly radio) communication
facilities will be available. Emergencymedical and hospital arrangements
will be madewith local authorities.
As a supplementary measure, all importart check points within the
reactor site will be patrolled and inspected by the security staff on a
periodic basis. This patrol function will b_ coordinated with the opera-
tional and radiation monitoring functions wherever possible.
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REACTOR HEAT TRANSFER
The reactor is designed to produce a total power of 60 MW from 27
MTR type fuel assemblies arranged in a 9 by 3 array. Of the total output
of 60 MW it is estimated there will be 57 MW generated in the fuel plates.
There are 23 standard fuel assemblies with 18 fuel plates in each assem-
bly and 4 shim control rod fuel assemblies with 14 fuel plates in each
assembly having a combined heat transfer surface area of 400 ft 2. This
results in an average heat flux of 490_000 Btu/hr-ft 2. From neutron flux
distribution calculations the ratio of the peak to average power is ap-
proximately 1.8:i which results in a maximum heat flux of 8803000 Btu/
hr-ft 2 .
The velocity in the fuel assemblies is 30 ft/sec and the local heat
transfer coefficients were calculated from the equation
hD
k
- 0.023 Re0"8 Pr 0"4
where the water properties were evaluated at the local bulk temperature.
The heat transfer coefficient at the hottest point in the reactor was
calculated to be 9000 Btu/hr-ft2-°F and a fouling factor of 253000 Btu/
hr-ft2-°F was assumed.
The reactor heat is to be transferred to a primary cooling water sys-
tem, then by means of heat exchangers to a secondary cooling water system
which dissipates the heat through the use of water cooling towers. It is
therefore desirable to operate the reactor and primary cooling water at a
high temperature level in order to dispose of the reactor heat as economi-
cally as possible. The maximum allowable fuel plate temperature was taken
to be 315 ° F in order to avoid excessive corrosion of the aluminum. The
pressure in the reactor tank was chosen to set the saturation temperature
a minimum of 55 ° F above the calculated surface temperature of the fuel
plates in order to prevent any boiling in the reactor during normal oper-
ation. This results in a pressure of 150 psia at the inlet to the re-
actor lattice. The maximum inlet water temperature to the reactor is
160 ° F so as not to exceed the maximum allowable fuel plate surface tem-
perature. The maximum outlet temperature is achieved by using the same
water to cool the reflector as is used to cool the fuel plates 3 i.e._
the reflector cooling is in series with the core cooling. This has been
compromised by placing some Be reflector pieces in the lattice (in paral-
lel with the core) to gain flexibility in location of the fuel assemblies.
The primary cooling water enters the bottom of the pressure tank at
160 psia and 159 ° F_ flows upward through the bulk of the reflector and
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enters the top of the lattice at 150 psia anl an average temperature of
160° F. The water then flows downwardthrough the lattice and out of the
pressure tank. The upflow is separated from the downflow by one inch
thick Be plates cooled internally by i/4 inc_ holes drilled vertically
through the plates and spaced 1/2 inch between centers. The total primary
water flow is determined by the flow through the fuel elements and through
the interstices of the lattice and is approximately 153000 gpm. Essen-
tially all of the reactor heat goes into the primary water giving an aver-
age outlet water temperature of 187° F.
Inasmuch as most of the reflector is in series with the core3 the
reflector can be greatly overcooled during n_rmal operation without im-
posing a large increase in cooling water flog. The maximumheat load in
the Be adjacent to the core at 60 MWis estimated to be 3×I06 Btu/hr-ft 5.
All Be pieces were designed for the thermal stress caused by this heat
load.
Shutdownheat fluxes for the fllel elements were based on the sumof
the neutron decay power after scram and the )eta and gammadecay power.
The neutron decay power as a function of tim_ after scram was obtained
from figure 2.59 for a negative reactivity i_sertion of i0 percent. The
beta and gammadecay power was calculated fr)m the following equation of
reference A.I
P = 5.9xi0-3 p_ _ T0)-O._ _ -0._
for the reactor operating for I0 days at 60 megawatts where p is the
decay power in watts_ P is the reactor oper _ing power in watts3 TO is
the operating time at constant power in days, and • is the number of
days after start up. The shutdown cooling s/stem flow rate of If00 gpm
through the lattice is sufficient to cool the fuel elements for this case
2 seconds after scram. The main pump coast down will take care of the
first few seconds.
The rate of heat generation in the beryllium reflector was assumed
to decrease by a factor of 3 at the instant of scram to i×106 Btu/hr-ft 5
and was assumed to decay with time according to the equation of reference
A.I given previously. The shutdown cooling _ystem flow rate is sufficient
to cool the beryllium reflector two seconds _fter scram. The pump coast
down will take care of the first few seconds.
REFERENCE
A.I. Glasstone3 Samuel: Principles of Nuclear Reactor Engineering_ D.
Van Nostrand Company_ Inc., p. 1193 195S.
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REACTOR PHYSICS CALCULATIONS
The diffusion equations and nuclear parameters used in the reactivity
calculations are presented. A brief description is given of the methods
used and results obtained in the calculations of reactivity 3 temperature
coefficient_ void coefficient 3 and mean prompt neutron lifetime. Prelim-
inary results of excess reactivity control by burnable poisons are
presented.
A
B 2
D
H
Keff
Kf
Kth
LIST OF SYMBOLS
constant
total geometric buckling of the reactor
buckling in direction normal to direction of solution
neutron diffusion coefficient
height of reactor core
effective multiplication factor
fast group multiplication constant giving number of fission
neutrons produced per epithermal neutron absorbed
thermal multiplication constant giving number of fission neutrons
produced per thermal neutron absorbed
Boltzmann constant
L th
N
P
Pth
mean-square slowing dowel length of fission neutrons to thermal
energy
mean-square diffusion length of thermal neutrons
mean lifetime of prompt neutrons
atoms per cubic centimeter
specific power in fissions/cm3-sec
fraction of fission neutrons escaping capture in slowing down to
thermal energy
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r
T
t
V
v
X
Y
CL
5
k
P
Za
ZF
a
neutron flux
Subscripts:
f
n
th
vector distance
temperature of thermal neutrons
time
ratio of metal volume to water volume
neutron velocity
metal equivalence factor
fission yield in percentage
ratio of radiative capture to fissiou cross section of U 2S5
reflector savings
number of neutrons emitted per neutron absorbed by a U 235 nucleus
reciprocal period of prompt neutrons in second-13 also decay con-
stant of a radioactive nuclide
U235number of neutrons emitted per fission of a nucleus
density of H20 in gm/cm 3
macroscopic neutron absorption cross section
macroscopic neutron fission cross se=tion
microscopic neutron cross section for absorption
refers to fast neutrons
index number
refers to thermal neutrons
O
DIFFUSION CALCULATIONS
Two-group multiregion diffusion calculations have been made based on
the following equations (ref. B1):
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1 3@f
DfV2@f - (Za, f + DfBz2) @f + Kf(l - Pth) Fa,f@ f + KthZa,th@th-- vf
(BI)
2 i
DthV2@th - (Za,th + DthBz) @th + PthZa#f@f = Vth -_
(B2)
where all of the quantities have been defined in the list of symbols.
Equation (B1) includes a term giving the neutron production due to neutron
absorptions above the thermal group. This term is Kf(1 - Pth ) Za#f@f
where the following definitions are made
Za, f = Df/L 2 (BS)
VZF_f (B4)
Kf = (1 - Pth ) Za, f
Equations (BI) and (B2) apply for the passive regions with
Kth _ Kf_ O. At the interface between two regions the fluxes and neutron
currents are made continuous. At the extrapolated boundary of the second-
ary reflector the fluxes are made zero.
The operator _ is modified such that the terms in the direction
normal to the direction of solution are taken proportional to the flux.
In equations (BI) and (B2) effective absorbers are introduced to account
for the neutron leakage in these directions_ these are DfB_ and DthB _
for the fast and thermal neutron groups# respectively. The quantity B_
is the geometrical buckling of the equivalent bare dimensions of the re-
actor normal to the direction of solution. The various geometrical buck-
lings were determined by iteration on the reactor simulator of the solu-
tions for the dimensions of interest. The applicability of the foregoing
two-group diffusion equations for light water moderated assemblies has
been shown in reference B2.
The composition of each region was assumed to be homogeneous for
purposes of solution. Solutions for the time-independent forms of equa-
tions (BI) and (B2) have been obtained using one-dimensional and two-
dimensional electric analogs. The rectangular parallelepiped formed by
the 9×3 array of fuel elements and surrounding reflectors was indicated
in figure 2.8. The active lattice is nominally 9 inches wide_ 27 inches
long_ and 24 inches high. The core has a composition by volume of 0.423
aluminum and 0.577 water ana an assumed enriched uranium concentration
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NU-255 of 0.000110×1024atoms/cc reactor (se,_ ref. B.5). Top and bottom
reflectors are regions containing 0.77 water and 0.25 aluminumby volume
and are 9 inches thick. The primary side reflectors are regions contain-
ing 0.95 beryllium and 0.05 water by volume. The secondary side reflec-
tors are regions containing water only and are infinite in thickness in-
sofar as reactivity effectiveness is concerned.
The two-group nuclear parameters used for each reactor region and
for the experiments are listed in tables B.I and B.2 on the following
page.
The reactivity and neutron flux distributions were obtained by iter-
ative solutions on the two simulators. The final solution indicated that
the value of Keff was 1.185 for the cold startup loading of fuel ele-
ments containing 168 grams of enriched uranium and shim-rod fuel elements
containing 150 grams of enriched uranium. The total buckling B23 for
the equivalent bare pile was estimated from these solutions to have a
value of 0.005405_ the vertical buckling B_ was estimated as 0.001622.
These values were used in subsequent simplified calculations on the one-
dimensional space simulator as an estimation of leakage in the direction
normal to the direction of solution. The quantity BzREwas computedfrom
the expression
B_ = _2 (BS)(H + + °2)
where
H height of the active lattice in cm
51 reflector savings for top of core
5 2 reflector savings for bottom of co_e
values of 51 and 8 2 were obtained from r_ference B.4.
In order to calculate conveniently the _emperature coefficient, void
coefficient, and the mean lifetime of the prompt neutrons 3 a cylindrical
reactor of the same height H and total buckling B 2 as the reference
slab reactor was employed. These cylindrical calculations should be
reasonable approximations to the slab reacto_ and the coefficients cal-
culated should apply for the slab. The radius of the cylindrical reactor
core was taken as 22 cm} the primary reflectcr was i0 cm thick and con-
sisted of 0.95 Be - 0.05 H20 , the secondary water reflector was 40 cm
thick.
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Temperature coefficient of reactivity. - The temperature coefficient
of the cylindrical reactor was obtained by solving the time-independent
forms of equations (BI) and (B2) on the one-dimensional reactor simulator.
The primary effect of an increase in reactor temperature is a decrease in
the density of the water with corresponding :'eduction in the concentration
of hydrogen and oxygen atoms. There is also the effect of an increase in
the kT temperature of the thermal neutrons. The most important effect
of the reduction of water density is the increase in the mean-square slow-
2
ing down lengtho Lf of fission neutrons to thermal energies. This in-
in L__ tends to decrease the Kef f ,)f the reactor and thus hascrease
an important bearing on the stability of the reactor. Values of L_ were
computed by the following empiricism (ref. B.5) fitted to the experimental
data of reference B.6 for aluminum-water mixture for the range of values
of interest.
2 (1+ v)2
Lf = 51.4 (P + XV),_ (B6)
where
V ratio of aluminum to water volumes
p density of water
X aluminum equivalence to water 3 0.292
The calculation of the temperature coe:fficient showed that the ef-
fects of variation of microscopic thermal ab_orption cross sections were
negligible compared to density effects. (AIL of the aa'S were taken as
I/v with the exception of U235.) The only significant cross section ef-
fect was the temperature dependence of the e:'fective microscopic transport
--H
cross section gTR for hydrogen due to chemical binding. The effects of
chemical binding of hydrogen in water have b(_en evaluated by a method due
-H
to Radkowsky. Values of aTR used have been presented as a function of
temperature in reference B.7.
The effect of the expansion of the aluminum fuel elements was found
2
to be unimportant. The strongest effect was due to the variation of Lf
with temperature as a result of the decreased density of the water.
Two sets of calculations were made on the one-dimensional simulator.
One set with the temperature of the reflector varying in the same manner
as the temperature of the core. The second set with the temperature of
!
_o
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o
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the core varying and with the reflector kept at the average reactor oper-
ating temperature of 82.2 ° C (180 ° F). These two sets of calculations
gave identical results for the temperature coefficient) this is reason-
able since the primary reflector is 0.95 beryllium - 0.05 water and the
parameters for this reflector changed but little with temperature.
The results of the simulator calculation are shown in figure BI where
g_K/K °C is plotted as a function of temperature. It is seen that the
temperature coefficient is negative and increasingly so with temperature.
At the average reactor operating temperature of 82.2 ° C (180 ° F) the value
of _/K °C is -lS.0Xl0 -_ (-10 -4 _/K °r).
Void coefficient of reactivity. - Another coefficient of importance
in evaluating the kinetic behavior of the reactor is the void coefficient.
In making the calculations_ voids are introduced in the reactor core_ the
nuclear parameters varied accordingly_ and the diffusion equations solved
on the one-dimensional simulator. Reactivity effects of voids are ob-
tained relative to the reference reactor with no void in the core. The
effect of voids appears as a change in the density of the water in the
core with the effective neutron temperature remaining at 82.2 ° C (180 ° F).
This computation of the void coefficient was made on the reactor simulator
using the cylindrical geometry previously described.
The results of the calculations for uniformly distributed voids are
Z_K
presented as figure B2. On this graph -_- is plotted as a function of
the percentage void introduced into the reactor core. It is seen from
this curve that the void coefficient is always negative. The curve is not
AK
quite linear with -K-- an increasing function of void percentage. Over
the linear portion of the curve the change in Kef f per percentage dis-
&Keff/Keff
placement in water &Vvoid/VH20i - -0.180.
The foregoing calculations were made assuming a uniform distribution
of voids in the core_ but in general it can be expected that any mechanism
introducing voids would do so in some nonhomogeneous manner. Therefore_
three calculations with nonuniform voids in the core were made. In the
first calculation a linear radial distribution of voids was introduced
into the cylindrical core such that more voids were in the volume elements
at the center of the core than at the edge. The total amount of void in
the entire reactor was then 9 percent. Solution on the simulator indicated
Z_K
that -_ was -4.29 percent for this nonhomogeneous distribution of voids
as compared to -3.12 percent for a homogeneous distribution of the same
amount of voids. In the second calculation_ a linear distribution of voids
was introduced into the reactor over the first 12 cm radius of the core
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(the core radius As 22 cm), again with more -roids near r = 0 cm than
at r = 12 cm. This distribution of voids amountedto a total of 3.6
percent over the entire reactor core. It was found that 2_K/K was -1.89
percent for this nonhomogeneousdistribution as comparedto -1.15 percent
for a homogeneousdistribution of voids. In the third calculation 22.7
percent void was introduced into the volume element of the core extending
from r = 0 cm to r = 4 cm. This amountedto an introduction of 0.75
percent void throughout the entire reactor core. It was found that this
distribution of voids gave a 2_K/K of -0.48 percent as comparedto -0.25
percent for the homogeneousdistribution of ;he void.
These solutions point up the higher statistical weight of voids in-
troduced at the axis of the cylindrical core than at the interfaces. It
must be kept in mind that in these one-dimensional solutions 3 the radial
distributions of voids extend the full height of the core. As such3 they
may not properly estimate the worth of comparable voids concentrated
at the center of the cylindrical core.
The Oak Ridge-NACAprogram of experime_,s at the Bulk Shielding Re-
actor has provided data on the reactivity effects of completely voiding
various numbersof water passages in a singl_ fuel element. These ex-
periments are fully described in S[_plement 2II to this report (ref. B.8)
and data for successively voiding water pass_es in the fuel element at
the geometric center of a 7x5 slab loading _'e presented therein. (This
fuel element corresponds to that in the LC-6 position shownin fig. 2.8.)
Voided water passages in this fuel element of high statistical weight
introduce negative reactivity of greater magnitude than that for compar-
able homogeneouslydistributed voids. Analy_is of the BSRdata for the
7×3 slab loading indicate that the fractional void coefficient for a
linear portion of the curve is -0.64 2_(/K/AVvoid/VH20. This is to be
comparedwith a calculated value of fractional void coefficient for homo-
geneously distributed voids of -0.18 in the r ACAreactor 9×5 slab loading.
Similarlyj voiding of water passages in the fuel element at the hot-
spot positLon at the core-reflector interfac_ (fuel element in the LD-6
position shownin fig. 2.8) produced a fractional void coefficient of
-0._i ZSK/K/_Vvoid/VHoO. These results indicate the strong spatial sta-
tistical dependenceof void coefficient.
Mean prompt neutron lifetime. - To comp[te the mean lifetime of the
prompt neutrons in the reference reactor_ solutions of equations (BI) and
(B2) of the following form are assumed:
 f(r,t) = A ef,n(r) e
n=0
(B7)
!
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_th([,t) =tAn_th,n([) eknt
n=O
(B8)
where the functions @f,n and Qth_n satisfy the time-independent
equations
Df?2_f_n _ 2 _n) +Kf(l_Pth) Z +KthZa,th_th_n 0
- a,f+DfBz+_f _f,n a_f_f,n =
DthV 2@th_ n ( 2 k_th)- Zasth + DthBz + _th,n + PthZa,f_f,n = 0
(B9)
(BIO)
Again for the reflector, equations (B9) and (BI0) apply when Kth _ Kf _
O.
Since the delayed neutrons have not been considered, the reciprocal
asymptotic period k, is related to the mean lifetime of prompt neutrons
Z by (ref. B.9):
Z_Keff/Kef f
k = _ (Bll)
The mean lifetime of the prompt neutrons can be found in the following
manner. First, equations (B9) and (BIO) are solved with k = 0 to ob-
tain a value for Kef f. Second 3 an absorber equal to k/re for the fast
group and k/Vth for the thermal group is introduced into the reactor
core and reflectors and equations (B9) and (BIO) are solved again. Final-
ly, knowing k and ZiKeff/Kef f the lifetime _ may be computed from
equation (BII). Solutions were obtained on the one-dimensional space
simulator. As expected the value of Z was independent of the value of
k chosen.
The above method was used to calculate the mean lifetime of the prompt
neutrons which was found to be 90xlO -6 second. This calculation was based
on the cylindrical reactor discussed previously except that the primary
beryllium reflector thickness was increased to 20 cm and this was followed
by a 30 cm water reflector. Also vf was taken as i0 Vth and the core
was assumed to be in the hot-clean condition.
A computation of the mean lifetime of the prompt neutrons in the re-
actor after i0 days of operation was made and the lifetime was not found
to be appreciably different from 90_0 -6 seconds.
152
Excess reactivity requirements for reactor operating cycle. The
excess reactivity necessary to operate the reactor for a period of lO
days was estimated from the equivalent bare pile two-group criticality
equation (ref. B.2):
KthPth + Kf(l - Pth) = Keff (BI2)
The operating characteristics of the reference reactor core have
been computed as a function of time using thls criticality equation. The
nuclear constants used to compute Kef f for the cold-clean reactor at
time t = 0 days are listed on table B.I an,i the value of B 2 used was
such that Kef f = 1.185. This Kef f was then the same as that computed
by the two-dimensional reactor simulator.
The reactor was taken to be operating a] a constant specific power
watts/cm 3 with approximately 90 perceut of the fissions due toof 6OO
thermal neutrons. It was further assumed that the fast production term
of equation (BI2) remained constant throughout the operating cycle of the
reactor.
The effects of xenon poisoning_ samari_a poisoning 3 low cross sec-
tion fission product poisoning (abbreviated IjCSFPP)_ and fuel burnout on
the Kef f of the reactor were computed as a function of time. The macro-
scopic equilibrium thermal absorption cross ;ection of xenon was computed
using (ref. B.10)
Xe-Xe-
Xe _ Y °a J'F2th__h
Z a kXe + _Xe _tl
(BIS)
O
?o
where
Me
y 0.0716
_Xe 2.95xi0_18 cm 2
a
k xe 2.103 xlO -5 sec -I
Values of xenon constants were taken fr)m reference B.1. The macro-
scopic thermal absorption cross section of samarium as a function of time
after startup was computed using the following equation (ref. B.IO):
OI
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lq X ) e °@tht+ _th - k
(sl4)
where
zSm(-]
a " - YZF,th
Y
k
fission yield of promethium
4.1×10 -6 sec -I, decay constant of promethium
2
5.3×10 -20 cm , absorption cross section of samarium
The macroscopic thermal absorption cross section of the LCSFPP was com-
puted by
yLCSFPP = (p)x (t)× (aLCSFPP) (BIS)
where the specific power is 1.872xi015 fissions/cmZ×sec and the aLCSFPP
is obtained from curves plotted in reference B.II. The fuel burnout was
computed by
AN U = (I + _)x(p)x(t) (BI6)
where _ is the ratio of the radiative capture cross section to the fis-
sion cross section of U 235.
Based on the above assumptions and formulas, the excess reactivity
requirements presented in table 2.4 of section 2 were obtained. These
results are based on the average unit volume in the reactor and thus,
neglect the effects due to the nonuniform power distribution.
EXCESS REACTIVITY CONTROL BY BURNABLE POISONS
The concept of using fuel assemblies containing a burnable poison,
such as boron, to control excess reactivity associated with fuel burnup
and low cross section fission product buildup, has been widely studied.
For application to power reactors, where long periods of uninterrupted
service are desired, use of burnable poisons promises increased core life,
more uniform power distributions, and a more economical operation in com-
parison to use of conventional fuel elements.
Applicability of burnable poisons to research reactors. - The appli-
cation of burnable poisons to a research reactor of the MTR-type can pro-
vide several advantage_:
1S4
i. After equilibrium xenon has been ach.eved_ the shim rods maynot
have to be inserted as far as with conventio_lal fuel elements. Insertion
depth would be governed principally by translent xenon override require-
ments. This would permit a greater number or larger core and reflector
irradiation facilities to be exposed to reasonably uniform fluxes during
the operating cycle of the reactor.
2. Considerable improvement in operating economy and reduction in
fuel-element inventory may be achieved. Thi3 results from the larger
total fuel burnups possible from fuel elements initially loaded with large
concentrations of uranium and boron before tile elements require reprocess-
ing. An attempt to achieve larger total fuel burnups by increasing uran-
ium concentrations in fuel elements without the use of boron would pro-
vide core loadings with initially too much excess reactivity. These load-
ings would require initially deep insertion of shim rods with associated
maldistribution of neutron fluxes. The present MTR system of refueling
is to replace partially spent fuel elements with new elements of high
uranium concentrations so as to achieve required excess reactivity for
each new operating cycle. By this means large fuel burnups per element
may result by gradually shifting the partially depleted element toward
the center of the core. It will be shown_ however 3 that by the use of
boron in MTR-type fuel elements operating fo_: the suggested NACA reactor
operating cycle (10 days at 600 watts/cc core)j it is possible to operate
as long as three cycles (30 days) without replacing any fuel elements at
all.
The application of burnable poisons to _ research reactor can intro-
duce several problems:
I. The fabrication techniques for such _lements are yet to be per-
fected and their reliability is yet to be proven.
2. Larger average uranium concentration_ in the core result in lower
thermal fluxes for the core operated at constant average specific power.
With reflector fluxes remaining about the smne 3 larger thermal flux
gradients will occur at the core-reflector i_erface where the point of
highest heat flux is located. In an uupert_:bed core this would place a
restriction on the total core power by increasing the maximum-to-average
specific power. However 3 for the NACA core ;ith experiments in the hori-
zontal through holesj these flux peaks at the core-reflector interface do
not occur.
Specific reactivity calculations with b_nable poisons. - Burnable
poison in the form of natural boron was added to the MTR-type fuel ele-
ment array being considered for the core of _he NACA research reactor.
By this means# a longer operating cycle can be achieved with less shim
rod movement required and less excess reactivity present at reactor start-
up than with conventional fuel elements.
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The calculation was carried out for a 9- by 27- by 24-inch core (5
by 9 fuel element array) which was surrounded successively by a 3/_-inch
beryllium tank 3 5 inches of berylllum_ and an effectively infinite water
reflector. An excess reactivity of lO percent was tentatively aimed for
to allow 5 percent for experiments and 5 percent for transient xenon over-
ride during most of the cycle. The initial investments of boron and uran-
ium were distributed uniformly. Preliminary homogeneous calculations for
this reactor were used to attain the initial investments used. This was
taken to be 250 grams of U-255 and 0.25 grams of B-10 (distributed as
natural boron) for each fuel element.
All burnup calculations were made on the one-dimensional reactor
simulator. The spatial solution was in the direction of the long hori-
zontal 27-inch core dimension with diffusion and leakage in the normal
dimensions accounted for. The modified two-group diffusion theory pre-
viously described was used for the solutions.
The power distribution is known to vary slowly _-ith burnup and can 3
therefore 3 be treated as essentially constant for small burnup intervals.
The actual buruup of fuel and poison in any interval of time considered
was based on the power distribution at the start of the interval. The
error from such an approximation is negligible in this case as small
enough intervals of burnup were chosen.
Calculations for the prescribed initial condition and burnups of
300_ 600_ 1200, and 1800 megawatt-days were carried out. The calculations
were made using equilibrium xenon 3 samarium3 and the other fission product
concentrations derived from a 60 megawatt power level. The variation in
reactivity with operating time is shown in figure BS. The value of Kef f
for this core at startup is 1.117. For the first 20 days at 80 Mw (1200
Mw-days) a very small change in reactivity is indicated. For 50 days at
60 Mw the loss of reactivity is only 5.8 percent, with sufficient 2_K
remaining to permit operation at 1800 Mw-days.
At this time in the operating cycle (1800 Mw-days) the center ele-
ments in the long 2V-inch dimension, the elements with greatest burnup,
were eliminated. The less depleted outside elements were then moved to
the center positions and fresh fuel elements were inserted in the outside
spaces. Such a procedure should lead to a greater percentage burnup of
fuel, and a more uniform power distribution. To simplify the evaluation
of the reactivity of the new nonunlformfuel and poison and fission prod-
uct loading 3 the remaining fuel and poison in the center elements were
redistributed uniformly in these elements.
The result of the diffusion calculation on the simulator for this
nonuniform core was to increase the reactivity of the core to a Kef f of
1.1093 a level only 0.8 perceut below the reactivity of the startup core.
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Subsequent operation at 60 Mwwith this particular nonuniform loading
resulted in a reduction in available reactivity to a Keff of 1.078 at
the end of 2400 total Mw-daysand a Keff of 1.058 at the end of total
5000 Mw-days as shownin figure B-5. The characteristic initial rise in
reactivity accompanyingthe more rapid burnout of boron relative to uran-
ium was not obtained in this second loading. This was due to the fact
that the elements shifted to the center of the loading at 1800 Mw-days
were practically depleted in boron (only about 15 percent of the initial
boron remained). The shifting of these boron depleted elements to the
central region of high statistical importance results in a loading in
which the advantages of using burnable poisons are lost. It would seem
that if outer fuel elements of initially greater boron concentrations were
used_ subsequent shifting of these to central core locations would improve
the core longevity characteristics.
Although studies are not complete at this time, the present results
for the addition of burnable poisons look favorable enough to merit fur-
ther investigation. It would appear that it may be possible to design
for a repetitive cycle of refueling by which an element would remain in
the core assembly about 40 days at 60 Mw. With 26 fuel assemblies in a
loading, this corresponds to an average burnu? of about 115 grams of uran-
ium per fuel element, or an average fuel burn_p of 40 to 50 percent.
I
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METEOROLOGICAL ASPECTS OF A PROPOSED NUCLEAR FACILITY
By Scientific Services Division
U.S. Weather Bureau
Washington, D. C.
INTRODUCTION
The proposed facility is located approximately 4 miles south-
southeast of Sandusky, Ohio and about 5 miles from Lake Erie. The sur-
rounding terrain is relatively level except for irregularities and bluffs
near the Huron River to the southeast.
The purpose of this preliminary report is to review the meteorology
of this area for use in the evaluation of the site location and compila-
tion of a hazards analysis.
SOURCE OF DATA
Meteorological data are not available from the precise location
proposed for this facility. However, records have been maintained for
many years at the Weather Bureau Office in Sandusky s Ohio. The differ-
ences occasioned by the urban location and closer proximity to Lake Erie
of the Sandusky station are not of sufficient magnitude to preclude a
preliminary description of the proposed site climate based on the Sandusky
records. Measurements of vertical temperature gradient are not routinely
made at Sandusky. For these data it was necessary to utilize radiosonde
data obtained at Toledo_ Ohio. Here again the Toledo station is suffi-
ciently similar to the lake shore climatic regime of the proposed site
to permit using the data to obtain at least a qualitative picture of the
vertical temperature structure.
Attached to this report is a copy of the Local Climatological Data
for Sandusky, Ohio (ref. C1). The narrative summary included in the
publication is a good general description of the weather of this area.
The table headed "Normals, Means_ and Extremes" on page 2 of this annual
summary presents much data on the temperature, degree days, precipitation,
humidity, etc.
CLIMATOLOGICAL REVIEW
In the present brief report_ emphasis will be placed on the meteor-
ological parameters which directly influence the spread of materials
through the atmosphere.
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Surface Wind Direclion
The hourly observations for a 5 year period 3 for the Weather Bureau
Office, Sandusky, Ohio were studied in detail. Table CI presents the
percentage frequency of the wind direction. The prevailing direction is
south-westerly with 55 percent of the winds occurring from the directions
south through west, on an annual basis. This predominance of southwest-
erly winds is true in all seasons, however, the increasing frequency of
north and northeasterly winds in the spring and summer deserves notice
and explanation.
Table CI shows that the northerly wind_ are almost twice as frequent
during the summer day as during the summer night. This shift is occasioned
by the development, during late spring and summer of the daytime on-shore
lake breeze, a phenomenon similar in character and cause to the more famil-
iar coastal sea breezes. The existence of the lake breeze and its intru-
sion over the site will result in frequent changes in air mass and thus
diffusion characteristics. Prior to the on-set of the sea breeze the
vertical temperature gradient over the land will usuall_be quite unstable
due to solar heating. The cooler lake air, moving inland, will be less
unstable and at the boundary of the lake air an inversion will be formed.
Thus the lake breeze will tend to scour out and push ahead any contam-
nants previously in the air, or to contain within the lake breeze (depth
from 200 to 500 ft) contaminants released after its arrival. Further de-
tailed study at the proposed site would be required to accurately evaluate
the particular character (i.e., depth, duration, arrival time 3 extent from
lake shore, etc.) of its action in dispersing air borne materials.
TABLE CI. - PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY O_ WIND DIRECTION,
WEATHER BUREAU AIRPORT STATION, ZANDUSk'X 3 OHIO
(Based on hourly observations December 1949 - November 1954)
! I
Winter Spring Summer Fall! Annual
i (all
observed)
i
i
!
i
N I 5 9 12 7 i 8
NE I 6 15 ii 8 : I0
E I 7 15 13 7 ii
SE I 5 5 5 5 5
S I 15 12 15 16 15
SW I 32 19 21 30 25
W I 18 17 Ii 15 15
NW I ii i0 I0 ii i0
Calm I l (b) 2 3 I
Daylight a
Summer IAr nual
16 i0
14 12
9 9
2 3
9 ii
22 25
14 17
14 13
(b) (b)
aDaylight - 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.} Night - 5 p.m. to 8 a.m.
bLess than i percent.
Night a
Summer! Annual
9 7
i0 8
iS 12
7 6
19 17
21 26
i0 13
7 9
2 2
Annual (during
precipitation-
16.2 percent
of time)
7
i0
i0
6
15
25
15
Ii
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Another factor worthy of mention can be seen from table CI. Con-
trary to many climatic regimes there is no major shift in wind patterns
during precipitating weather. Although precipitation occurred only about
16 percent of the hours considered, the frequency of wind_ by directions_
is virtually identical with the annual frequencies. Thus_ no special
consideration of the direction of travel of "washed-out" material is
necessary.
Wind direction may also be important when the lower atmosphere is
very stable and atmosphere diffusion is a minimum. Examination of the
Toledo_ Ohio radiosonde data shows that with southerly winds inversions
occur 70 to 90 percent of the time at night. Southerly winds also favor
daytime inversions_ particularly in winter. These conditions are shown
in detail in table CS(b).
!
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Surface Wind Speed
Table C2 presents the frequency of wind speeds in various class in-
tervals. More than 75 percent of the wind speeds are between 4 and 12
mph. The average speed is 9.7 mph with the strongest winds occurring in
winter and spring. Winds less than 4 mph are rather common particularly
in summer when 13 percent of the values are in this interval. Peak wind
speeds reaching more than 50 mph have occurred in all months except May.
The highest recorded speed was 77 mph during June.
TABLE C2. - PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF WIND SPEED GROUPS (mph),
WEATHER BUREAU A]]KPORT STATION, SA]CDUSKY_ OHIO
(Based on hourly observations December 1949 - November 1054)
Winter Spring! Summer Fall Annual
(all
ob served )
0-5 5 6 15 ii
4-7 27 55 55 41
8-12 42 59 29 56
15-18 25 18 5 ii
19-24 5 2 [a) i
25-51 'a)I! } 'ia)la)
52-46 [a) 'a) a)
47 ia) (a) (a)
9
59
57
14
i
i:t
a)
Daylight
Summer Annual
7 5
55 56
55 4O
5 17
-- 2
-- (a)
Night
Summer Annual
16 ii
55 41
26 55
3 12
(a) 1
-- (_)
Annual (during
prec ip itat ion-
16.2 percent
of t_ne)
4
2.6
41
Z6
5
(a)
aLess than i percent.
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Two very localized types of storms which _re accompanied by high
winds deserve special mention_ thunderstorms, and tornadoes. Thunder-
storms average 32 days per year occurring primarily in summer. June and
July average 7 days apiece with thunderstorms. Thunderstorm activity is
extremely variable but a rare severe storm may cause winds in excess of
50 mph_ i to 3 inches of rain in an hour and hailstones 1/2 inch or larg-
er in diameter. Situations favorable for the formation of severe thunder-
storms are also conducive to tornado formation. A 35 year study of United
States' tornadoes shows that iii tornadoes occurred in Ohio during this
period with the largest percentage of these st(,rms in the northern and
western portions of the state.
O
_O
Precipitation
As indicated in the attached Local Climatological Data_ the Sandusky
area receives about 35 inches of precipitation per year which will be
spread over approximately ]_38 days. Maximum precipitation occurs during
the late spring and summer. The maximum recorded monthly total is 12.51.
Sandusky has an average of 12 days per year with an inch or more of snow-
fall. The yearly average snowfall is 28 inche_ however_ the maximum month-
ly fall has been 29.8 inches and as much as 12.3 has been recorded in 24
hours.
Atmospheric Stability
Measurements of vertical temperature gradients are not routinely made
in the Sandusky area. However, twice daily radiosondes (i0 a.m. and i0
p.m. EST) are made at Toledo, Ohio and five years of these data (from 1946
to 1950) were examined in detail. Salient features of the lapse rate are
presented in table C5. The location and climate of Toledo and the pro-
posed site are sufficiently similar to permit at least a good qualitative
notion of the lapse rate near Sandusky to be obtained from the Toledo
data. In table C3 the I0 p.m. observations are referred to as "night"
conditions_ the I0 a.m. as "day" conditions. _[though these discrete ob-
servations do not provide information on inversion duration the above
classification is sufficient for a preliminary _nalysis.
It can be seen that inversions are a commoa feature of the climate
of this area at night and not too infrequent during the day. Summer is
the season of the most frequent night inversion3 but the frequency drops
to almost half the summer value by winter. The reverse is true of day
inversions with these reaching a maximum during winter. In connection
with these frequencies it shot_Id be mentioned t_at the summer inversions
will almost always be eliminated by daytime heating while in late fall
and winter stable conditions may persist for se'zeral days.
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TABLE C3. - INVERSION DATA (TOLEDO, OHIO 1946 - 1950)
a. Percentage Frequency of Base of Inversion
Invers ion base
Surface
_Surface<lOO0 '
iSO0 '
Winter
N D
59 14
3 19
47 41
Spring
N D
49 4
9 ll
61 22
Summer
N D
73 1
2 6
75 9
Fall
N D
67 5
2 19
70 31
Annual
N D
37 6
4 14
63 26
b. Percentage of Inversions with Specified Wind Direction
Wind direct ion
N
NE
E
SE
S
SW
W
NW
Calm
Winter
N D
1S 4
20 0
38 14
73 51
72 47
48 25
24 8
13 0
85 0
Spring
N D
22 0
58 2
62 1
8O 8
79 17
6O 2
41 1
25 1
83 0
Summer
N D
41 0
54 0
6S 0
86 2
86 1
85 1
70 1
61 0
95 0
Fall
N D
53 6
50 5
74 2
92 ll
86 13
71 4
38 4
47 3
86 29
Annual
N D
32 2
42 2
61 5
86 ll
81 20
65 8'
39 4
33 1
88 14
c. Percentage of Inversions Base at the Surface with
Specified Wind Speeds
Wind speed
<4 mph
All speeds
.Winter
N D
59 28
59 14
Spring
N D
74 5
49 4
Summer
N D
83 0
73(a)
Fall
N D
82 13
67 5
Annual
N D
79 9
57 6
aLess than i percent.
N 2200 EST.
D IO00EST.
Table CS(b) indicates the frequency that inversions occur with par-
ticular wind directions. This tabulation indicates that with southerly
16_
winds inversions can be expected at night between 70 and 90 percent of
the time. Inversions occur least frequently with northerly winds. As
would be expected stable conditions occur most frequently with light
winds, particularly at night. These data are shownin table CS(c).
Atmospheric Diffusion
Within the last few years, there have been many reports prepared for
the Atomic Energy Commissionwhich have utilized the diffusion equations
of O. G. Sutton (refs. C2_ CS) in computations of the spread of radio-
active wastes_ either from a continuous or instantaneous source. These
equations, together with the appropriate meteorological parameters are
given below:
where
X
Continuous point source
I h2)zQ exp (Cl)
X = _C2ux2_n CC_- _
Instantaneous source
X = _5/2cS(ut)S/2(2_n) exp C2(ut)2_
con<_entration at the ground; gm or curies/m S
theory_ from wind gustiness and velocity profile information.
(c2)
Q source strength, gnn/sec or curie/sec for continuous sources, gm or
curies for instantaneous sources
h sta_k height_ m
x horizontal distance downwind from stack base, m
C virtual difference coefficient, mn/2
u mean wind speed, m/sec
n dimensionless stability parameter
t time, sec
Values of the parameters C and n follow, according to Sutton's
Experience
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with above relations at various sites permits a reasonable preliminary
estimate to be made of C and n values appropriate to the site usin4
climatological data as a guide. The stability parameter_ n_ may vary
from 0 to i_ such as:
Large lapse
Zero or small lapse
Moderate inversion
Large inversion
C 2 then varies with hj n_ u such as:
h
25
5O
i00
n u(m/sec)
i 5 i0
o
.006
1/4 .015
1/4 .008
O. 046
•014
.005
•002
•010
•005
O.OAO
.012
.O04
.002
.008
.OO4
From equation (CI) for a continuous source_ it is found that the
maximum ground concentration_ Xma x, would be
2Q
Xmax -
e_uh s
and the distance_ d_ in meters of this concentration from the stack base
would be
Holland (ref. C4) has tabulated some of the formulae needed most
frequently for practical applications and Gifford (ref. C5) has developed
an alinement chart which will facilitate most of the desired diffusion
computations• This work has been extended to the calculation of radia-
tion dosages from diffusing clouds of hypothetical reactor explosion
products (ref. C6).
Concentrations of specific isotopes can be calculated from equations
(CI) and (C2) if the quantities released are known, and these concentra-
tions can be compared with tolerance for the appropriate exposure times
with the aid of reference (C7).
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LOCAL CLIMATOLOGICAL DATA
WITH COMPARATIVE DATA
1955
SANDUSKY, OHIO
NARRATIVE CLIMATOLOGICAL SUMMARY
The weather records indicate a varied climate for this vi-
cinity. The mean temperature is 50 ° , the average summer
temperature is 72 ° and the winter months average about 30 ° .
Spring and fall average 470 and 54 ° respectively. The
warmest year of record is ]921 with a mean of 54 ° , the cold-
est year was in 1885 with a mean of 47 ° . The warmest summers
were 1931 and 1949 when temperatures of 90 ° or higher were
recorded 31 times each. The longest hot spells occurred
in 1949 with temperatures above 90 ° for 8 consecutive days
from June 29 to July 6, inclusive. The coolest summers were
in 1882 and 1907 with 90 ° or above being recorded but once
each. The coldest winter was 1884-85 with an average of
16 ° , the mercury having dropped to zero or lower on 21 days.
The next coldest winter was 1935-36 with sub-zero reading_¢
on 16 days. The longest cold speil of record occurred in
January of 1936 with below zero temperatures on 6 consecu-
tive days, from the 22 to 27 inclusive. The highest temp-
erature ever recorded here was 105 ° in 1918 and again in
1936. The coldest day was on January 3, 1879 with a read-
Ins of 16 ° below zero. The lowest modern record is 12 be-
low in 1936. The warmest winter day of record was on Jan-
uary 25, 1950 with a temperature nf 73 ° . An oddity of this
occasion was the report oF a heat prostration case, the
first such case to ever occur, according to local insurance
officials. There have been 24 winters during which the
temperature failed Lo go b_ low zero.
The growing season in this vicinity itxtend_ fK'om about
April 15, to October 26, an averag,: of 194 d._ys. The
longest season of record was 221 day_ it, ]911 and again
in 1921, The shortest were in 1888 and 1_46 with but
168 days betwe_'n killing frosts. The latest killing frost
in the spring was on May 9, 1923; the earliest in the fall
occurred on Septembc'_ 29, 1942.
Precipitation vari_ consid_r_bly from year to year with an
annual average of 33 iv.ches. Spring and fall account for 8
inches each while i0 inches fall in the summer and 7 in the
winter. The wettest year was 1950 with over 50 inches, the
next highest amount fell in 1937 with a total of 47 1/2 in-
ches, while over 46 inches were recorded way back in 1881.
The heaviest rain occurred on June 24-25, 1937, with nearly
6 inches falling in 24 hours. The total for the whole
month was over 12 inches, a record for any month. The
driest year was 1934 with but 21 inches being recorded.
The longest period of rainfall on record was from November
29 to December 10, 1914, with at least 0.01 inch on each
of the 12 days. The greatest number of consecutive days
without rain was 28 days between October 9 and November 3,
1944.
Snowfall also varies considerably with an average of 29
inches per winter. The heaviest annual amount of record
was the 68 inches that fell in 1893, with nearly 30 inches
of it in January alone. Other heavy amounts were 61 inches
in 1910, and nearly 48 inches in 1940. The heaviest fall
in a 24 hour period was 14 inches in April, 1886, the next
heaviest being in November, 1950, with a little over 12
inches being recorded on the 25. The least annual snow was
ll inches in 1890, 1919 and 1928.
Sunshine in Sandusky averages about 51% of possible and the
average cloudiness is about 6 tenths. There are an average
of 90 clear days per year and 152 cloudy days, the rest being
partly cloudy. Humidity runs about 63 during the daytime
and 76 at nlght. Thunderstorms occur on an average of 31
days per year, and hail twice. There has been one tornado
here in 73 years, that occurring in 1924. Wind averages 10
Mt_d, the prevailing direction is SW with NE being a close
second. Winds of 40 MPlt or higher occur several times per
year, usually in connection with thundersqualls. The high-
eat ever registered was 77 MPH and occurred in connection
with the tornado.
168
MONTHLY AND SEASONAL SNOWFALL
1905-1H_ 0 0 ¢
1906-1_70 0 0
1907-19_ 0 0 0
1909-1_90 0 0
1909-1910 0 0 0
1810-1911_01911-1812 0
1912-1913 0 0 O
1813-19140 0 0
1914-1915 0 0 0
19131818_ _ _1918-1917
191,1913_ g g1918-1912
1919-1920 0 0 0
192o1921_ _ _1821-1922
0
1-3-1923 _ X X o1923-19_
19_-1920 0 0
1928-1926 1!2
1926-1937_
1927-1928
1928-1939
1929-18_
1930-1931
1931-1932 0
1933-1933 0
1833-1894 0
1994-1935 T
Oct. Nov. Dec. J_. Feb. l Mar,
0 0.3 0.9 1.9 6.4 LI.e
T 0.1 4,1 4.4 3.0 2.8
O 0.1 3.110.1 13.8 0.1
0 0.1 3,915.3 9,1 1.6
T T 13.1 28.5 18.4 0.1
0.8 7.9 3.6 7.9 3.19.0 8.3
2.91 5.010.4 1.3 0.5
0 0.514.310,7 13.811.3
0_1 10.4 2.3
8.3 3 7 6 1
0.612.813,3
0.4 14.0 3.9 7.60.1 7.6 11.8 6.6
1.6 4.9 11.3 23.0 1.3
0 T 0.8 4.50'7 1.9
11,5 2.8
0 T 4.3
T 3.6 3.2 2.3 7.511.8 4.2 3.2
O0 1.8 13.8 8.0 3.4T 0.3 10.3 LO.O
0.5 4.3 9.1 0.9
9.2 5.3 8.7 !12.7
13,12,6 I 7,5 9,62'.4 , ,4.3 3.6 4.5
0.2[ O.7 [18.6 ]14.8
0.9111.51 5.3] 2.2
1.81 3.3] 4.3 1.4
4.O1 0.2] T 3.3
3.3F 4.5[ 1,0 1.3
8.1[ 6.511,6 6.7
r [ 8.21 0,5 8.9
A4_r. May
0 T
0.8 T
0.9 T
0.3 T
5.0 0
1,0
264
o13
16.1 2.0
7,7 1"
0.5:1.3
4.2 T
2.2 1.8
1.7 0.8
4.0 0.8
5.2 0.1
5.g 2.4
1.7 0
4÷9 2÷_
1.2 0.4
0.9 T
7.8 T
6.9 0.3
4.9 3.8
5.2 T
4.4 2.0
7 0.3
].=s Tots/ I
0 21.1
0 15.0
0 31.4
0 30.3
0 65.1 [
T 0 23.30 38.0
0 00 40.80 41.3
0 0 30.7
Be o .033.8
0 0 44.0
0 0 7.6
O 0 23.3
Be o i3318,5
T 0 31,10 28.9
0 0 16.5
_i0 328
0 31.2
o 0o 17o33.0
0 O 27.4 i
0 °_ 18318.4
O0 0 14.3
0 0 29.315.9
Semen luly Ao 1
1236-193, g I
1937-1938 0 (
1938-1939
1939-1940
1940-1941
1841-1942
1942-1943
1943-1944 0 ¢
i_,4-1945 0
1945-1946 0 01946-1947 0
1947-1948 0 0
1943-1049 O0 001949-1950
1950-1951 O O
1901-1833 0 0
1952-1953 0 O
: 1953-1954 0 O
1954-1953 0 O
1955-1958 0 0
ept Oct.
0 T
0 T
Be %1
0 IO.1
0 T
0 0
0 T
0 T
0 O
. o0
9 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 T
0 T
Nc,,. 1_, I_
0.710.5 8.
1.1 3.4 3.
3.7 2.5 5.
8.6 2.713..T 2.3 9.
L
4.4 5.7 8.
0.1 1.0 2.
3.0 8.8 +2.
0.91.10.
0.3 .3.9 14.
0.6 .0.4 3.
0 7.6 4.
3.5 4.0 7.
T 3.1 3.
2.0 1.2 4.
19.8 .0.5 12.
4.3 _0.2 3.
0.2 8.2 5.
5.2 7.5 4.
T 3.5 3.
0.2 3.9
;
Feb, bier.!
7,0 I 3.8
2.1 2.0
2,9 0.7
8.8 0.5
.4,8 9.6
6,3 3.8
.1,4 3.2
4.9 8.3
8.2 7.1
7.3 3.9
2.6 T
2.2 L1.9
3.5 2,0
0,8 7.1
4.8 7.1
4.4 7.2
4.8 2.6
3.8 0.7
8,1 L1.1
3.5 L2.1
SAIfl)USE'f, OHIO
POBT OFFICE BUILDING
1932
Apt+
0.7 0
T 0
4.4 0
0.9 0
3.3 T
0 0
0.2 0
0.7 0
0.4 0
T 0
0T _
T 0
T 0
1.7 O
T 0
4.7 O
0.5 0
T T
T 0
I rot_
0 32.1
0 12.7
0 20.2
0 34.9
0 39.8
0 28.1
0 18.0
0 35.1
0 13.3
0 39.8
0 17.1
0 29.1
0 27.9
0 14.4
0 21.3
0 54.9
0 39.7
O 17.2
T 36.4
0 24.6
horlmontsl llael drawn on the Average T0mperat_re, Total PreclpltattoD, Montbly and Beaeonal Degree Dayl, and _onthly and Beaeonal Bnowfall tables separate
the data sccordleq| to etatlol location (see 8tatlon Locatlon table).
STATION LOCATION
I
i..u
O
[',3
Best House Hotel, Cot.
ColUmbuS • Market Btl.
P, O. Building, corner
of Columbus • Barker
lew P. 0. BIdB.. corner
Bashlqi_ton • Jackson
8trc'ts
!
8- 1-77
4- 1-88
3-13- 27
I
3-31-88
3-13-2711 •lock
present_2 blocks
I
L.m.d+
41 ° 25'N [82 * 40'W
41o 25'B 182 ° 40'W
EleWI_C_ oJ_ove
Se _ l+v't
. 11.11 _. !
639
41 ° 25'R 82 ° 40'W 603 6_ I 67 7
k_amt
!
3 2
REMARK8
Reason for move unknown.
Move due to erection of new
P. O. • d1_mantlln6 of the
old.
ButlAtnl_ & trees s_rrouml
location but due to diltmnce
1nee lend there 1s but ldt t le
I effect on t he sccurmcy of
the t_Irnae_ s. The sloping
effect of the P.O. roof II
thought to adversely affect
lind velocltles sllghtlv.
Prlor to the opeuln6 of the _01n SanduSky, teIperature and proclpltatlon obse_vatlons were made u.de the supervision of the Silthsonlan Instltutlon In
9arglretta _ownshtp about 5 illes southwest, Temperature observations were iade from 1868 to 1876 _nd precipitation from 1839 to 1867.
NRRC, Asheville, N. C, --+ 1/31/56 _-- 350
O
r-_
I
O3
O3
I
AVEBAGE TEMPERATURE
I
Yeaz Jan Feb. i Max. Apr May June i
1906360270296
1907201612319142_340.449'632159"465.460'2
190028.11 i26.439.948.360.469.6
190931.332.0138.346.437.068.6
191026.424.5!45.650.035.068.9
191130.524.438.0
30.731.436.548.866.870.8
191215.420.128.447.660.766.2
191334.324.237.248.658.869.5
191432.219.833.848.081.469.8
191323.032.031.952.854.864.9
191833.623.630.047.250.264.0
191726.221.837.845.152.066.0
101814.628.241.045.985.168.2
191932.731.337.646.856.474.1
192018.925.040.842.866.3169.3
192132.832.646.854.851.872.0
192225.831.438.640.052.270.0
1923 46.954.071.8
192423.426.1.34.149.432.598.0
192525.234.2139.931.554.872.2
i
1926 27.2128.1130.4 42.1 58.2!65.2
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1949
1D49
1950
1951
1962
1953
1954
1955
RZC 0_,D
MAX
i16
July A_g Sept
71.776.060.7
72.969.463.0
73.470.768.4
71.872.863.4
74.8 71.766.8
74.471.886.5
73.669.066.8
73.873.063.6
73.672.963.7
71.067.667.3
77.874.864.6
73.070.082.0
71.375.668.4
76.671.267.6
70.770.866.8
78.7 71.0 70,2
73.271.468.6
73.070.363,2
70.871.660,8
71.671.960,6
72.7 74.0 65.4
64 2_41.0 47.6 57.8 64.0 72.9 67.168.6
_36 11,601668[, 617,817,11627
93.0124.2143.8152.0157.0187.1173.8169.2L85.8
25.4137.0 ]36.0148.3161.8171.0175.2 !72.8 ]67.1
30.6 ]33.4 ]35.0140.7168.4 h69.0170.0173.9170.0
39.0138.0 ]31.8144.0 [60.1170.8173.8173.8166.4
36.9 [30.4 [36.8 L47.6162.0174.4 [76.4 ]72.6 [69.0
32.4117.4132.6 r46.4 [62.7175.6177.8 ]71.4168.0
28.1128.8 ]42.8148.4154.4166.4177.4173.4165.2
22.4120.0139.5 [44.6 [63.4188.8176.2175.0168.8
34.2130.0 ]33.2147.1160.6160.2 [74.1175.4 [63.8
28.3 [34.5 i44.6160.1 _59.9169.0175.1176.0 [64.8
31.3131.0137.1145.5162.8172.4L74.0174.0i68.0
18.0128.2131.4144.6 _87.3170.3 [73.4172.8163.8
28.0126.8131.8152.4 [63.6171.2 [75.6172.2189.2
28.0124.8140.0153.4162.2170.6 i75.4 ]72.2165.0
26.5 [30.1 [36.0143.0168.8 L74.2 L75.1173.2 _63.0
32.8 i31.2 [33.6144.4164.6173.1174.8174.8166.2
19.8129.8149.0152.0154.2187.0172.2173.0167.4
30.0130.8147.4 L49.8150.2166.2173.6 [69.0187.0
33.0123.6132.8147.0158.3167.0171.8 [77.8167.1
21.4128.0137.6152.8157.3166.8175.0179.8158.0
35.1134.8138.0147.7162.5174.9179.0174.8162.2
37.2 ]30.1 [33.9 !43.8 i60.3189.7 ]79.4171.8 ]68.0
30.3130.1 i38.7 ]47.2161.0170.1 !74.5 !71.3164.1
32.9 ]33.1 _37.0 ]80.4 ]69.0174.3178.0 j72.7165.8
33.8134.3140.9145.9161.4172.8174.4174.7 i66.8
29.5137.1 ]36.4154.1157.4 !73.4173.7172.5168.6
27.5[30.7138.9156.5163.1168.5170.8177.0167.8
Oct. Nov Dec. A_'|
52.040.4318509
49.040.033.2 '48.6
54.742.032.251.1
48.7 48.4 24.2 50.0
68.236.825.248.9
52.437.236.051.8
53.443.033.6148.2
53.845.038.2151.47 2 1 625 449.8
53.143.8 30.0149.7
53.242.228.2!40.9
45.638.621.646.7
56.042.838.850.5
58.840.625.251.5
60.341.034.049.7
54.142.232.854.0
66.244.130.751.9
52.241.939.650.4
58.841.226.648.0
48.6 39.8 28.0 50.3
62.6 39.9 27.8 48.6
34.1
30.0
31.0
38.9
31.8
32.1
54.3 _45.229.2
63.6142.626.1
54.0 137.8 35.2
51.4 ]39.728.8
86.8 144.8 32.4
55.8141.834.8
54.6140.034.fl
87.7144.0 37.5
55.4 143.0 26.8
53.1130.820.8
54.0143.826.0
53.2 ]43.7
59.0146.7 34.5:
62.0138.531.8
50.0146.834.2
60.442.633.4
58.738.225.8
58.146.134.8
58.537.231.1
50,944.936.6
56.942.5132.555.9138.028.9
12781292r367!477158216o 217411722_65 o 545417131.3
34.535.244.055.667.677.o o2.68o.4!74.362.548.412101200129313961606160915061640,57,I,931946'374252
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TOTAL PBECIPITATION
9ANDu3rf, O_tO
POST OFFICE BUILDIJG
1965
_'em ]an.
1906! .93 1.01
1907 4.87 .33
1908 2.09 3.701909 2.6i iiii
1010! 3._, ii_'_
1911 2_77 I 1.93
1912 1.62 I 1.60
1913 9.10l 2.07
1914 2.71 I 1.96
1915 2.41 I 1.89
1916 3.62 J 1.07
1917 2.66 I .73
1918 2.77[ 1.25
1919 14 I .94
1920 1.32 I .27
1921 1,69[ 1.91
1922 1.20 J 1.00
1923 2.50 J 1.21
1924 3.11 I 1.67
1925 .95 I 2.34
1028 1 7811.98
1927 1,48 I 2,32
1928 1.53 ] I. 79
1929 4.001 1.79
1930 5.41 I 1.81 !
1931 1.73 i 1.71 i
1932 4.07 I 1.06
1933 1.34 I 1.45
1934 1.1W I .76
1935 2.24 I 1.65
3.02
1936 1.07 2.681937I 8.58 2,41938 61 3.25
1939 2.113.43
1940 1.36 !
1941 1,30 i .65 !
1942 1.08 2.70
1943 1.64 1.06
1944 .00 1.62
19451.10 1.57
1947 _ 4.20 .40
1948 I 1.65 2.36
1949 3.09
1950 6.544.531
I
1951 2.37 2.67 i
1952 397 2.00 I
1953 3.20 .82
2.89
19541955 ' 2.55 2.12
2.02 i 2.30
AN 2.35
i
blar ._ Apr. _ Ma_ June
i
1.8711.50! 1.48 I 1.53
4.39l 1.192.16l 4.64
2.83 ! 2.12
2.16L3'61[ 2"50 I 5.2214.981"72
.28r 6.24 ] 1.09 ] 1.74
1.6613.46 1.92] 3.90
2.931 2.43 1.94 I 4.52
8.6912.10 4.8011.54
2.16i 3.86 4.0313.13
1.17! .35 3.00; 3.48
3, 09! k 1.37 3,60[ 4.36
2.72[ 3.66 3.1314.21
1.92! 1.39 4.15l 1.26
3.37 ! 3.41 3.46 I .81
1.38; 4.77 1.05l 4.83
4.07 _, 3.65 2.28[ 1.73
4.43 _, 3.02 2.58[ 1.96
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APPENDIX D
MEMORANDUM ON THE GEOLOGY AND HYDROLOGY OF A PROPOSED
REACTOR SITE NEAR SANDUSKY_ OHIO
By Stanley E. Norris I
INTRODUCTION
Purpose and Scope
The purpose of this report is to discuss, with special reference to
the disposal or unintended loss of radioactive fluid to the ground, the
geology, and hydrology of a proposed reactor site at the Plum Brook Ord-
nance Works near Sandusky, Ohio. The report was prepared at the request
of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics as an aid to the Com-
mittee on Reactor Safeguards of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in
evaluating the feasibility of operating a nuclear power reactor at the
site in question.
Previous Work and Acknowledgments
Data on which this report is based are from well records in the files
of the Ohio Division of Water_ from publications and manuscript maps of
the Ohio Division of Geological Survey, from publications of the Ohio Divi-
sion of Shore Erosion, and from engineering data collected by the U.S.
Corps of Engineers. A brief reconnaissance was made of the site area by
the writer and R. K. Cash, of the Geological Survey, in company with of-
ficials of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and personnel
of the Plum Brook Ordnance Works. Mr. Cash also spent time in the field
collecting well data and information on water use in the area.
This report was prepared under the general supervision of A. N.
Sayre, Chief of the Ground Water Branch, U.S. Geological Survey. The
writer is indebted to Mr. N. P. Miller of the National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics for his assistance in furnishing engineering data of the
site, and to Mr. R. E. Lamborn of the Ohio Division of Geological Survey
for making available the manuscript maps prepared by Frank Carney, show-
ing the extent of the beach ridges in the Sandusky area.
IDistrict Geologist, Ground Water Branch, U.S. Geological Survey,
Columbus_ Ohio.
AREAOFINVESTIGATION
Location and Extend
As shownon figure DI; the Plum Brook OrdnanceWorks occupies an
area of between 15 and 20 square miles; chiefly in Perkins and Oxford
townships, Erie County, Ohio. The proposed reactor site lies in the
northern part of the ordnance works grounds, five miles south-southeast
of the Court House in Sandusky, Ohio.
Topography and Drainege
The area under discussion lies near the southern shore of Lake Erie,
on the flat plain which in glacial time was a portion of the lake bottom.
The land surface slopes gently toward the lake; descending from an eleva-
tion of 700 feet above sea level at Prout Station, at the southern bound-
ary of the ordnance works; to the level of the lake, about 573 feet 2 above
sea level. The topography is very flat; the principal relief being af-
forded by the old beach ridges and sand hills which mark the former shore-
line. The present shoreline_ in the vicinity of Sandusky_is one of sub-
mergence, characterized by drowned stream mouths and large areas of marsh-
land (Metter, ref. D3, p. 5).
The drainage in the area of the ordnance works is by short streams
which flow north across the lake plain in rel:_tively straight courses to
empty into Lake Erie. As shownon the map, the streams draining the im-
mediate area of the proposed reactor site include a tPibutary of Pipe
Creek on the western side; an unnamedstream Ln the central part, and
Plum Brook in the eastern portion of the site area. These streams have
very low average flows and are intermittent e:(cept in their lower courses
near the lake where they enter the marshland _long the shore.
!
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GEOLOGY
Soils
The soils in the general vicinity of the proposed reactor site are
derived from very fine sand, silt, and clay, (_xcept in areas of the beach
ridges where they are developed on deep sand (r sand over clay. Natural
drainage is classified as good on the beach ridges and poor to very poor
in the intervening areas (Conrey et al.3 ref. DI, pp. 21-25).
Surficial Deposits
The surficial deposits in the area are comprised of lacustrine clay_
th_niy underlain by _lauial till_ with local patches of sand along the
2During the summer of 1951_ Metter_ ref. D3_ pp. 7-9.
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old beach ridges. The unconsolidated deposits generally are thin, not
more than about 20 feet in thickness_ with bedrock exposed at many places.
Within the ordnance works is a fairly extensive area underlain by sand
deposits which formerly were a source of molders sand.
The unconsolidated deposits along the lake shore_ both in the marshy
areas near the stream mouths and beneath the shallow offshore waters_ are
considerably thicker than the unconsolidated deposits in the area of the
ordnance works. As reported by Metter (ref. DS, p. 15):
"The Sandusky city engineers have made a series of auger bore holes
in the marshy region from the new Cedar Point entrance road westward to
within about 300 yards of Willow Point. The borings were made at 1000-
foot intervals in nine north-south rows i000 feet apart. The westernmost
line of borings encountered bedrock at an elevation of approximately 550
feet_ overlain by gravelj sand, clays, and swamp muck approximately 25
feet of unconsolidated material. The next line of probings_ i000 feet
farther east_ encountered bedrock at an elevation of 545 feet_ and there
is no more record of bedrock elevations eastward along the shore of the
peninsula. Borings at the Plum Brook Intake went down to elevations of
516 feet without encountering rock_ giving a minimum thickness here of
approximately 60 feet for the unconsolidated material."
Consolidated Rocks
Consolidated rocks underlying the area are sedimentary in origin aud
of Devonian age. A generalized geologic section_ compiled from Stout
(ref. D5_ p. 559) and other sources is as follows:
N821e
Ohio shale
Olentan_f shale (includes the
Prout limestone member of
Stauffer near the top)
Delaware limestone
Columbus limestone
Approximate
thickness 3
ft
300
4O
70
65
The regional dip of the strata is easterly and younger rocks crop
out progressively from west to east. The bedrock is limestone in the
western part of the ordnance works property and shale in the eastern part.
On the map is shown the line of demarcation between the Columbus and Dela-
ware limestones on the west and the 01entangy and Ohio shales on the east.
Also shown on the map are locations of quarries and other exposures of the
bedrocks.
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The carbonate rocks in the Sandusky area are described hy Stout (ref.
D_3, p. 363, 365-566) as follows:
"The stone in the Columbus formation shows considerable variation,
both physical and chemical_ in different parts of the section. In com-
position3 it changes upward from a dolomite bearing a little free calcium
carbonate to a limestone containing from i0 to 25 percent magnesium car-
bonate. The stone in the upper part is blue in color and lies in thin to
medium beds rather uniform in thickness. Formerly this part was quarried
extensively near Sandusky along Mills Creek, w_s known to the trade as
"Sandusky stone," and was employed for buildin_ paving_ and flagging pur-
poses. In the middle portion the strata are more massively bedded_ are
from bluish to light brown in color_ and locally contain some chert. The
dolomite in the lower portion is well crystallized_ massive bedded_ and
commonly light brown . "
!
O
"The youngest of the carbonate rock formations in Erie County is the
Delaware which extends in a strip from four to five miles in width from
the lake and bay near Sandusky southwestward a_ross the area to Huron
County. It covers central Portland3 western P_rkins_ southeastern Margar-
etta_ western 0xford_ and eastern Groton townships. The general color of
the Delaware limestone is bluish gray but owin_ to the effects of organic
pigments parts assume brown and dark sooty shales. The stone is finely
crystalline_ hard_ dense_ and fossiliferous. Locally it contains chert_
usually in the nodular form, localized along b_dding planes_ and varying
much in color depending upon the state of weathering. Ordinarily the
strata are rather uniformly bedded in layers f_om 2 to i0 inches. This
formation has been rather extensively quarried south of Sandusky for
building stone and crushed rock products."
The 01entangy and Ohio shales were exposel in former years at two
localities within the ordnance works, in the r_[iroad cut about a mile
north of Prout Station_ and along Plum Brook about two miles northeast of
Prout Station. Based on the description by Stauffer (ref. D4, p. 120-121),
the Olentangy shale_ below the Prout limestone member_ is at least 30 feet
thick and is a soft_ blue shale, marly in comp)sition_ containing layers
and nodules of hard, fossiliferous limestone. At the top of the 01entangy
shale is a prominent limestone bed approximateLy 9 feet thick which Stauf-
fer called the Prout limestone and described (?ef. D4, p. 120) as a "very
hard silicious blue limestone with a layer of :herty pyrite at the top."
The Ohio shale, which overlLes the Olenta_gy shale_ is a black_ thin-
ly bedded shale, containing pyrite and much bituminous matter. The upper
portion of the Ohio shale was called the Huron shale in older reports.
GROUND-WATERHYDROLOGY
Source and Occurrence of Ground Water
Groundwater in the area of the ordnance works has its source in
local precipitation. The limestone beds are the principal aquifer and_
in areas where they comprise the bedrock_ furnish supplies to most of the
farms and suburban homes. Yields from the limestone deposits range gen-
erally between 5 gailons a m_nute and I0 gallons a minute_ though varia-
tions over a considerable range - from 3 gallons a minute or less to more
than 25 gallons a minute - are not uncommon. Water in limestone beds oc-
cur principally in joint cracks_ along bedding planes and in other open-
ings_ someof which maybe enlarged by solution to form interconnecting
passages through which water maymove in muchthe samemanner as a sur-
face stream. This is the case at Castalia_ about 6 miles west of the
proposed reactor site_ where water issues in great volume from a famous
spring cabled the "Blue Hole." According to Stout (ref. D6_ p. 278):
"The rocks forming the highlands to the south of Castalia are lime-
stones and dolomites of the Columbusand Detroit River formations. They
are highly pitted with sink holes as far south as Bellevue_ nine miles
away. These are the source for the water of the great Blue Hole and other
springs issuing in the vicinity of Castalia. The flow into the Blue Hole
alone is more than 7_000_000gallons daily. Water is close to the surface
throughout the entire Castalia Prairie of over 4000 acres."
No large limestone springs are knownto the writer in the vicinity
of the ordnance works_ nor do sink holes_ such as those which give rise
to the underground flow at Castalia_ appear to characterize the area.
Most wells in the limestone deposits in the vicinity of the ordnance works
range between 50 and 80 feet in depth. The quality of the water deterio-
rates rapidly with increased depth_ and wells deeper than about i00 feet
generally yield sulphur water.
Ground water conditions change abruptly east of the line which marks
the boundary between areas underlain by limestone and those in which the
bedrock is shale. The shales are relatively impermeable and wells drilled
into these beds generally yield less than about 3 gallons a minute_ a
quantity barely sufficient for limited farm or domestic use. Manywells
drilled into the shales are failures and in such cases property owners
commonlyresort to cisterns for their water supplies. Wells drilled
through the shales_ into the underlying limestone beds_ generally encoun-
ter water of poor quality_ unusable in most cases.
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Movement of Ground Water
Based on well records and foundation data furnished by the U.S. Corps
of Engineers_ the water table in the area of the ordnance works is with-
in a few feet of the surface_ the general range in depth is between 5 and
15 feet. The configuration of the water table is a subdued replica of
the surface topography. The flow of ground water_ therefore_ is similar
in direction to the course of the surface runoff. The average hydraulic
gradient in the area is very low_ less than about one percent_ and the
rate of ground water movement probably is no greater than a foot or two
per day in the limestone beds_ and certainly is much less than this in
the shales. These estimates are based in part on percolation rates in
typical materials as given by Tolman (ref. D7, p. 219) and on other
factors.
SURFACE WATER SUPPLIES
Lake Erie
Two principal water supplies in the area of the proposed reactor site
are from Lake Erie. These are the Sandusky water supply and the water
supply of the Plum Brook Ordnance Works. Both supply intakes are located
east of Sandusky_ as shown on figure DI. The Plum Brook pumping plant
has a capacity of 51 million gallons a day (mgd). Maximum pumpage_ when
the ordnance works was operating at near capacity was 28 mgd. The City
of Sandusky presently uses about 3.3 mgd in the winter and up to Ii mgd
in the summer.
Drainage from the area of the proposed reactor site enters the lake
about midway between the Sandusky intake and the Plum Brook intake. Cru-
cial questions relative to the hazards of contaminated water entering
either the Sandusky intake or the Plum Brook intake involve the effects
of dilution by the lake waters and the direction of the lake currents.
Direction of Lake Erie currents. - The Ohio Division of Shore Erosion
has been making studies of the Lake Erie shoreline for the past several
years in cooperation with the Ohio Division of Geological Survey. Studies
in 1951 revealed important facts about the direction of flow of longshore
currents in the Sandusky area. As reported by Metter (ref. D3_ p. 44):
"The Cedar Point shore line trends nearly N. 45 ° W._ and wind produc-
ing waves from north of N. 45 ° E. would impinge upon the shore in such a
manner as to produce an eastward current. Waves must approach from east
to N. d5° E. to produce a resultant current toward the west. This con-
cept of the cause of direction of longshore currents was borne out during
the summer of 1951_ when currents were observed to flow from the west on
all but two of the days that the author was in the area_ and on those two
days_ the wind was from the E.N.E.
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From the above reasoning, it would foll,_w that during the times that
the waves were from N. 45 ° E. on around to tile northwest, longshore cur-
rents would carry sediments to the east. Du_'ing the severe storms usual-
ly associated with waves from the east the movement would be to the west."
From Metter's observations, it would follow that the principal hazard
associated with the discharge of radioactive fluids into Lake Erie between
the Sandusky intake and the Plum Brook intak_ would be more apt to involve
the water supply of the ordnance works than lhe Sandusky supply. A poten-
tial hazard would confront both_ however.
EARTHQUAKE ACTIVIT_
The State of Ohio has experienced at least ii earthquake shocks which
had their epicenters within the State boundary. According to Heck (ref.
D2), six of the shocks had an intensity of 6 or more on the Rossi-Forel
scale of intensity. All but one of the six r_st severe earthquakes had
their epicenters in northwestern Ohio, in Auglaize and Shelby counties.
The area of these epicenters is about Ii0 mi_es southwest of Sandusky.
Damage from earthquakes does not appear to b_ an important consideration
in the Sandusky area.
!
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CONCLUSIONS
Owing to the proximity of Lake Erie, ant. the absence of any large-
scale ground water developments along the principal flow routes between
the proposed reactor site and the lake_ the l azards of ground water con-
tamination resulting from the spillage of radioactive fluid appear negligi-
ble compared to the potential hazards to surface water supplies.
The short flow routes and the poor infiltration properties of the
soils and surficial deposits over which a cortaminant must move, would
seem to assure its entry into the lake with _ut little prior dilution and
perhaps only slight dimunition in quantity. The latter condition would
hold true especially in times when the ground is frozen or saturated.
Conversely, infiltration would be greatest w_en the soil is dry, such as
during periods of large moisture deficiency _hich commonly occur during
the growing season.
The course of a spilled liquid, should it reach the water table,
would be toward Lake Erie where it would discharge into the lake through
springs and seeps along the shore. In the ccurse of its underground
journey, it is possible that a contaminant might_ under present conditions,
be diverted to wells that supply some of the farms and suburban homes in
the area. However, owing to its very slow movement through either the
underlying limestone beds or shale deposits, time would be available for
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remedial measures. Areas subject to possible ground water contamination
are not large and auxiliary supplies doubtless could be provided where
required during such an emergency.
If a contaminant were to enter Lake Erie in volume_ a much more criti-
cal problem would arise. Under average wind and weather conditions_ the
currents probably would carry the contaminated water in the direction of
the Plum Brooh intake. If so, it would be a potential hazard to personnel
of the ordnance works while in proximity to the intake crib. It might re-
quire closing the intake until the contaminant had moved safely to leeward
or until dilution to a nonhazardous level had occurred.
Should lake currents carry a contaminant toward the Sandusky intake,
hazards would be of similar nature, though perhaps somewhat more critical.
The Sandusky intake is closer to the potential source of contamination and
it is reasonable to suppose there would be less dilution of wastes at that
point than in the vicinity of the Plum Brook intake.
Additional hazards caused by the discharge of radioactive fluids into
Lake Erie would involve the safety of bathers at the Sandusky beach and the
possible contamination of fish. Sandusky is the center of an important
fishing industry which could be adversely affected if fish in the area were
contaminated. In this connection it should also be borne in mind that the
international boundary between the United States and Canada is in Lake Erie
within a few miles of Sandusky.
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PRIMARY WATER ACTIVITY
A knowledge of the water activity is necessary to determine (I) the
shielding required along the cooling water circuit} (2) water disposal
procedures} and (3) water handling procedures during certain operations
(for example; when changing fuel elements). The short-lived activities
determine the shielding requirements while long-lived activities control
the disposal situation.
In the 2-pass cooling system contemplated the water in its passage
through the reactor pressure tank is activated both when flowing up and
around the reactor and again when flowing down through the reactor. The
activity induced during the flow around the reactor is important and has
to be evaluated. The flow picture in the pressure tank is not known_ and
in order to simplify calculations_ the following simplified flow pattern
is assumed. Referring to figure E.I_ water enters near the bottom of the
tank and flows upward around the reactor core at a uniform velocity of
18 cm/sec until it reaches the top of the tank. Then it flows downward
toward the reactor through a narrow column above the reactor at a uniform
velocity of 300 cm/sec. Through the reactor core the velocity is 900
cm/sec. After flowing through the reactor the water exits near the bottom
of the tank.
As the water flows upward_ around the reactor_ its activity at any
level varies with the distance radially from the reactor core. The aver-
age activity at any level (obtained by mixing the flow over the cross
section) occurs along the surface of a streamtube having a constant rad-
ius. The average activity of the water at any level in the tank is thus
determined by evaluating the activity along this average streamtube
surface.
The activation of the water is considered to occur in 6 phases:
(a) In flowing upward along the average streamtube surface the acti-
vating flux is assumed to vary exponentially with the distance below level
A (bottom of reactor).
(b) In flowing between level A and level B (top of reactor) the acti-
vating flux is assumed to be constant along the streamtube surface.
(e) In flowing away from the reactor along the streamtube surface_
the activating flux is assumed to vary exponentially with the distance
above level B.
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(d) As the water flows downtoward the :'eactor it passes through a
region where the radiation flux is assumedto) vary exponentially with the
distance above level B.
(e) Through the reactor the water is activated by a constant flux.
(f) In flowing awayfrom the reactor the water is activated by a
flux varying exponentially with the distance below level A.
The N16 activity which is the most predc,minant in the water is the
result of 016 (np) reaction having about a i(! mevthreshold. In evaluat-
ing this activity the uncollided flux was us_d. The thermal flux was used
for most of the other activities. In the reactor the average thermal flux
is about 5x1014 n/cm2-sec. Above and below the reactor the thermal flux
was approximated to vary as 5xlO14 e-0"I2y where y is the distance
above or below the reactor. Along the average streamtube surface the flux
was approximated to be 3.6xi015 in the regiom between the top and bottom
levels of the reactor. Above and below thes_ levels the fltlx varied as
5.6×1013 e-O.12y.
The uncollided flux in the reactor was _valuated to be 5.2×1014 and
to vary as 2.6xi014 e-O'I3y above and belov the reactor. Along the
streamtube surface between the top and botto_ levels of the reactor the
flux was evaluated as 7.8×1011 and above and below these levels the flux
varied according to 7.8×1011 e-0"ISy.
Consider the case where the flux varies with distance y from level
A according to @(y) = @0e-py where the attenuation coefficient p and
flux @0 are constants. Water flows toward A with constant velocity v
from a distance H.
If the water at H has an activity s0 then at level A its activity
will be
[
_ = (_0 e--V- + +_--_-_v 1 - e-
where
k decay constant
Z macroscopic absorption cross section
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If water flows away from A and if its initial activity at A is s0 then
at H its activity is
c_ = Cto e + _v - k - e
If water flows in a region of constant flux @0 at constant veloc-
ity v for a distance H then
o_ = C_o e (v + Z¢0 I - e v
These equations were applied to the 6 irradiation phases of the water
during each cycle. For each radioactive isotope3 its activity after cy-
cling for i000 hours was computed at a level C below the reactor (fig.
E.I). At level C (about 40 cm below level A) the radiation flux has
dropped sufficiently so it contributes only negligible activity to the
water.
In order to determine activities the concentrations of the impurities
in the water must be known. These impurities consist of those originally
in the water entering the system, and constituents of the stainless steel_
aluminum, and beryllium which corrode into the water. The equilibrium
concentrations of impurities in water (attained in about I0 hr running
time) are as follows:
Na 0.03 ppm
K 0.005 ppm
Ca 0.005 ppm
Mg 0.002 ppm
Si02 0.02 ppm
Cl 0.06 ppm
Stainless 0.iO ppm
AI 0.07 ppm
Be 0.002 ppm
These are based on:
a. Corrosion rates of AI = 0.231xi0 -5 Ib/hr-sq ft, Stainless :
0.016x10 -5 ib/hr-sq ft; Be = 0.0282xi0 -5 ib/hr-sq ft, and
surface areas of A1 : 700 sq ft_ Stainless = 15,000 sq ft;
Be = 175 sq ft.
b. Cooling water flow = 16_250 gpm.
c. Bypass flow to system deionizer = i00 gpm.
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d. Make-upwater = 5 gpm.
e. The water supplied initially to the system, and as make-up
contains a total ion concentration = 0.i ppmCaCO3
equivalent.
f. Water after passing through the system deionizer contains a
total ion concentration = 0.i ppm CaC03 equivalent.
In the reactor many atoms in the aluminum plates upon capturing a
neutron and becoming radioactive, recoil out 3f the aluminum into the
water. The activity in the water due to the3e recoils is an appreciable
part of the total water activity. The recoil isotopes consist mainly of
A128 A127 Na 24 A127the following: from (my) capture, from (n_) reaction,
Mg 27 from A127 (np) reaction, and Mn 56 from YEn55 (ny) capture (the Mn 55
being an impurity in the aluminum).
A summary of the activities of the important isotopes is presented
in table E.I. These activities are the values just after the last irrad-
iation of the water in the cycle (at level C) and are based on an operat-
ing time of I000 hours. For the long half life isotopes_ the allowable
activities in water based on values given in reference 5.1 are listed.
The composition of the stainless steel was t_ken from reference E.I.
Isotopes of half lives greater than abo_t 15 minutes will have con-
stant activity (at values given in table E.I) during the entire cycle.
The activities of shorter half life isotopes may vary appreciably through-
out the cycle depending on their half lives. The important short lived
isotopes are NI6_ 019_ A128_ Mg 27. Their activities throughout the cycle
are shown plotted in figure E.2. The total _yele time is 90 seconds.
After the final irradiation the water spends 9.6 seconds in the pressure
tank before exiting, 38 seconds outside the _ank, and 4.1 seconds back
in the tank before entering the first irradiation region again. In pass-
ing around the reactor the first three irradiations occur in succession
and last 2.3, _.5_ and 2.3 seconds. The water flows up to the top of the
tank during the next 28.2 seconds and down t _ the start of the final three
irradiations in the next 1.7 seconds. The fLnal irradiations take a total
time of about 0.3 second.
I
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TABLE E.I. - ACTIVITIES OF RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES IN PRIMARY COOLING WATER
Radio- Half life Source Activity_ Allowable*
active d is/cmS_sec astir _ty,
isotopes d ! s/cm3-:_cc
Na 24 15 h
O_
O
I
D
A128
Mg2 "7
I_ 56
N 16
019
Ca 41
Ca 45
Ca 47
Ca 49
K42
$35
C136
C158
Fe 55
Fe 59
Cr S1
Co 60
Ta 182
i_ 94
Ni 59
Ni 63
Ni 6S
C 14
g.27 m
9.45 _TL
2.6h
7.35 s
29.4 s
1.2xlO S y
152 d
4.8 d
8.Sm
12.4 h
87 d
4.4)'105 y
37.5 m
2.94 y
45.1 d
Recoils in AI. plates, A127 (n_)
From AI in water, A127 (n_)
From Na in water, Na 2_ (n_)
Recoils _n AI plates, A127 (rg)
From AI in water, AI _7 (rW)
From SiO 2 in water, Si 28 (np)
Recoils in AI plates_ A127 (np)
From AI in water, A127 (np)
From MfI Zn waber# I_ 26 (rg)
Recoils Mn component .in AI plates, Mn 55 (ny)
From Mn compouent in AI in water
From fin component in S.S. in water
From 0 in _,..mter_ 0 IC (np)
From 0 in _.._ter_ 01C (ny)
From Ca in water, Ca 40 (Ir()
From Ca in ',..'at{-r_Ca 44 (nT)
From Ca in _<itor, C2 16 (rW)
From Ca in _._ter, Ca 48 (_£)
From K in water, K 41 (ny)
From CI in water_ C155 (np)
From CI in ,._ater, C155 (ny)
From CI in vmlter, CI _7 (ny)
From Fc component in SS in water, Fe _4 (ny)
From Fo component in SS in war<r, Fe 55 (n¥)
7. U x103_ "_
5
D .6x102_
,i. Sx 10 '1
4. IxiO 'I]
££,. S ×203]
27.8 d
5.27 y
!ii d
5xlO 4 y
8 .10 '1 y
85 y
2.56 h
5570 y
From Cr component in SS in water_ Cr 50 (rg)
From Co component in SS in water_ Co 50 (ny-)
From Ta component in SS in _t<r 3 T;_itl (ny)
From Nb component in SS in water, Nb o3 (ny)
From Ni component in SS in water, Ni 5't' (ny)
From Ni component in SS in water, N_ c2 (:_)
From Ni component in $8 in ".zatcr, N[ 6'i (tP()
From C component in SS in ',,atFr_ (.LZ:,(£I')
4, _2:,40 S
4 _ xl0 _
4.1×104
7
4.8×iO °
4. ? xlO 6
S. 2 xl 0 d
2.4 xlO -3
• 37
i. S×]_O -°
,S1
1S
9
.7 ×10 -2
3.6 ×102
6.8
2.4
240
.65
•dO
2.2 xlO-B
7.6×I0 -4
.14
7 .O
1×20 -6
50
550
i. c
Si<
18
8.9
14.8
.41
1850
67
920
13
_Values c_iculated from r_f. 5.[.
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In order to facilitate radiation calcul_tious from the water activity
the following table is presented. The fract.on of disintegrations yield-
ing a photon and photon energies are given f,_r several isotopes.
TABLE E.2. - PHOTON YIELD AND ENERGY FOR SEVERAL
RADIOACTIVE ISOTOPES
Isotope
NI6
O19
A128
Mg 27
Mn 56
Na 24
Fract ion of
dis int egrat ions
yielding a
photon
0.74 i
06
• l
.70
i. 00
i .00
.20
1.00
.25
.iS
1.00
1.00
Photon
energy
6.1
7.1
1.6
1.8
.8
1.0
.8
1.8
E.1
2.7
1.4
!
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A_PPE_gDIX F
ANALfSES OF THE BORAX-TYPE EXCURSION IN THE NACA REACTOR
The effectiveness of steam formatio:_ as a self-limitin_ meckani_:m !r
a Rorax-type excursion has been established by the series of Borax and
Spert tests (refs. F.Ij F.2; and F.3). Various analyses have been mad;
attempting to predict the results of Borax-type excursions in reac!ors
w_th Bo_ax (_4fR) t_pe fuel elements. A description of the methods of four
of these analyses (refs. F.4; F.S; F.6, and F.7) and the results of t]<e_r
application to the NACA reactor will be presented. All four methoJs _<-
tained some limited desree of success in predicting the results of the
_orax experiments. Despite the fact that there is considerable %u_._s<iou
as to the validity of any of these analyses for reactor s stems otker t%an
the Borax t3_pe; they were used for the NACA reactor because no better ones
were available.
BORAX-TYPE EXCURSION ANALYSIS
Edlund and Noderer (ref. F.4) make the following general assumptions
for the self-limiting process of a Borax-type excursion. The power r_ses
exponentially with constant period until sufficient steam volume forms to
completely compensate for the initial increase in reactivity. Heat is
transferred from the fuel plate to the water by nucleate boiling once the
saturation temperature is reached. The heat transferred to the water is
contained in a layer adjacent to the fuel plate; the thickness of which
grows directly as the square root of time. The pressure in the reactor is
equal to the saturation pressure corresponding to the average temperature
of the heated water layer. The pressure rise is directly proportional to
the second derivative of steam volume with respect to time. Equations are
derived which permit the estimate of maximum fuel plate temperature_ ex-
cursion energy_ and maximum pressure in a Borax-t_e excursion.
Gartner and Daane (ref. F.S) make the following general assumptions
for the self-limiting process. The power rises exponentially with con-
stant period until sufficient steam volume has formed to completely com-
pensate for the excess prompt reactivity. Heat _s transferred from the
fuel plate to the water by conduction. The pressure in the reactor is
equal to the saturation pressure correspondinQ [o the surface <empvrature
of the fuel pl<_te. The pressure rise is d_rectly proper<tonal to the
second derivative of steam volume with respect to t_me. Eqoations are
derived which permit the estimate of maximum fuel plate t<_mperature; ex-
cursion energy_ and maximum pressure.
Golian_ P,ergstralh; Narrisj and O'Rourke (ref. F.6) make an analysis
of the self-limiting process with the following _eneral assumptions. The
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power rises exponentially with constant period until sufficient steam
volume has formed to completely compensatefor the excess prompt reactiv-
ity. Heat is transferred from the fuel plate to the water by conduction
until the boiling point is reached. Abovethe boiling point_ heat is as-
sumedto be transferred through a steam fil_ by conduction. The pressure
is assumedto remain constant. Equations are derived which permit the
estima_,e of maximumfuel plate temperature a_d excursion energy.
Booth (ref. F.7) analyzes the self-limiting process with the follow-
ing general assumptions. The power rises exponentially with a constant
period until sufficient steam volume has forned to halt the rise. Heat
is transferred from the fuel plate first by _onduction and then by nu-
cleate boiling. Booth defines "fully developed boiling" as the condition
where the net rate of heat transfer to the boiling water layer adjacent
to the fuel plate is zero. That is_ the heat transferred from the fuel
plate to the layer of water adjacent to the fuel plate in which boiling
is taking place is equal to the heat transferred from the boiling water
layer to the subcooled water at the center of the passage. The assump-
tion is madethat the temperature profile in the subcooled water is re-
lated to the temperature profile which existed in the entire water cross
section at the time boiling began. The heat transfer from the layer of
boiling water to the subcooled water is calcllated as equal to the heat
conduction into the subcooled water required to give the appropriate slope
to the temperature profile of the subcooled water. The correlation of
Rohsenowfor steady-state nucleate boiling i:_ used to estimate the heat
transfer from the fuel plate to the boiling "later layer. The heat trans-
fer into the boiling water layer is assumed,_qual to the heat transfer
out of the layer. The resulting equation cau be solved for fuel plate
temperature and this fuel plate temperature _s assumedto correspond to
the fuel plate temperature whensufficient s_,eamhas formed to halt the
nuclear excursion.
The value of the void coefficient of re_tctivity 3 which determines the
effectiveness of steam volume formation as a self-limiting mechanism_is
of considerable importance in the analyses oJ' references F.4_ F.5, and F.6.
The hydrodynamics of the reactor 3 which dete]'mines the relationship be-
tween the steam volume generated and the pressure 3 is of considerable im-
portance in the analyses of references F.4 a_.dF.5. The void coefficient
of reactivity and the hydrodynamics of the N_DAreactor will be discussed
below.
_o
APPLICATION TO NACA REICTOR
Void Coefficient of Reactivity
The void coefficient of reactivity has been computed for the NACA re-
actor as described in appendix B. For uniformly distributed voids the
oa
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AK/K Several cases of nonuniformly dis-
computedvalue is -0.I@ AVvoid/VH20.
tributed voids have been computedcorresponding approximately to the type
of distribution which might occur in a Borax-type excursion. The ratio
of the void coefficient for nonuniform void distribution to the void co-
efficient for uniform void distribution varied from about 1.65 to 2.00
depending on the degree of concentration. For the analyses of this sec-
tion it has been assumedthat this ratio is 1.5 and the fractional void
coefficient in a Borax-type excursion is equal to 1.5x(-0.18) or
-0.27 ZkK/K
_Vvoid/VH20"
The results of experiments in the Bulk Shielding Facility on a re-
actor configuration which was specifically selected to approximate the
NACA reactor are described in supplement III. These results indicate that
voiding of water passages in the fuel element at the geometric center of
the slab loading produced a fractional void coefficient of
aK/K
-0.64 AVvoid/VH20} voiding of water passages in the fuel element at the
hot-spot position at the core-reflector interface produced a fractional
aK/K
void coefficient of -0.41 AVvoid/VH20. These results indicate the strong
spatial statistical dependence of the void coefficients and the fact that
aK/ 
the assumed weighted void coefficient of -0.27 AVvoid/VH20/ is probably
conservative.
Hydrodynamics of the Reactor
The hydrodynamics of the reactor, which determines the relationship
between the steam volume generated and the pressure, is of considerable
importance in the analyses of references F.4 and F.5. The situation in
the reactor core is essentially this: When steam is generated in the
core_ the volume it occupies is many times the volume occupied by an
equivalent weight of water. Therefore, a certain amount of water must
be expelled from the core to make room for the steam. Similarly_ the
water outside the reactor core must move to make room for the water ex-
pelled from the core. Force is required to overcome the inertia of the
water and this force is felt as a pressure.
Assumption A: Water incompressible_ bellows. - In references F.4 and
F.5 the assumption is made that the water is incompressible_ or equiva-
lently that the speed of sound in water is infinite. This assumption
leads to the following relation
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where
m.
V
s
pressure rise in the reactor core_ a function of time
second derivative of steam voluble with respect to time
0 density of water
EL a constant which depends on the reactor geometry
t time
The constant, _, depends on the lengths and cross-sectional areas
of the water flow paths in the reactor core, and from the reactor core to
the nearest free surface.
The only free surface in the NACA reactcr primary water system is in
the head tank which is very distant from the reactor core. The value of
for this system would be very large, whic_ is undesirable. According-
ly_ it was considered that bellows might be ]ocated in the reactor tank
close to the core to provide additional exparsion volume. Bellows were
designed with sufficient volume and flexibility to provide the equiva-
2
lent of a free surface and were located 37 feet above the top face of the
reactor core. Values for the maximum fuel plate temperature, excursion
energy_ and maximum pressure were calculated for the NACA reactor by the
methods of references F._ and F.5 using a value of _ which took into
account the presence of the bellows (the methods of refs. F.6 and F.7
were not affected by the presence or absence of bellows). These results
will be discussed later in this appendix.
Assumption B: Water compressible_ no bellows. - Since water is
actually compressible, the effect of water compressibility will now be
considered.
The formation of steam gives rise to pressure waves in the water.
The pressure waves compress the water and the change in volume at any
given time is the volume occupied by the stesm. The relationship between
steam volume generated and the pressure, considering only the compressi-
bility of the water and not the bellows system described above, can be
expressed
V s = J'_ap(I,t) dv (F.2)
0
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where
_p(Z_t) local pressure rise_ a function of position and time
bulk modulus of compressibility of water
dv differential volume element
Vs steam volume
The integral of equation (F.2) is taken over the entire volume of
water in the system. For the NACA reactor_ only the water in the reactor
tank will be considered. This is a conservative assumption.
The exact form of the function_ _pj depends on the geometry of the
system under consideration. For the NACA reactor_ the following simplify-
ing assumptions will be used. Plane pressure waves will be assumed to
originate in the horizontal plane which passes through the reactor center
line. These plane pressure waves will extend over the entire cross-
sectional area of the reactor tank. The plane pressure waves will travel
both up and down and will reflect from the top and bottomj respectively_
of the reactor tank. When the reflected waves reach the plane of origin
they will be badly broken up by the local structure and therefore no sub-
sequent reflection will be considered.
To account for the fact that the pressure waves actually originate
from a small volume in the reactor core and not from a plane across the
entire reactor tank_ the pressure level of the plane waves will be as-
sumed to be one-ninth the pressure in the reactor core. The value of
this factor was obtained by assuming it equal to the reduction in pres-
sure of a spherical wave traveling outward from a one foot diameter sphere
representing the volume of origin to the nine foot diameter of the reactor
tank. The value of one foot was determined by assuming the surface area
of the sphere of origin equal to the surface area of the ends of the fuel
elements.
The local pressure rise in the reactor tank may then be expressed
Ap(Z_t) = l[fiP(t)]t=t__ + l[z_P(t)]t=t---2L-2 (F.3)
a a
where
distance from plane of origin of pressure wave (taken positive
in both directions)
a speed of sound in water
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L distance to plane of reflection at the top or bottom of the re-
actor tank (taken positive for both locations)
Equation (F.3) expresses the fact that the pressure at a given time
t, at a distance _ from the plane of origin of the pressure waves, is
equal to the pressure which existed at the plane of origin at a time in
the past) the time decrement being equal to l he time required for the
pressure wave to travel from Z = 0 to _ = _, namely 2/a for the
original wave and 2L - Z for the reflected wave The first term on the
a
right hand side of equation (F.3) represents the contribution of the orig-
inal pressure wave and the second term represents the contribution of the
reflected pressure wave.
Using equations (F.2) and (F.5), an expression relating steam volume
generated and pressure rise in the reactor core can be found
+ 2 1_z dZvs = (t)]t--t-! t:t-
a a
+
-_- (t)] t=t___ 2L2-Z
a t=t-7
(F.4)
where
A cross-sectional area of reactor tan_
L1 distance from plane of origin of pressure waves to top of re-
actor tank
L 2 distance from plane of origin of pressure waves to bottom of
reactor tank
Equation (F.4) represents approximately ";he relation between V s
AP(t) for the NACA reactor considering only t]_e compressibility of the
water.
and
Comparison of assumptions A and B for reS'erences F.51F.6# and F.7. -
It is now desired to apply the analyses of references F.4, F.5, F.6# and
F.7 to the NACA reactor using assumption B in place of assumption A.
This is accomplished by replacing equation (F.I) with equation (F.4) in
the analyses. The results will then be compared to the results using
equation (F.I) and the bellows system described previously.
O
_0
O
!
!
2_
195
The results from references F.6 and F.7 are entirely unchanged since
neither analysis uses equation (F.I) or any similar relationship.
The substitution of equation (F.4) for (F.I) is very easily carried
out for the method of reference F.5 and figure F.I compares the values of
maximum fuel plate temperature, excursion energy 3 and maximum pressure in
the reactor core as calculated using equation (F.4)(assumption B) and us-
ing equation (F.l)(assumption A). It will be noted that the maximum fuel
plate temperatures, excursion energies, and maximum pressures calculated
using assumption B (water compressible, no bellows) are lower throughout
the range of periods considered.
Comparison of assumptions A and B for reference F.4. The substitu-
tion of equation (F.4) for (F.I) is difficult to carry out for the method
of reference F.4. This is because there is an approximation in the deri-
vation which is no longer pertinent when equation (F.4) is substituted
for equation (F.I) and because, after the derivation is complete, a con-
stant is evaluated by comparison with experimental data. It was felt that
the changes resulting from the use of a different approximation in the
derivation and the evaluation of a new constant from the experimental data
would constitute too much of a change in the original method for the re-
sults to be properly comparable with the results of the original method.
Accordingly_ a more roundabout method is used. An assumption is made
as to the variation with time of the reactor core pressure. Using this
assumption, the steam volume is computed for assumptions A and B. The as-
sumption which provides more steam volume for a given set of conditions
provides for better self-limiting of Borax-type excursions.
It will be assumed that the variation of pressure rise in the reactor
core with time can be approximated by an exponential function
= emt (F.s)
where
m the reciprocal of the period of the pressure
AP o pressure rise at t = 0
Substituting equation (F.5) in equation (F.1) and integrating twice
with respect to t between the limits t = 0 and t = t gives
Z_Po(emt - mt I)
Vs = 2 (F.6)
0_m
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Substituting equation (F.5) in equation (F.4) and integrating gives
g_Po_Aaemt[I 1 2_i 1 Ii 2_2-IIVs-" _mm - e + - e (F.7)
The ratio of the value of Vs in equation (F.7) to that in equation (F.6)
is
Vs(F.7)
Vs(F.6) _Aamp_ <e emt )Ill 2_i-I If 2_2-)]9 mt _ mt - i - e + e
(F.S)
For values of R greater than ij the steam volume as computed using
assumption B (water compressible; no bellows) is greater than the steam
volume as computed using assumption A (water incompressible_ bellows).
Therefore; for R greater than I assumption B provides better self-
limiting of Borax-type excursions than assum)tion A; for R less than i;
the opposite is true. We wish to show that R is greater than i for the
periods of interest.
In order to evaluate R from equation IF.8) it is necessary to make
some assumption as to the value of m; the reciprocal of the period of
the pressure. From the rather uncertain experimental pressure rise data
of references F.I, F.2_ F.53 and F.7 it would seem that the pressure
period is probably shorter than the power peiTiod for the periods of in-
terest. Since it turns out that R increases with increasing m_ the
assumption that m is equal to the reciproc._l of the power period is
probably conservative.
R also depends on mt (the time in per_ods) in the term
emt
This term is always greater than one and therefore the val-
emt - mt i"
ue of R assuming this factor is equal to oiLe is always conservative.
However_ some indication of the value of the factor may be obtained from the
experimental evidence in references F.I_ F.2 and F.5. The time interval
between the time when the fuel plate temper_ ure reaches the boiling point
and the time when the power peak is reached fs of the order of 0.5 to I
period for power periods from 15 to 50 milli_econds for subcooled reactors
emt
of the Borax I or Spert I type. The factor varies from 27
emt - mt - i
for mt = 0.5 to Z.8 for mt = i.
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In table F.I below, are tabulated the values of R computedfrom
equation (F.8):
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TABLE F. I
Period,
sec
0.040
.020
.010
.005
m R (assuming that
emt/e mt - mt - i = i)
25 0.085
50 .51
I00 1.05
200 5.2
R (assuming that
emt/e mt - mt - i = 5.8)
0.52
1.2
4.2
12.2
It may be seen from table F.I that even for the most conservative
assumption_ the ratio R is greater than one for periods of i0 milli-
seconds or less. If a more probable value of the term emt/e mt - mt - i
is used 3 the ratio R becomes greater than one at still longer periods.
For example, for mt = I, emt/e mt - mt - I = 5.S, R is greater than one
for periods of about 21 milliseconds or less.
This completes the lengthy digression which was necessary because we
could not directly substitute equation (F.4) for equation (F.I) in the
analysis of reference F.4. It has been shown_ within the limits of the
accuracy of the assumptions of the above analysis, that for periods of
i0 milliseconds or less water compressibility alone provides more volume
for steamj and consequently better self-limiting of Borax-type excursions_
than would be provided by the bellows under the assumption that the water
is incompressible. Therefore the values of maximum fuel plate tempera-
ture_ excursion energy, and maximum pressure in the reactor core as cal-
culated under assumption A (water incompressible, bellows) are conserva-
tive for periods of 10 milliseconds or less} these are the critical peri-
ods for the NACA reactor. It has also been shown that there is a good
probability that the values of temperaturej energy_ and pressure cal-
culated under assumption A are conservative for periods of 21 milliseconds
or less and perhaps even for longer periods.
Results for the NACA Reactor
It is now possible to give the final comparison of the results of
applying the analyses of references F.4_ F.5, F.6j and F.7 to the NACA
reactor system (no bellows in the reactor tank). The results given for
references F.6 and F.7 do not depend on the presence or absence of a bel-
lows. The results which will be given for reference F.5 are those com-
puted by substituting equation (F.4) for equation (F.I) in the analysis
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of reference F.5. The results which will be shown for reference F.4 are
those computed assuming that the water is i[eompressible and that the
bellows system previously described is present. These results have been
shown to be conservative for periods of I0 milliseconds or less and possi-
bly for longer periods.
The critical set of initial conditions for the NACA reactor is the
case of a ZLK step increase when the reactor is operating at zero power.
This condition is critical because the degree of subcooling is greatest
and because it is physically possible to obtain a closer approximation to
a g/_ step as opposed to a ZkK ramp. The following results are based
on an initial reactor temperature of 50° F a_d an initial pressure of 135
pounds per square inch absolute. The temperature of 50 ° F is the lowest
temperature it is expected the primary water might attain in the winter.
The pressure of IS5 pounds per square inch aosolute is the average of
reactor inlet and outlet design pressures.
Figure F.2 shows the variation of maximum fuel plate temperature with
period as predicted by the four different me_hods. It may be noted that
the fuel plates would not melt unless the pe-iod were shorter than about
i0 milliseconds_ Z3K greater than about 1.8.
Figure F.3 shows the variation of energlr release with period for
three of the different methods. The method _f reference F.7 does not per-
mit the computation of energy release. It m_ be noted that the predicted
energy release of the NACA reactor is less than 135 megawatt-seconds (the
energy release of the Borax explosion) for p,_riods down to about 5 milli-
seconds, f/_ greater than about 2.9.
Figure F.4 shows the variation of maximum pressure in the reactor
core with period for two of the different me_hods. The methods of ref-
erences F.6 and F.7 did not permit the comp_ation of pressL_e rise.
o
FINAL REACTOR SHUTIXWN
If a Borax-type excursion occurred due to the insertion of a step
ZhK into the reactor at a time when the control rods failed to function
properly and the formation of steam volume ir the reactor core shut down
the reactor before any permanent damage could be done_ the reactor might
again become critical when the steam condensed in the subcooled water_
and the entire cycle repeat itself. Some meens of shutting down the re-
actor when the control rods fail to function _ust be available to prevent
this type of occurrence. Various methods of accomplishing this are under
consideration and the one which is deemed most suitable will be built in-
to the NACA reactor.
OI
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POSSIBLE CHEMICAL REACTIONS
As a result of the nuclear energy release in a Borax-type excursion,
the fuel plates of the reactor may be heated to a temperature high enough
to permit a metal-water reaction to occur between the aluminum and
aluminum-uranium alloy of the fuel plates and the water in the core. If
this reaction should occur_ hydrogen would be liberated. The nuclear and
chemical energy released by the nuclear excursion and concurrent metal-
water reaction would undoubtedly rupture the reactor pressure tank and
hurl a portion of the contents of the reactor pressure tank into the air-
filled dome of the containment tank. The hydrogen liberated by the metal-
water reaction might react with the air in the dome of the containment
tank. A discussion of the potential metal-water reaction and the poten-
tial hydrogen-air reaction occurring will be discussed below.
METAL-WATER REACTION
Mills (ref. G.I) first noted that if metal-water reactions actually
occurred during a nuclear runaway_ the heat released would be comparable
in magnitude to that released by nuclear reaction. Further_ if the chemi-
cal reactions went explosively_ there would be the possibility of spread-
ing radioactivity over a large area. Numerous experimental investigations
have been undertaken subsequently to establish whether or not the reac-
tions really proceeded under conditions that might be attained in reactors.
It may be noted that the free energy change is negative for the reaction
of all metals commonly used in reactors with the exception of nickel. In
the NACA reactor we are concerned with aluminum and an aluminum-uranium
alloy (~i0 perc.ent uranium).
Literature
Several types of experiments have been performed that are pertinent.
West and Weills (ref. G.2) forced molten aluminum (3kg) into water by
sudden application of air pressure. The nozzle through which the aluminum
was forced was perforated by a large number of 1/16 inch diameter holes.
No detectable steam pressure was produced and there was no evidence of
significant chemical reaction even when the aluminum was heated to i000 ° C.
Milich and King (ref. G.3) melted metal rods inductively in an argon
atmosphere. The molten metal (~i0 gm) was allowed to drop into varying
amounts of water (lO-1AO ml). Aluminumj zirconium, 304 stainless steel_
and mild steel were tested. No violent reactions or detonations were ob-
served. Slight reaction was observed with zirconium_ 304 stainless, and
2OO
mild steel. No reaction was observed with aluminum except in one case
in which the dish containing the water was insulated to retain the heat.
In aluminum foundry practice_ water is _sed as a quench to form ingots
from the molten metal. Several serious explosions have occurred, however_
and Russell (ref. G.4) has investigated the _onditions under which ex-
plosions take place. He found aluminum poured from a I inch diameter
opening will not explode under conditions wh_re that poured from a 3 inch
diameter opening would explode violently. __so there appeared to be a
correlation between higher temperature of the molten metal and increasing
tendency to explode. No explosions occurred if water depth was greater
than 30 inches.
Higgins (ref. G.5) poured the following molten metals_ in a i inch
diameter stream into water: aluminum, nickel , zirconium, stainless steel_
magnesium, and a aluminum-lithium alloy. Noue reacted violently though a
thin oxide coating was formed on the globule_ in each case. In an attempt
to obtain dispersion of the molten metal, a blasting cap was inserted be-
neath the surface of the water, provided witll a timing circuit. With this
setup, violent reactions were obtained with _:irconium_ Zircaloy-2_ a
aluminum-lithium alloy_ and magnesium. However, aluminum and nickel
yielded no violent reactions_ only the forma%ion of a thin oxide film oc-
curred. The particle size of the nickel and aluminum globules was such
that $7 and 81 percent_ respectively, passed through a 4-mesh screen.
Shidlovski (ref. G.6) was able to induc_ explosive reactions in
mixtures of water (43 percent by weight) and magnesium powder (57 percent
by weight) by providing confinement and deto_ating them with a blasting
cap. A mixture of 50 percent water and 50 percent fine aluminum powder
did not explode under the same conditions. Kowever_ with an auxiliary
detonating charge of tetryl in addition to t_e blasting cap, a true ex-
plosion was initiated. Some AI203 powder wa_ recovered from the products
along with some unreacted aluminum.
Higgins (ref. G.5) extended the work of Shidlovski in a different
apparatus employing smaller sample size, a l_sser degree of confinement 3
and a larger booster charge. He obtained exTlosions with 50-50 slurries
of magnesium in water and in methanol. Howe_er_ the following slurries
could not be exploded: AI-H20_ AI-CH30H, Zr-H20 J and AI-Mg-CH3OH.
Ruebsamen, Short, and Chrisney (ref. G.7) heated metal wire and foil
samples while immersed in water by means of _ high voltage condenser dis-
charge. Samples were heated to about 2500 ° C. The extent of the chemi-
cal reaction was calculated from measurements of the amount of H 2 found
and the weight of metal lost. Explosive reactions were observed with
substantial amounts (up to ].O0 percent) of the metal reacting for: uran-
ium, zirconium 3 aluminum, aluminum-lithium, and aluminum-uranium (i0 and
!
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28 percent U). No outstanding differences in reactivity were observed.
Nickel did not give explosive reaction nor react to any great extent.
Experiments are in progress at the MTR (ref. G.S) in which aluminum-
uranium alloy samples (26 to 50 percent by weight U-235) i/S-inch diameter
and 0.10-inch thick with aluminum cladding on one side only are mounted
in a small ceramic cup and exposed to water on only one face. The test
cup is glued to a pressure capsule containing the water and fitted with
a pressure transducer. The sample is lowered into the reactor lattice for
6-12 second irradiations. Indications are that explosive reactions are
obtained just above the melting point of the alloy_ though not at higher
temperatures (ref. G.9).
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Discussion of Literature
It appears that aluminum is the most difficult of the reactive metals
with which to induce an explosive reaction in water. This is undoubtedly
due to the very protective AIOOH formed on its surface. This hydrated
oxide is practically completely protective on solid aluminum and almost as
protective on molten aluminum. However_ the literature indicates that an
explosion can be obtained under two sets of conditions:
A. When a massive blob of molten aluminum is dropped into a compar-
able amount of water_ not deep enough to cool the aluminum substantially
before striking the bottom of the container. Whether this is a steam ex-
plosion or a metal-water explosion has not been demonstrated. In any
event these conditions are not possible in the NACA reactor.
B. When the aluminum is very finely dispersed as in a fine powder or
when atomized (i.e., heated above the boiling point).
The aluminum-uranium alloy will give an explosive metal-water re-
action more readily than pure aluminum. The greater the percentage of
uranium_ the more easily will the explosion occur. The i0 percent uran-
ium alloy is probably only slightly more reactive than pure aluminum.
This no doubt depends on how much the protective AI00H is altered by the
i0 percent uranium.
Explosion Problem Arising from A1-H20 Reaction in NACA Reactor
A. Weight of aluminum: It may be assumed that only the aluminum in
the fuel plates will be heated enough during a runaway to be considered
here. This amounts to 90kg. About 1/3 of this is aluminum-uranium (90-
I0 percent) alloy and 2/3 pure aluminum cladding.
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B. Heat evolved from reaction:
i 5/2 H2Al(s ) + 5/2 H20(Z ) _ _ AZ2D 5 +
-AH298 = 195 kcal
Q(9OkgAl) = 1550 megawatt secs
C. Hydrogen evolution: Approximately 4100 cu ft of hydrogen at
standard conditions (25 Ib) would be evolved.
D. Heat evolved from reaction:
i
H 2 +_ 02 _ H20
-AH298 = 68.3 kcal
Q (H2 from 90 kg AI) = 1600 m_gawatt secs
E. Estimate of fraction of metal that will react:
From examination of residue of Borax experiment (ref. F.I_ appendix F)
and from drop size measurements obtained by _iggins (ref. G.5) it appears
that molten metal dispersed by an explosion [n water is not so finely
divided (as in powders) than an autocatalyti_ reaction is to be expected
in the case of aluminum. Hence the fraction of the molten aluminum that
reacts would probably be small. The situati)n is, however_ far from clear.
The assumption made in the body of the reporo (section 6.4.5) that 50 per-
cent of the metal in the fuel plates reacts _ppears to be conservative for
the case of little or no metal vaporization.
I-
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HYDROGEN - AIR REACT[0N
Following a detonation in which the rea:tor pressure tank is
destroyed 3 a jet of water_ H2_ and metal will issue into the containment
tank dome. The exact composition of this je_ in unknown since it depends
on the extent of the reactions which have preceded its emergence. The
course of the jet is also not known since de_ris_ protective equipment
and the like will serve_ in some measure at Least to deflect and disrupt
it. It is known that in the absence of such deflectors the jet would is-
sue vertically with little spreading.
Two questions are of paramount importance: (i) is there enough inert
gas in the jet to render the H2-gas mixture nonflammable under all condi-
tions and (2) if an explosion does occur would it rupture the containment
tank.
2O5
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With regard to the flammability of H2-air-inert mixtures3 some data
exist on the effect of water vapor and the limits of flammability (ref.
G.10). There are also some data on the detonation limits of H2-air mix-
tures in the absence of water (ref. G.II). These data are shown in fig-
ure G.I. For the flammability limit data straight lines have been drawn
between the H2-air limits and the single point for nonpropagation irre-
spective of fuel-air ratio for mixtures containing water vapor. Similar
data on other fuels suggest that straight lines are a reasonable approxi-
mation (ref. G.IO). The point of major interest, however_ is the one at
which no fuel-air mixture is flammable. This mixture contains 60 percent
water by volume and i0 percent H2 by volume or a H2/H20 ratio of about
0.17 by volume and about 0.02 by weight. Since the water must be in the
vapor state or at worst in the form of a very fine mist it seems unlikely
that this condition would exist following a catastrophe.
If one assumes that the detonation limit curves are parallel to the
flammability limit curves_ it is possible to find a corresponding non-
detonation limit for water mixtures. There is no particular justifica-
tion for this assumption. Nevertheless_ a cross-over occurs at a volu-
metric water vapor concentration of about 52 percent and a H 2 concentra-
tion of 21 percent of a H2/H20 ratio of about 0.66 by volume or 0.07 by
weight. It again appears unlikely that this condition would exist in a
catastrophe. It must therefore be assumed that it is possible, during the
mixing of the jet from the reactor tank into the containment tank_ that
flammable and possibly detonable mixtures of H2 and air would at some time
occur. It does not_ of course_ mean that these mixtures would occur at a
time and place containing an ignition source nor does it mean that a large
volume of the total mixture would exist in the flammable range.
A part of the same problem concerns the ultimate mixture which would
result if the jet is uniformly mixed in the chamber. To be nonflammable
the ultimate mixture of H2-air would have to contain less than 4 percent
hydrogen by volume. The containment tank has an air volume of 451_000
cu ft_ the 25 pounds of hydrogen produced if all the metal in the fuel
plates reacted would result in a concentration of hydrogen of about i
percent by volume in the containment tank. It appears_ therefore, that
the ultimate uniform mixture would be well below the flammability limit.
The probability of explosioD is thus considerably reduced since even flam-
mable concentrations will exist only as a transient. This transient con-
dition must also occur in the presence of an ignition source. Since the
upward thrust of the original jet is great, little mixing will probably
occur in the early stages so that some cooling will take place before the
flammable mixtures form.
Assuming that an explosion might occur, what will be its severity.
The minimum concentration of hydrogen which will form a detonable mixture
is about 18 percent. In the body of the report (section 6.4.3) it is
2O4
assumedthat 50 percent of the metal in the Cuel plates reacts. This
would produce about 11.5 pounds of hydrogen} the volume of hydrogen would
be approximately ZSOOcubic feet. The explosion which would most severe-
ly try the containment tank is that which would occur if someportion of
the detonable mixture were in contact with the containment tank. The
pressure-time history which the containment tank would see if a hydrogen-
air mixture in contact with it were to detonate is discussed in appendix
H.
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FORCES ON THE REACTOR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE
The forces acting on the reactor containment structure are discussed
below. Included in this discussion are the forces due to a 400 pound TNT
explosion at the reactor location_ the forces which might act on the re-
actor containment tank if a ]_ydrogen explosion occurred in the air above
the shielding pool_ and the equilibrium pressure in the containment tank
after an excursion.
FORCES DUE TO A 400 POUND TNT EXPLOSION
An explosion of 400 pounds of TNT was assumed to occur at the loca-
tion of tile reactor core. Pressure-time histories were calculated for
the reactor pressure tank and the shielding pool floor and walls by use
of reference H.I. The results are shown in figure Hol. The impulse-time
histories for the shielding pool floor and walls are shown in figure H.2.
The Reactor Pressure Tank
The pressure on the bottom is that due to 400 pounds doubled for
full reflection. That at the top was taken to be that due to 800 pounds 3
thus allowing for some focusing by the side walls. This should be a
reasonable estimate. The side pressures are faired between these two
charge weights.
Shielding Pool Floor
The 9-foot steel tank and accompanying concrete are assumed to offer
no resistance whatever and are henceforth ignored. According to reference
H.I (pp. 255-259)_ the pressure on the floor should vary from double that
due to 400 pounds of TNT directly below the reactor to that due to 800
pounds of TNT at the intersection with the side wall. By a comparison
with reference H.I_ figure 7.19, this variation was established. Because
of the free surface 3 there will be a rarefaction wave from the surface
hitting the floor at a later time. This simply cuts the initially high
pressure due to the shock to zero. As the shock travels at about 5000
fps 3 the times at which the shock wave and rarefaction wave arrive are
given by
tshoc k = r/5 milliseconds
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2500 + r 2
trarefaction = 5 milliseconds
r radial distance from reactor measur_d along floor
depth of water 25 feet
Because of reflection from the side waL.s 3 the wave recrosses any
point on the floor_ repeating the pressure history at a time after the
initial wave
t 2(30- r)
- 5 milliseconds
for the short floor amd
2(A0 - r) millisec:onds
t - 5
for the long floor. T},e distance to the side wall is assumed to be about
30 feet for the short floor and about 40 feet for the long floor.
Shielding Pool Wal].s
Assume that the floor of the tank is fl_ and a perfect reflector.
Then at the walls 3 the effect of the bottom Js allowed for by consider-
ing the blast as 800 pounds of TNT at floor ]evel. Then from reference
H.I 3 the pressure-time histories at the wall distances can be found di-
rectly. These pressures should then be doub]ed to account for reflection
from the wall. Because of the free s_rface_ there will be a rarefaction
wave hitting the wall at a later time. The times at which the shock wave
and rarefaction arrive are given by
4x2 + 900
tshock = 5 milliseconds
4900 + (50 - x) 2 milliseconds
trarefaction = 5
Short side wall
'x + 1600
tshock = 5 milliseconds
t 416'00 + (50 - X) 2
rarefaction = 5 milliseconds
Long side wall
x height on the side wall measured from the floor
!
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Remarks
Tke effects of the secondary pulses and gas bubble have been ignored
in the hope that they will dissipate themselves. In any case; their ef-
fect should be sinall. The assumptions throughout of perfect reflection
from the walls and floor are sufficiently conservative so as to allow a
considerable margin for error in this respect.
The pressures computed as described above should be at least as ac-
curate as the initial number of 400 pounds of TNT.
If the side wall is allowed to expand and leak 3 but not break_ the
containment tank wall 15 feet beyond this will feel no appreciable load
due to the blast.
FORCES DUE TO A HYDROGEN EXPLOSION
Experiments have been run at the NACA (ref. H.Z) to determine the
pressure-time histories in hjdrogen explosions. A twenty-four inch diam-
eter pipe closed at both ends was filled with hydrogen-oxygen mixtures
and the mixture was then detonated. Side-on and face-on pressures were
measured. Some of the runs were made with the pipe full of water spray.
The water spray somewhat reduced the detonation pressures but did not
prevent detonation. Figure H.5 shows the variation of face-on pressure
with time for a tjpical run with water spray and with a stoichiometric
mixture of hydrogen and oxygen. Mixtures of hydrogen and oxygen leaner
than stoichiometric give somew-hat lower pressures. In the NACA reactor
the mixture will probably be below stoichiometric and the reaction will
be between hydrogen and air rather than hydrogen and oxygen. The pressure-
time history of figure H.3 should therefore be conservative as applied to
the case of a hydrogen explosion in the NACA reactor.
EQUILIBRIUM PRESSURE AFTER AN EXCURSION
The equilibrium pressure in the containment tank after an excursion
was estimated in two different manners.
The value of 400 pounds for the TNT charge was chosen because its
total energy was equivalent to about 820 megawatt seconds. The energy
released by the reaction of the hydrogen evolved from the reaction of 50
percent of the metal in the fuel plates is about 800 megawatt-seconds.
The sum of tme two energies is 1620 megawatt-seconds.
The first method of estimating the equilibrium pressure assumed that
the air in the containment tank was originally at 75° F and 50 percent
relative humidity. For the equilibrium conditions after the excursion it
2O8
was assumedthat this air was saturated wit_ moisture_ and that the en-
thalpy of the air had increased 1620 _:e_awatt-seconds. The air pressure
increased about 0.9 psi and the vapor pressure increased about 1.0 psi_
making a total pressure rise of about 1.9 psi.
The second method used was to assumethat all the energy released
goes into generating saturated steam and that the steam compressedthe
air adiabatically and without mixing. The maximumpressure arrived at
by this method of computation is coincidenta[ly also about 1.9 psi. The
steam wouldj of course_ eventually mix with the air 3 someof it would
condense out 3 and the final condition would _orrespond to the final con-
dition of the first method.
The maximumpressure in the containment tank after an excursion has_
therefore_ been assumedto be about 2 psi.
!
O
_o
H.I. Cole 3 R. H.:
1948.
H.2. Ordin_ P. M.:
REFERENCES
Underwater Explosions, Pr:nceton University Press_
}Ijdrogen-Oxygen Explosio1_s in Exhaust Ducts; NACA
report in preparation.
APPENDIX I
2O9
0
r-t
!
!
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
The philosophy of the containment design has been to make the struc-
ture inside the containment tank shield the containment tank as much as
possible from the forces associated with a Borax-type excursion.
The containment tank and the structure inside it are shown in fig-
ures 2.12 and 2.13. The ability of this containment structure to resist
the forces due to the 400 pound TNT explosion_ the concurrent hydrogen-
air explosion_ and the resultant equilibrium pressure_ will be considered
below in the following order:
I. The reactor tank and adjacent concrete
2. The radial quadrant walls of the shielding pool
3. The shielding pool wall
4. The floor of the sub-pile room
5. The fillet between the sub-pile room walls and the floor of the
shielding pool
6. The shielding pool floor
7. The shrapnel shield
S. The debris from the _00 pound TNT explosion
9. The hydrogen-air explosion
i0. The resultant equilibrium pressure
ii. The containment tank
The presentation will outline the types of loads considered on the
various portions of the structure and the methods used to estimate the
ability of the structure to resist these loads. Many of the assumptions
used in the following analyses are necessarily approximate; all assump-
tions were selected with the aim of being conservative.
Reactor Tank and Adjacent Concrete
The pressures due to the 400 pound TNT explosion on the nine-foot
diameter reactor tank and the two-foot thick concrete surrounding
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the reactor tank sides are quite high (see fig. H.l(a)) and no attempt
was madeto design these structures to hold. It is accordingly assumed
that the reactor tank and the two-foot thick concrete surrounding the re-
actor tank sides will fall immediately. To be completely conservative 3
no credit has been taken for the energy absorbed by this structure. Sub-
sequent calculations concerning the effect of the blast on other structur-
al memberswere carried out with no diminuation in blast pressures due to
the resistance of the reactor tank or the concrete surrounding the reactor
tank sides.
Radial Quadrant Walls of the Shielding Pool
As can be seen in figure 2.12(a), the reactor tank is not in the
center of the shielding pool 3 and consequently 3 two of the radial quadrant
walls are shorter than the remaining two. These two shorter walls3 having
less resistance to the forces being considered 3 will govern the design.
The ends of these walls adjacent to the reactor tank were assumedto be
subjected to the forces shownin figure H.l(a) for the side of the reac-
tor tank (see sketch in fig. I.l). The distance h3 in figure I.l 3 is
the height above the floor of the center of Eravity of the pressure forces
on the end of the quadrant wall. The total integrated pressure force is
shownas F. The moment Fh tends to rotate the wall about a neutral
axis at point o in figure I.l, while the force F tends to shift the
wall laterally. Steel reinforcing bars are olaced in the wall vertically
to resist rotation 3 and diagonally to resist lateral shift.
It will be noted in figure H.l(a) that oeak pressures for the entire
height of the wall are above the crushing strength of concrete. To induce
local weakening of concrete adjacent to the tank3 horizontal reinforcing
steel will be formed and arranged as shownia section B-B of figure 1.1.
By this meansit is believed that except for the initial shock wave of
very brief duration# pressures exceeding the crushing strength of concrete
would not be transmitted to the body of the _all.
Wewill first consider the resistance of the wall to rotation, and
then the resistance of the wall to lateral d_ift.
Resistance asainst rotation. - The moment, M = Fh, produces a rota-
tion of the quadrant wall about the neutral _xis, o 3 shown in figure 1.1.
This tendency to rotate is resisted by the v_rtical steel bars and the
concrete. The concrete and steel would be iu compression at the base of
the wall to the left of the neutral axis, o. The steel to the right of
o would be in tension. The concrete is_ of course 3 assumed to have no
resistance in tension.
The amount of overturning of the quadrant wall can be computed from
[l(Mu + Mn-I)- Wa - MR](tn - tn-l) = Jo(0n - en_l) (I1)
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where
M applied moment due to the blast forces = Fh (see fig. I.I)
W weight of the wall
a distance from center of gravity of wall to centroid of
the compression area at the base of the wall
M R resisting moment due to the material of the wall
tn - tn_ I increment of time
Jo polar moment of inertia of wall about neutral axis through
o (see fig. I.I)
derivative of the angle of rotation of the wall with
respect to time
and the subscripts
n value at time_ t
n
n-i value of time 3 t
n-i
The resisting moment of the material may be expressed
+ M' + M (12)MR = Ms s c
where
M s resisting moment due to the portion of the vertical steel bars
which are placed in tension
resisting moment due to the portion of the vertical steel bars
which are placed in compression
M c resisting moment due to the concrete in compression
When the material is in the elastic range 3 the values of the indiv-
idual resisting moments may be expressed
(I5)
n - i
fs gA (y12 + y_ + y2 + . . .), :Ms n
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M : i fs k3b (IS)
c 3 n g
where
f unit stress in tension bar at greatest distance from neutral
s axis_ elastic range
A cross section area of one vertical steel bar
g distance from neutral axis to fart_Lest tension bar
x distance from neutral axis to partl cular tension bar
n ratio of modulus of elasticity of steel to that of concrete
y distance from neutral axis to particular compression bar
k distance from neutral axis to farthest compression fiber of
concrete
b wall thickness
When the material reaches the plastic range_ the individual resisting
moments are
M s = fspNsA_ (I6)
M' : (n l) ' - (17)
s " fcpNs Ay
I
M c = _ fcpkZb (I8)
where
fsp
N s
x
fcp
N;
Y
unit stress in tension bar, plasti_ range
number of vertical bars on the ten_ion side
distance from centroid of steel tension forces to neutral axis
unit stress in concrete on compression side_ plastic range
number of vertical bars on compression side
distance from centroid of steel compression forces to neutral
axis
!
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The neutral axis can be located 3 both in the elastic and the plastic rangej
by application of the principle that the summation of the vertical forces
on the base of the wall is zero and the summation of the moments is zero.
Using equations (II) through (18), and a time increment in equation
(Ii) of one quarter millisecond_ it was found that the quadrant wall would
rotate 0.00074 radian which results in it lifting about 0.15 inch at
the reactor end. The quadrant wall is_ thereforej safe from the point of
view of rotation.
Resistance to lateral drift. - Under influence of the blast forces
(see fig. I.i) the quadrant wall, in addition to rotating, will be
forced to shift laterally. This lateral movement is assumed to be re-
sisted _y the diagonal reinforcing bars and the inertia of the wall. The
lateral drift can be computed from
[_ i (Vn + Vn_l(Fn + Fn_l) _ (tn - tn_ _ = m(v n - Vn_l) (19)
where
F lateral blast force
V total shear value of all diagonal bars
m mass of wall
v velocity of wall
Substituting appropriate values in equation (19) and using time in-
crements of one quarter millisecond_ the lateral shift was computed as
0.35 inch. The quadrant wall is, therefore, safe against lateral shift.
Shielding Pool Wall
As can beseen in figure 2.12 the reactor tank is not in the center
of the shielding pool_ and_ consequently_ the design of the shielding pool
wall will be governed by the forces and impulses on the section of the
wall nearest the reactor tank. The shortest distance between the center
of the reactor tank and the shielding pool wall is 30 feet. Forces and
impulses at a radius of SO feet are shown in figures H.l(d) and H.2(c).
In the following calculations_ the shielding pool wall will be assumed
to be a ring 30 feet in diameter.
The elongation of the reinforcing hoops in the shielding pool wall
can be calculated from
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where
(Pn + Pn-I ) - 2 (Qn + Qn-i (tn -_n-l)- 2_R
P
Q
t n - tn_ 1
(vn - Vn_l)
(IlO)
pressure on the wall
resistance of structural mm_ers expressed as an equiv-
alent external pressure
increment of time
mass of the wall
radius of the wall
radial velocity of the wall
m
R
v
and the subscripts
n value at time_ t
n
n-i value at time_ t
n-l
In the elastic range
In the plastic range
AEsr
R2
where
A
E s
r
cross sectional area of steel hoops
modulus of elasticity of steel
radial displacement of the wall
(Iii)
(I12)
!
0
['0
fsp dynamic yield point of steel
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Substituting appropriate values in equation (Ii0) and using incre-
ments of time of one quarter millisecond_ the elongation of the steel re-
inforcing hoops in the shielding pool wall was found to be about eight
percent. The elongation to rupture of the material in the hoops is six-
teen percent_ and the shielding pool wall, though _t might crack badly,
would not fail in a gross sense. Because the shielding pool wall would
hold_ the containment tank would be almost unaffected by the blast forces
transmitted laterally through the water of the shielding pool.
Floor of the Sub-pile Room
The sub-pile room beneath the reactor tank is shown in figure 2.15.
Between the reactor tank and the sub-pile room is a section of concrete
and lead. The lead is about one foot thick and the total concrete thick-
ness about twenty inches. The shock wave in the water of the reactor tank
due to the equivalent TNT explosion would be transmitted through this mass
of concrete and lead. The peak pressure of the shock would be well above
the crushing strength of the concrete and the shock wave in passing through
the concrete-lead mass would crush the concrete, break the entire mass
loose 3 and impart a velocity to it. When the shock reaches the concrete-
air interface at the ceiling of the sub-pile room 3 a rarefaction wave is
propagated back through the concrete and lead increasing the velocities
of these materials. The final velocity imparted to the crushed concrete
below the lead is greater than that imparted to the lead and the crushed
concrete strikes the floor of the sub-pile room first transmitting a pres-
sure wave to the concrete of the sub-pile room floor. A short time later_
the lead strikes the crushed concrete layer which has just fallen and
transmits a pressure wave through it to the concrete of the sub-pile room
floor. The resistance of the concrete below the sub-pile room to these
impacts will be considered.
When a strong_ normal shock wave reaches the interface of two dif-
ferent materials_ and both transmitted and reflected shock waves are prop-
agated_ the equations approximately relating the pressures and material
velocities are
u2 -
2u I
P2a2
i +--
Plal
(I13)
P = pau (I14)
where
material velocity
p density
a speed of sound
P pressure
216
and the subscripts
i the material in which the incident shock is propagating
2 the other material
In equation (114), the quantities are all evaluated in the samematerial.
The values used for p and a are listed below.
p a
(sl gs/cuft)(ft/sec)
Water 2.05 43500
Concrete 5.24 15,000
Lead 21.5 41000
Crushed concrete (sand) 1.94 23000
When the shock wave reaches the concrete-air interface at the ceiling
of the sub-pile room, a rarefaction wave is propagated back through the
concrete doubling its velocity.
Using equations (115) and (114), taking into account geometrical at-
tenuation where appropriate, and also the do _ling of the concrete veloc-
ity due to the rarefaction wave from the con:rete-air interface at the
sub-pile room ceiling I the initial velocity of the lead plug is found to
be about 85 ft/sec_ while the velocity of the crushed concrete below it
would be about 140 ft/sec. The velocities @ten the lead and the crushed
concrete strikes the floor, will be about 89 ft/sec and 145 ft/sec,
respectively.
The crushed concrete will hit first, an( then the lead plug will hit
the crushed concrete layer which will transmit the shock to the floor.
The equation approximately relating the material velocities when a fall-
ing body strikes a stationary one is
uf
u = (115)
s Psas
i +_
pfaf
where the symbols are the same as before, and the subscript f refers
to the falling material, and the subscript s to the stationary material.
Equation (I14) again relates pressure and material velocity in the
material.
Equation (115) governs the shock wave propagated in the concrete of
the sub-pile room floor when it is hit by the falling crushed concrete.
It also governs the shock wave propagated in the fallen crushed concrete
layer when it is hit, a short time later, by the falling lead. Equation
I
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(IIS) still governs the transmission; from the crushed concrete to the
floor; of the shock wave set up in the crushed concrete when it is struck
by the lead.
Using equations (I15), (I14), and (I15), the resultant pressure on
the floor of the sub-pile room was found to be about 3400 psi due to the
impact of the crushed concrete_ and a short time later about 4500 psi due
to the impact of the lead. The geometrical attenuation factor from the
bottom of the sub-pile room to the containment tank skin eight feet below
can be estimated from an equation given by Morse (ref. I.i_ p. 513) as
about equal to 2. The maximum resultant pressure on the concrete just
above the containment tank skin is about 2150 psi. The dynamic crushing
strength of concrete is about 5000 - 6000 psi (ref. 1.2). The floor of
the sub-pile room would_ therefore 3 not crush through to the skin of the
containment tank.
The containment tank skin is backed by the limestone bedrock with
all cracks in the limestone pressure grouted. Therefore, even if the con-
crete in the sub-pile room floor were crushed through to the containment
tank skin 3 the metal skin would not move much and_ being ductile 3 would
not fail.
Fillet Between Sub-pile Room Walls and Shielding Pool Floor
The shielding pool floor beyond a radius of about 20 feet from the re-
actor vertical centerline is constant in thickness (see fig. 2.15). From
this radial distance inward, the thickness of the shielding pool floor in-
creases rapidly until the pool floor finally blends into the walls of the
sub-pile room. For convenience, this mass of concrete of varying thickness
will be referred to as the fillet.
The resistance of the fillet to the blast is best considered on an
energy basis. The energy release from the 400 ib TNT explosion is about
5.55×108 ft Ibs. Most of this energy is degraded into waste heat by the
time the shock wave reaches the surface of the reactor tank at the fillet
location. Approximately i0 percent of the energy will remain in the form
of kinetic energy and pressure energy (ref. 1.3). Furthermore_ the fillet
subtends only about 27 percent of the 4_ solid angle around the reactor.
The energy available to do work in the shock wave when it reaches the
fillet is then about 1.5x107 ft Ibs.
Not all of this energy is transmitted to the fillet. A portion of
the energy goes into the reflected wave in the water. The portion of the
total energy transmitted to the concrete is given approximately by
/
/
E C
E1
pwaw _ .
Pcac +
Pc ac/
(116)
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where
E
c
energy transmitted to concrete
E1 energy in incident shock wave
and the subscripts
c concrete
w water
The portion of the energy going into the concrete is about 40 per-
cent. The energy going into the concrete of the fillet is x therefore_
about 6.0xi06 ft ibs.
The volume of concrete in the fillet down to the skin of the contain-
ment tank is about iS_O00 cu ft. The energy required to crush a cubic
foot of concrete can be found by integratin_ the stress-strain curve up
to the dynamic crushing stress. This gives a value of about 540 ft
ibs/cu ft. The energy required to crush all the concrete would be about
8.1×106 ft ibs. Therefore, the 6.0x108 ft ibs of energy which is trans-
mitted to the fillet would not crush the corerete through to the skin of
the containment tank.
The containment tank skin is backed by the limestone bedrock with
all cracks in the limestone pressure grouted. Therefore 3 even if the con-
crete in the fillet were crushed through to the containment tank skin: the
metal skin would not move much and_ being duztile_ would not fail.
!
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Shielding Pool Flo_r
The resistance to the blast of the shieLding pool floor beyond the
fillet is best considered on an energy basis in a similar manner to the
fillet. The quadrant in which the shielding pool wall is thirty feet from
the reactor centerline is the critical one. Approximately five percent
of the energy in the shock wave will be available in the form of kinetic
and pressure energy (ref. 1.3). The section of the floor beyond the
fillet in this quadrant subtends about 3.3 p_rcent of the 4_ solid angle
around the reactor. The portion of the energy transmitted to the concrete
is again about forty percent. The total energy transmitted to the con-
crete is about 3.6xi05 ft ibs. The volume of concrete is about 2600 cu
ft. The energy required to crush the concrete is about 4.6_i0 S ft Ibs.
Therefore_ the concrete will not be crushed through to the skin of the
containment tank.
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The containment tank skin is backed by the limestone bedrock with
all cracks in the limestone pressure grouted. Therefore3 even if the
concrete in the shielding pool floor were crushed through to the contain-
ment tank skin 3 the metal skin would not move much and_ being ductile_
would not fail.
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Shrapnel Shield
The 400 Ib TNT explosion will rupture the reactor tank top and the
water and tank-top debris will move upward and be caught in the shrapnel
shield. The amount the shrapnel shield would be lifted can be estimated
Xn - Xn_l = (Vn +-2-Vn-l-/(tn - tn_l)
m(v n Vn_l)= [A_-n +-2Pn-l-I - W](tn - tn_l ) (I18)
fr om
where
X
V
t n - tn_ 1
m
A
P
W
distance shrapnel shield is lifted
velocity of shrapnel shield
increment of time
mass of shrapnel shield
area of shrapnel shield subjected to pressure
pressure
weight of shrapnel shield
(liT)
and the subscripts
n value at timej tn
n-l value at time_ tn_ I
Substituting appropriate values in equations (I17) and (118) and using
increments of time of one quarter millisecond 3 the shrapnel shield was
found to rise about 15 feet. Since the distance from the shrapnel shield
to the top of the dome of the containment tank is about 50 feet_ the rise
of the shrapnel shield will cause no damage to the containment tank.
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Debris
Most debris from the blast will be slowed downby the water in the
shielding pool to the point where it can do no damage. Debris from the
reactor-tank top will be caught by the shrapnel shield. Of the other
debris, that in the shielding quadrant (assuming the quadrant happens to
be dry) will have the highest velocities. The maximumvelocity of this
debris will be in the part of it which comesfrom the concrete and steel
directly opposite the reactor. The maximumvelocity of the concrete and
steel can be estimated from equation (113) assuming that the steel, being
relatively thin, takes on the velocity of the concrete (this assumption
is conservative). The maximum_elocity of tle steel and concrete frag-
ments is found to be about 160 ft/sec.
The largest piece of concrete likely to be dislodged would be about
the size of a cube with side equal to the spacing of the reinforcing bars.
This piece would weigh about 6 lbs. A similar sized piece of steel would
weight about 18 lbs. Supposeby chance a piece of debris of this type hit
the containment tauk without any diminuation of velocity. The steel frag-
ment is obviously critical. Using an equatiou given in reference 1.4_ the
velocity required for an 18 lb fragment of steel to pierce the containment
tank is about 1000 ft/sec. Even though the eluation of reference 1.4 was
intended for velocities muchgreater than 160 ft/sec, the safety factor
is sufficiently great to assure the safety of the containment tank.
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Hydrogen-Air Explosion
If the hydrogen-air explosion occurs at _.II, it is difficult to esti-
mate _chere the explosion might occur or what portion of the hydrogen would
detonate. The explosion would be most dangerous if it occurred right up
against the containment tank. The pressure-tlme history of the explosion
as _ould be felt by the containment tank for this condition is shown in
figure H.3. The area of the containment tank which would be affected
would depend on the area of contact between the containment tank and the
hydrogen. Two areas of contact, typical of those whlchmlght occur, will
be considered: a circular area two feet in diameter and a circular area
twenty feet in diameter.
The case of a circular area, two feet in diameter, was investigated
experimentally in reference H.3 for hydrogen-o:_gen mixtures. The tests
in reference H.3 were carried out in a long pipe two feet in diameter.
One end of the pipe was sealed with mild steel sheet of different thick-
nesses. A series of experimental detonations Jn the two foot diameter
pipe indicated that while a 16 gage (0.065 in.) sheet would fail, both
12 gage (0.109 in.) and 14 gage (0.083 in.) sheets would not rupture.
The edge of the steel sheet was clamped and the maximum unit strain would
be expected to be greater than the maximum unit strain for the comparable
two foot circular area in the containment tank whose edge has a greater
degree of freedom.
O!
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Since the thickness of the containment shell, 0.7S inch, is many
times the thickness of the 12 and 14 gauge sheets which did not rupture
in the experiments 3 it may be concluded that the containment tank would
readily contain a hydrogen-air explosion with a two foot diameter area
of contact.
The case of a twenty foot diameter area of contact was checked analyt-
ically. The elongation of the material can be approximately determined by
integrating the equation
d2h _ 2g p 8gsh (I19)
dt 2 oH DR2
where
h height of the center of the contact area above the edge of the
contact area
t time
g acceleration of gravity
D weight density of steel
H containment shell thickness
P pressure
s dynamic yield point of steel
R outer radius of the contact area
This equation assumes that the material is stressed in the plastic
range throughout and that the mode shape is parabolic. The first term
on the right represents the effect of the pressure load and the second
term on the right represents the resistance of the material. Equation
(119) was integrated numerically to determine the maximum h and this
h was used to determine the maximum biaxial elongation. The maximum bi-
axial elongation was found to be about A.8 percent and the containment
tank would not fail.
Equilibrium Pressure
The equilibrium pressure in the containment tank has been estimated
in appendix H to be about 2 psi. The hoop stress in a i00 foot diameter
cylinder with a 3/4-inch thick wall due to an internal pressure of 2 psi
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would be 1600 psi. The stress in a i00 foot diameter sphere would be 800
psi. The doors in the containment tank are _Ii designed for a steady in-
ternal pressure of 5 psi with a safety factor of 3. The containment shell
would, therefore_ readily contain the equilibrium pressure.
Containment Tank
The entire philosophy of the containme_ design has been to make the
structure inside the containment tank shield the containment tank as much
as possible from the forces associated with a Borax-type excursion. The
preceding results will be reviewed with this in mind.
The equivalent 400 ibs TNT explosion would destroy the reactor tank
and the concrete adjacent to its sides. The radial quadrant walls I though
badly damaged 3 would not move appreciably as a unit. The concrete in the
shielding pool wall might be badly cracked bl_ the steel reinforcing hoops
would hold and there would be no gross failure of the shielding pool wall.
Because the shielding pool wall does not fail in a gross sense 3 the con-
tainment tank would be almost unaffected by _he blast forces transmitted
laterally through the water of the shielding pool.
The equivalent 400 Ib TNT explosion would crush a good deal of the
concrete in the sub-pile room floor 3 the shielding pool floor 3 and the
fillet between them. However_ though the corcrete might crack clear
through to the skin of the containment tank_ the concrete will not crush
clear through to the containment tank skin. Since the containment tank
skin is backed by the limestone of the local terrain_ which has been pres-
sure grouted to fill all cracks and topped with a layer of concrete to
eliminate rough spots_ the skin of the containment tank below the floor
levels will suffer little or no distortion.
The equivalent 400 Ib TNT explosion would break the top of the re-
actor tank, but the tank-top debris and the _ater behind it will be
trapped by the shrapnel shield. This entire mass will rise in the air
perhaps as much as fifteen feet, but it will not reach the dome of the
containment tank.
There are forces which the structure insde the containment tank
could not shield from the containment tank. F_ese are the forces due to
some of the debris from the 400 ib TNT exploslon, the forces due to the
hydrogen-air explosion, and the forces due to the equilibrium pressure.
It has been shown in the preceding sections t]mt the debris from the
400 ib TNT explosion would not pierce the con_ainment shell; the hydrogen-
air explosion would not rupture it; the equil_brium pressure would be
contained.
In conclusion it may be stated that, though the structure inside the
containment tank would be severely damaged, the containment tank itself
would survive, its integrity would be maintained, and it would contain
all solids, liquids, and gases present inside of it.
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RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS FROM THE RELF.ASE OF FISSION PRODUCTS
The extreme importance of containing a Borax-to_e excursion which is
of sufficient magnitude to melt the fuel plates is indicated by a study
of the hazards associated with the release of fission products. The haz-
ards resulting from the release of fission products to the ground diluted
in water_ or to the air as a gaseous cloud are discussed below 3 as are the
hazards resulting if all the fission products are contained in the reactor
containment tank.
!
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HAZARDS DUE TO RELEASE OF FISSION PRODUCTS DILUTED IN WATER
If the reactor containment tank were to fail and fission products
diluted in water were released to the ground_ the radioactive water
would be contained by the surrounding dike (see section 5.5) and would
leave the site only by seepage through the ground. This is the first
case considered. The other case considered is the combination of condi-
tions which could cause the maximum conceivable contamination of Lake
Erie.
IIazards Due to Ground Water Seepage
In the event of a major accident_ it is possible that all of the
nonvolatile fission products from the reactor core would become dissolved
in all of the reactor water_ i.e._ both quadrant and cooling water. This
water would seep into the ground and move as a unit toward Lake Erie_
following the route indicated on figure D.I_ appendix D_ at the rate of
1-2 feet per day.
Assuming this concentration_ direction, and rate, two potential haz-
ard extremes exist. The first is represented by the active water in well
number 8 (fig. D.I_ appendix D) and the second by the radioactive water
entering the City of Sandusky water supply via the Sandusky intake.
Since the flow rate at the water table level is 1-2 feet per day_
the slug of water would take approximately i0 years to reach well number
8 and approximately 40 years to reach the lake. This establishes the
criterion for choosing the fission products. That is 3 products with half
lives long er_ugh so that the activities built up will be large enough to
be significant_ but not too short that the activities will have decayed
out completely.
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Assuming i000 grams burn up, the important fission products and their
activities are :
Nuc lide
Cs 137
Ba137mJ
Sm 151
Sr90 }
y90
cdll3m
Nb9Sm
s.125
eD125m_
pml47
Activity
i0 Years
490
in curies after
20 Years
56O
91
58O
40 Years
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No information as to yield
1470 280 ii
ii0
iO00
i0
5
.O7
The specific activity at well number 8 is then 0.49 pc/cm 5. The
specific activity at the lake is then 0.077 pc/cm 3.
Although these activities appear to be well above tolerance, i.e.,
above lO -7 _c/cm 5 (ref. J.1)3 two factors have been omitted in the cal-
culation that tend to reduce the hazard. The first is that no ion-
exchange has been assumed to take place in the ground. And second, is
that this active water will be diluted considerably between the time it
reaches the lake and the time it actually rhaches the Sandusky water in-
take. The factors have been omitted because no information is available
on either at present.
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Maximum Conceivable Contamination of Lake Erie
by Surface Water Rur-0ff
A dire picture of Lake Erie contamination results if every possible
adverse circumstance occurs simultaneously _ith an explosion. This may
be shown by the following analysis _ich de_ends upon several crude
assumptions:
i. That a catastrophic explosion of the reactor occurs toward the
end of an operating cycle.
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2. That the containment tank ruptures and releases a major portion
of the fission products to the surrounding area.
3. That the ground is frozen and a heavy rain follows shortly after
the explosion.
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4. That the valves in the surrounding dike (see section 3.5) remain
open and permit most of the released activity to reach Lake Erie.
All of these assumptions can be summarized by assuming that the maximum
activity in the reactor is somehow released promptly to Lake Erie waters.
According to Glasstone (ref. Jo2_ p. 120) the maximum reactor activ-
ity is given roughly by the quantity
1.4P [(_ To) -0"2 -0.2]- - _ curies
where
P 60×106 watts
To I0 days
I0 days + run-off time of perhaps i day
for the case considered here. The maximum activity released to Lake Erie
is accordingly about 32×106 curies.
Obviously this activity cannot be dispersed throughout Lake Erie very
quickly and in the meantime considerable decay can occur. However 3 in the
absence of water flow data for the lake 3 no detailed study of the eventual
distribution of this activity seems worthwhile. The emergency 30 day con-
tamination l_vels for potable water is about 3xl0 -2 _c/cc (ref. J.3) or
about 8.5×10 _ _c/ft 3. Neglecting decay_ the released activity therefore
would contaminate about 4×1010 cubic feet. Each square mile of water 70
feet deep embraces about 2×109 cubic feet. Evidently about 20 square
miles of lake water could be so contaminated_ using an average lake depth
of 70 feet. The waters of Sandusky Bay and its environs are much shal-
lower_ thereby extending the contaminated area several fold. According
to reference J.4_ ordinary city water treatment is unlikely to reduce
this possible hazard to potable waters very appreciably.
If the intermediate level of i0 mc per 106 gallons of water (ref.
J.5) is chosen as a permissible contamination limit 3 the results are much
more adverse. This limit is about 10 -4 times the emergency limit. Since
Lake Erie has an area of about 104 square miles_ it fo_lows that the re-
leased activity assumed above is more than sufficient to contaminate the
whole lake by a factor of about 20.
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There are a number of mitigating circumstances which could be as-
sumed here which would make the situation somewhat more favorable, but
not enough so to warrant detailed consideration here. It was this kind
of treatment_ crude though it is_ that led to the provision of the dike
around the reactor site as described in section 3.5.
HAZARDS DUE TO RELEASE OF FISSION PRODUCTS AS A GASEOUS CLOUD
In the event of a large-scale reactor disaster, if the containment
tank is pierced, some fission products will be diffused in the atmos-
phere as a highly radioactive cloud.
Calculations have been made of the radiation dosages received by an
individual at various distances directly dowawind of the accident. The
total dosage received would be the sum of the external radiation dosage
of the cloud passing overhead; the surface deposition dosage due to
"fall-out" or "rain-out_" and the inhalation dosage due to breathing con-
taminated air. In addition_ there would be the additional hazard of in-
gesting radioactive food or water. The ingestion hazard is difficult to
calculate accurately and its estimation has aot been attempted here.
Dosages have been calculated for a severe inversion and a small lapse
atmospheric diffusion conditions using the Satton parameters a1:d equations.
Two types of reactor accidents have been ass_med_ a clean reactor power
excursion of 150 MW-sec_ and a saturated rea_tor steady power accident at
60 MW. Six cases were computed. The table 0elow is a detailed listing
of the cases.
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Case
number
II
III
IV
V
VI
Type of
reactor
accident
Power
excursion
Clean
reactor
Power
excursion
Clean
reactor
Steady
power
Saturated
reactor
Steady
power
Saturated
reactor
Steady
power
Saturated
reactor
Steady
power
Saturated
reactor
Atmospheric
diffusion
condition
Severe
inversion
Small lapse
Severe
inversion
Small lapse
Severe
inversion
Small lapse
Type of
release
Instantaneous
Instantaneous
Instantaneous
Instantaneous
Continuous
over 24 hours
Continuous
over 24 hours
Height
of
release,
h,
meters
15
15
IS
15
Ground
level
Ground
level
Stability
param-
eter,
n
0.5
.25
.5
.25
.5
.25
Sutton Mean
diffu- wind
sion veloc-
coeffi- ity,
cient, meter_
C _ sec
0.008 1
.020 5
.0O8 I
• 020 5
•008 i
•020 5
In all cases; i percent of the total fission product activity is assumed
to be released into the atmosphere.
Results
The radiation dosages received by an individual directly downwind
of a radioactive airborne cloud are shown in figures J.l to J.9.
The first three figures show the external dosages in roentgens, the
next three show the deposition initial dosage rates in roetgens per hour
for maximum rain-out and maximum fall-out, while the last three indicate
the inhalation dosages in roentgens. An inversion and a lapse condition
are plotted on each figure. The distance to the nearest residents, i000
meters, and the distance to the center of Sandusky, 7200 meters, is indi-
cated on each figure by arrows for easy reference.
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It is apparent from the figures that 3 as might be expected, a power
excursion starting with a clean reactor does not represent as great a
radiation hazard to outlying areas as a steady power accident starting
with a saturated reactor. This is due 3 of co_rse_ to the much larger
amount of fission products present in the saturated reactor and the more
rapid rate of decay of power excursion products compared to steady power
products (t -l'21 as compared to t -0"21 respectively) The worst dos-3
ages, for all cases except one, occur when s_eady power products are re-
leased instantaneously under severe inversior conditions. The worst in-
halation dosage to the nearest residents occtrs when steady power pro-
ducts are released over a twenty-four hour p_riod under severe inversion
conditions. In the table below are indicated the greatest possible
dosages received by an individual at 3 distances of interest.
I
O
WORST POSSIBLE DOSAGES
Nearest residents_
i000 meters = 3200 ft
State Soldiers Home 3
3000 meters = 9600 ft
Center of Sandusky_
7200 meters = 4.5 miles
External,
roentgens
38
17
7
Dc ?osition 3
r( entgens/hr
170
18
3.5
Inhalation_
roentgens
123500
23700
690
Computation of External Dosage
The gamma dosages were computed from th_ nomograms due to J. Z.
Holland_ listed as figures 8.I and 8.3 in re_erence J.6. For the NACA
reactor operating at a steady power of 60 MW for an infinite time_ the
total gamma activity contained in I percent cf the fission products was
Q_ = 5.46x106 t -0°21 c_ries
Ti_e source strength used in all calculations of hazards due to release of
fLssion products in a gaseous cloud is taken from reference J.7. If this
is released at a constant rate over 24 hours; this becomes
_ = 0.0632 t -0"21 Kiloctries/sec
]_s was multiplied by the dosage per Kilocurie as obtained from the nomo-
_!iramat_d integrated over the total time of e_osure of the observer.
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t=_63000Dr(roentgens) = Dosage/Kilocuries x ]o×0.0632 t -0"21 dt
Jt: 
u
where uL is a mean wind velocity of i meter/sec 3 _ is the mean wind
velocity in meters/sec3 and d is the distance from the reactor to
the observer in meters. The total integrated beta dosage in roentgens/
MW-sec listed in reference J.6 was used to calculate the surface body
beta dosage for the case of a clean reactor power excursion°
D6 (r/MW-sec) =
8_I--_ _----_(2__i) exp6 • ,,_z_ _-
where a release_ Er3 of 150 MW-sec was assumed.
where
h is the height of release in meters
n
C
z
is the dimensionless stability parameter
is the Sutton virtual diffusion coefficient in metersn/2 in
the z-direction
Since this is a surface body dosage 3 and in addition 3 takes no ac-
count of clothing shielding_ an attempt was made to take these factors
into account to give a total body dose.
Since the penetration of the betas into the body is small (0.15 in.)3
the ratio of tissue affected by beta radiation to total body tissue is
calculated to be i/IO. This multiplied by an arbitrary clothing shield-
ing factor of 0.53 yields a combined total body and clothing shielding
factor of 0.0503 which was applied to all the beta dosages.
The total integrated beta dosage 3 in roentgens 3 listed in reference
J.6 was used for the saturated reactor steady power case.
D6 (roentgens) = exp
_CyC zd2-n 6.8×1010 d 2-
where Cy is the Sutton virtual diffusion coefficient in the y-direction.
For infinite operation at 60 MW steady power
% = 1.57xi019 t -0"gl Mev/sec
For a continuous release at a constant rate over 24 hours
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dQ_
dt-- = 1.585xi012 t-0.21 Mev/sec 2
and again we integrate over the exposure tim_ of the observer to obtain
a total dosage.
Computation of Surface Deposition Dosage
Using the conversion factor cited in reference J.6_ that a uniformly
contaminated slab of I curie/m 2 emitting gamma radiation of 0.7 Mev pro-
duces a dosage rate of 10r/hr at a point i meter above it 3 the source
strengths were calculated and substituted into the deposition equations.
Q
_rain-max = 1
e_ _ C d 2-(n/2)
Y
n
_Odry_ma x = _ °_rain-max
where Q is source strength in curies or curies/second and _ is ground
concentration in curies/m 2 or curies/meters 2 sec. In this manner the
gamma deposition dosage rates were calculated for both maximum rain-out
and maximum fall-out.
For the beta radiation_ an attenuation of 0.325 Mev/meter in air was
assumed. The average beta energy upon arrival at the body surface was
estimated to be 0.25 Mev. Correcting for total body dosagej clothing
shielding_ and geometry_ it is estimated that a surface uniformly con-
tam_rlated with i curie/m 2 of fission product oetas would produce a dosage
rate of 25 mm/hr for a human being assumed to be entirely concentrated at
a point i meter above the surface.
l
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Computation of Inhalation Dosage
An observer breathing in a radioactive cloud as it passes by will
receive a dosage due to the entry of radioactivity into the respiratory
tract. A rough rule taken from reference J.6, which has been used here 3
is that i0 curie sec/m 3 of mixed gamma and beta fission product activity
would produce an _nternal dosage of 25 roentgens. The Total Integrated
Dosage for_ula (ref. J.6) is used to compute _he number of curie sec/m 3
t_at tlie observer is exposed to.
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T.I.D. = 2Q eXPIc -h2 nl
_C2_ d2-n 2 7-
where C is the Sutton generalized diffusion coefficient assuming iso-
tropic turbulence. The source Q in curies is ___ + Q_ for each partic-
ular case and type of release. The source strength and method of integra-
tion over time for a continuous source is listed and described previously.
HAZARDS IF _ THE FISSION PRODUCTS ARE CONTAINED
An accident resulting in the release of a large amount of fission
products would constitute a serious hazard even if it were contained in
the reactor containment tank. The fission products would be present both
in the quadrant water and in the air in the containment tank. This would
result in a hazard to individuals both inside and outside the building.
The basic assumption made for the evaluation of this hazard is that
the integrity of the containment shell is not violated. With this as-
sumption in mind_ two cases will be considered. Case I involves the haz-
ards due to the gamma radiation from gaseous fission products within the
shell. Case II involves hazards due to gamma radiation from nonvolatile
fission products dissolved in the quadrant water.
Case I: Hazards due to gamma radiation from gaseous fission products.
The assumptions for this case are:
i. The containment shell is a cylinder of volume and diameter equal
to that of the actual shell.
2. The fission gases which are important are:
Br 84 Kr 85 i131 Xe135
Br 87 Kr 87 1132
Kr 88 1133
1134
i135
136
I
The criteria for these choices are that only gamma emitters are considered_
that no isotopes of gamma energy less than 0.i mev are considered_ and that
isotopes with extremely small yields are neglected.
3. The fission products are at equilibrium values. These were ob-
tained from Clark (ref. J.8) for i000 hours of reactor operation.
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4. Instantaneous uniform dispersion of the gases in the shell.
The gamma flux at a distance "a" from the edge of a cylinder due to
a volume gamma source within the cylinder_ is given by Moteff (ref. J.9)
as
BS(E)vC2 e•(E) = 2(a + z) e-( aZ+ Itl+ 2t2)secante de
where
_(E) gamma flux_ mev/cm 2 sec watt
B
S(E) v
C
buildup factor
volume source_ mev/cm 3 sec watt
radius of the cylinder_ cm
a distance from the edge of the cylinder to the detector_ cm
z
_a = _2
tl
self shielding factor_ cm
linear absorption coefficient for air 3 cm -I
linear absorption coefficient for steel_ cm -I
thickness of steel_ cm
t 2 a_ cm
e arctan [height of cyl/2 (a + '_)]
The dose is then computed from this flu_ by means of tables given
by Moteff (ref. J.9).
The results of this calculation are plotted on two graphs. Figure
J.lO shows the dose rate as a function of di;tance from the edge of the
containment tank at various decay times. Fii_re J.ll shows the inte-
grated dose as a 1"unction of time for variou_ radial distances.
Case II: Hazards due to gamma radiatiol from fission products in
the quadrant water. The assumptions for thi_; case are:
I. All of the fission products which are not gaseous are dissolved
in the water. This is approximately 80 percent of all of the fission
products.
!
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2. All gaseous products have been removed from the shell.
5. The reactor has been operating for i000 hours. The activity val-
ues as a function of decay time were obtained from Moteff (ref. J.9) and
from Rockwell (ref. J.ll) using a 6-group energy distribution.
Dose rates were calculated at three positions in the reactor building
(a) i meter above the center of the pool_ (b) just outside the shell I
meter above the floor_ and (c) in the control room. Dose rates are also
obtained outside the reactor building as a function of radial distance
from the reactor.
For the three positions inside the reactor building 3 the surface of
the water is assumed to be an isotropic disc source of gamma radiation
of strength.
S(Z)v
S(E)A ='211w
The gamma flux is given at:
Position (a) by
(ref. J.10)
Position (b) by
_A
S(E) A e -_st
dA
and
Position (c) by
_(E) = S(E)A e-(_st+_AtA)
4_p_
dA
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where
s(s) A
s(S)v
_a
t_s
gamma flux, mev/cm2" sec megawatt
area source strength, mev/cm 2 sec megawatt
volume source strength_ mev/em 3 sec megawatt
Compton coefficient for water_ cm -I
-i
Compton coefficient for air_ cI_
-i
linear absorption coefficient for steel_ cm
average thickness of steel_ cm
tA
h
Pc
Ei(x)
average thickness of air; cm
height above the water; cm
distance from
distance from
e-Y dyY
dA to position (b)
dA to position (c)
For the dose rate outside the reactor building as a function of
radial distance, the source was assumed to be a point source with single
air scattering followed by exponential attenuation. The resulting dose
rates were plotted and faired into the value _f the dose rate just out-
side the reactor shell (position (b)) as calcalated above.
The results of these dose rate calculatiDns for fission products
released and contained in the quadrant water _re shown in three figures.
Figure J.12 shows the dose rate as a function of time for positions (a)_
(b), and (c). Figure J.iS.shows the dose rat_ as a function of radial
distance for various decay times. Figure Jol_ shows the integrated dose
as a function of time for various radial distances.
Figure J.15 shows the sum of the integrated doses due to both the
gaseous and nongaseous fission products as a _unction of time.
The results in all the figures for both gaseous and nongaseous fis-
sion products have been shown "per megawatt/' that is 3 for fission prod-
ucts resulting from I000 hours of operation at one megawatt. These fis-
sion products could originate either in the core or in an experiment.
Therefore, in order to evaluate the hazard from an accident, whether to
!
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the core or to an experiment, one needs only to multiply the dose rate
found on the proper graph by the operating power in megawatts of the fuel
involved.
Dose rates and integrated doses for significant locations and times,
and for the gaseous and nongaseous fission products resulting from iO00
hours of operation at sixty megawatts are tabulated below.
Time; days
after release
of fission
products
0
i/4
I
7
14
25
Just outside the
containment tank
Dose
rater
r/hr
393000
8;600
5;700
1;700
84O
270
Integrated
dose from
time zero;
r
200_000
450;000
1;200;000
l;SO0;O00
1;500;000
Nearest point of
NACA fence - 920
ft (see fig. J.16
Dose
rate 3
r/hr
55
6.9
4.0
.91
.54
.i0
Integrated
dose from
time zero;
r
5O
140
410
470
550
Nearest point of
Ordnance Works
fence - 5000 ft
(see fig. J.16)
Dose
rate 3
r/hr
0.18
.027
.011
.0013
.00045
.00011
Inte-
grated
dose from
time zero;
r
0.060
.160
.650
.950
1.080
The following conclusions may be drawn from the above tabulation con-
cerning t_e effects of the contained release of the fission products re-
sulting from I000 hours of operation at sixty megawatts.
In view of the extremely high initial dose rate just outside the con-
tainment tank_ it is doubtful that anyone in the reactor building near the
containment tank would survive unless they happen to be shielded. Other
personnel on the site further removed from the containment tank would have
to be evacuated as rapidly as possible.
Ti_e dose rates at the nearest point of the NACA fence are high and
certain portions of Plum Brook Ordnance Works would have to be blocked off.
The portions closest to the site would have to be blocked off for a period
in excess of twenty-five days. Calculations for longer times indicate
that the period will not exceed ninety days. There would be ample time
available to warn Ordnance Works personnel who happen to be in the vicin-
ity of the site since the integrated dose in the first six hours is 50 r.
Also, as may be seen from figure J.16, the sections of the Ordnance Works
_ich would have to be blocked off would not seriously hamper the opera-
tion of the works.
The dose rate at the nearest point of the Ordnance Works fence; which
represents the closest approach that the general public can make to the
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reactor, is not too high. The integrated dos__ which would be picked up
at this point in the first week (188 hours) is about 630 mr which is only
about twice the allowable continuous exposure dose of 300 mr/week. The
integrated dose for the second week (168 hours) is down to about 300 mr.
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APPENDIX K
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES IN EVENT OF SERIOUS FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE
O
I
The discussion of emergency procedures in the event of serious fis-
sion product release is divided into two parts: the emergency procedures
with respect to the area open to the public surrounding the reactor site_
and the emergency procedures with respect to the reactor site and Plum
Brook Ordnance Works. These are of a preliminary nature only. More time
and study are needed to provide a detailed comprehensive plan.
THE AREA OPEN TO THE PUBLIC
T_e probability of an accident which can endanger a great many peo-
ple away from the reactor site is believed to be low. However_ the con-
sequences of some conceivable accidents_ should the containment tank fail_
can be very serious. This means that some thought should be given to
planning for such a disaster. This planning is worthless if the system
is impractical to maintain over long periods of time because of (i) wan-
ing interest among those responsible_ (2) personnel changes (both at the
reactor facility and among public officials in nearby communities)_ and
(3) the common human tendency to become less aware of a problem the longer
people live with it. The long term practicality is most important. Some-
one has said that the safest reactor is one that has just started
operatiug.
Any extensive disaster planning is likely to involve the general pub-
lic. For this reason all disaster planning probably should include local
public officials.
There is another aspect of disaster planning which is also difficult
to assess_ namely 3 public opinion. Public reaction could easily become
one of unreasoning fear and objection to having a reactor anywhere near
them_ as soon as the subject of disaster planning is presented.
Complete dependence upon the reactor staff for executing a disaster
plan has much to commend it. Long term maintenance of the plan would be
easier to control. Less hazardous accidents can be handled effectively
by reactor personnel. There is one major weakness_ however. Such plan-
ning assumes a substantially intact staff which remains organized follow-
ing a major explosion. While a major accident might incapacitate a large
majority of the staff at the reactor site_ the guardhouse 3 920 feet away 3
and an administration area 5000 feet away where representatives of the
Health Physics Section will be stationed 3 will serve as points from which
effective action could be taken immediately.
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As explained in appendix J3 the chief i_mediate hazard to neighboring
communities which accompanies a catastrophic reactor explosion which rup-
tures the containment tank is the radioactive cloud which drifts away from
the site. This cloud can be very dangerous under certain atmospheric con-
ditions even as far away as Sandusky. Under more usual atmospheric con-
ditions and wind directions, the cloud would be less dangerous and would
not pass over Sandusky at all. Moreover, the cloud is unlikely to carry
any large fraction of the fission products present in the reactor at the
time of the accident. Under the worst possible conditions it might be
better to attempt the evacuation of communities lying along the path of
the cloud. To do so effectively requires very specific instructions to
the populace within a very short interval, either day or night. Care-
fully designed evacuation plans have to be worked out beforehand and the
proper one announced when needed. There is always the possibility of
mixup and subsequent confusion which might be worse than no plan at all.
This approach requires very swift evacuation _o be effective.
The best plan appears to be for everyone to stay indoors for a number
of hours at least. The heavier the fall-out _r rain-out_ the longer the
severe hazard period in a given locality. This approach may result in
excessive radiation dosages within buildings inder very special circum-
stances, but for the average case is probably adequate and certainly more
practical to achieve compliance.
Sandusky and the other communities in th._ area have no civil defense
organization of record. Any off-site assistallce in warning to the popu-
lace_ therefore_ must come primarily from the local and state police with
some help from local radio stations. Disaste:" planning thus far is lim-
ited 3 and probably will continue to be limite_ to cooperative arrange-
ments between the laboratory staff and these police organizations.
In case a catastrophic accident does occ_r, some mechanism for in-
forming the public will be necessary if there is danger to specific com-
munities. Reliance on radio instruction is likely to be very ineffective_
particularly between i0 P.M. and morning. SoT_e more positiw_ warning sys-
tem is necessary to supplement radio instructions.
The whole question about when and how to warn the public: is fraught
with many uncertainties. The advice of the AEC Safeguards Committee as
regards a reasonable disaster coverage would _e very helpful. Even very
limited provisions for a disaster can consume a fair amount of effort and
expense if the warning sjstem is to have any _ope of being usable when
needed, perhaps many years in the future.
I
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THE REACTOR SITE AND PLUM BROOK ORDNANCE WORKS
Disaster planning for the reactor site can be somewhat more realistic,
inasmuch as at least a portion of the staff will remain which can assume
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responsibility and provide the necessary effort_ Here again 3 detailed
planning must await further study in terms of work being done3 the safety
and monitoring equipment available_ and better information about the per-
sonnel available and their training.
According to appendix J3 an explosion which is contained by the shell
provided for the purpose is also a very serious radiation hazard 3 partic-
ularly to those working at the site. For example_ the following maximum
initial dosage rates have been estimated for a contained explosion:
Distance Dosage rate
50'
I00'
920 '
SO00'
4800 r/hr
1900 r/hr (includes most of site personnel neglecting
shielding by buildings)
35 r/hr (applies to NACA gate guard and nearest non-
site workers)
180 mr/hr
These data indicate that some reliance for emergency service can be placed
upon the gate guard and the Health Physics representative. These person-
nel can warn off-shift personnel and notify Ordnance Works officials.
Those at the site may also be able to help in this respect because radia-
tion damage effects will not be evident immediately after an explosion.
It must be borne in mind that some of them may be sufficiently shielded
that a lethal dose is unlikely. All site personnel must be instructed
to proceed promptly to the best locations in this respect.
Certain selected personnel can be provided with radiation instruments
to be kept at home in anticipation of serious accidents. The same is true
of the gate house and the administration area. By the use of such instru-
ments_ these people can approach hazard areas with discretion and thereby
avoid excessive exposures to themselves. Briefly 3 several teams can be
organized within the various shifts with detailed instructions as to what
they should and can do in an emergency. They would be given responsibil-
ity for rendering all possible aid to site personnel and for evacuating
surrounding inhabitants as prevailing conditions dictate. The composi-
tion and leadership of these teams would be based in part upon location
of homes of members so as to insure having at least one team intact in
time of need.
The Health Physics people would provide the leadership for executing
on-site disaster operations. They would be assisted by other groups ar-
ranged in teams composed of people who are least likely to be injured or
irradiated by an accident. The facility should be provided with a loud
speaker system_ for emergency use only which can be operated from several
points_ one of which includes the Health Physics Office at the site. It
would also help to have all radiation monitoring systems give a limit
242
warning in this same office and in the administration area. These Health
Physics offices at the site should have a permanently connected off-site
telephone provided with underground leads for a reasonable distance.
As presently conceived_ on-site disaster operations planning will
include a detailed study of what can happen_ w_th some decisions as to
what immediate steps can be taken. This is particularly desirable for
each type of fueled experiment. With a properly designed monitoring sys-
tem it should be easy to visualize what kind of accident has happened and
proceed with the proper control measures. These include warnings as
needed to on-site and off-site people_ a check on automatic shutdown oper-
ations (and_ if necessary_ supplementing these)_ evaluating the hazard
level at various check points_ and organizing _uch rescue or contamina-
tion control measures as are indicated.
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Figure 2.8 - Reactor core.
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Figure 2.8 - Concluded. Reactor core.
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Figure 2.9 - Reactor assembly.
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Figure 2.11 - Details of experimental test holes.
258
I
I--a
0
b3
260
0
I
0
L_
261
0
r-I
I
/
o
262
@ - 6_1
t_
!
0
263
0
r--I
I
(d) Sub-pile room plan and section.
Figure 2.12 - Concluded. Horizontal section of the reactor building.
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Figure 2.25 - Reactor geometry for two dimensional simulator, horizontal section.
(Each dotted area represents a grid point of solution.)
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Figure 2.28 - Neutron flux distribution for horizontal section of reactor with cadmium
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Figure 3.2 - Aerial mosaic of site area.
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